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PART I – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
These days, no fiery demand for social justice – or, for that matter, sober discussion of public 
policy – is complete without a demand that the powerful heed the voices of ordinary people, or 
that ordinary people be enabled to hold the powerful to account.  Over the past decade, trailing in 
the wake of an amorphous ‘governance agenda’, the elastic concepts of voice and accountability 
have come to dominate not just the development discourse, but also the language of international 
politics, business and activism.   
 
But the more talk there is of the importance of voice and accountability, the less these terms seem 
to mean, and the less relevance they appear to have for disadvantaged people.  It is for these 
reasons that this chapter seeks to illuminate just what is meant by accountability, and to 
demonstrate why a commitment to genuine accountability – as opposed to initiatives that pass 
themselves off as such – is critical to achieving social justice, equity and a decent quality of life 
for the world’s poor.         
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, two other much-used terms – democratization and globalization – are 
part of the reason why the concepts of voice and accountability have taken on such currency in 
recent years.  As liberal representative political systems replaced authoritarian regimes 
throughout much of the developing world during the late 20
th Century, hopes were raised in the 
power of free expression, democratic deliberation and political choice to improve the lot of poor 
and vulnerable people.  But neither constitutional checks and balances (the machinery of 
accountability) nor the sanction of the ballot (the definitive expression of voice) are proving 
sufficient to make governments live up to their promises.  All too often, their decisions on how to 
spend public funds, administer justice, deliver services, promote national security and regulate 
economic activity favour more powerful social groups.  Even worse, more and more of those 
groups seem to operate from beyond the reach of national politics.  Multinational firms, 
transnational religious movements, international NGO networks, multilateral economic 
institutions – all are engaged in activities that affected the lives of ordinary citizens, but are not 
easily subjected to state, and therefore popular, control.   
 
The failure of democratic institutions and the decline of national sovereignty have combined to 
generated pressure for new ways of making powerful actors, within and beyond the state, 
accountable for the impact of their actions on poor people.  The response has often taken the form 
of efforts to increase ‘participation’, most notably through a proliferation of consultative 
exercises to elicit the ‘voices of the poor’.  Initially welcomed, these initiatives have increasingly 
been dismissed as tokenism.  A growing chorus of critics has sought to shift the focus from 
capturing the voices of the marginalized to holding the powerful accountable.  This, in turn, has 
forced a re-examination of the fundamental questions the lurk beneath the surface of this rather 
ambiguous term: Who is demanding accountability?  From whom is accountability being sought?  
Where are they being held to account?   How is accountability being delivered?  And, perhaps 
most problematically, for what are people and institutions being held accountable?  This new           Page 4 of 88 
   
inquisitiveness, and the increasing frequency with which these questions are being asked in 
normative form – i.e., Who should be demanding accountability? – are indicative of important 
changes underway.   
 
The result has been the emergence of ‘The New Accountability Agenda’.  Existing mainly in 
fragments of conceptual innovation and practical experiment, the basic features of this agenda are 
nevertheless increasingly visible, manifested in a more direct role for ordinary people and their 
associations in demanding accountability across a more diverse set of jurisdictions, using an 
expanded repertoire of methods, and on the basis of a more exacting standard of social justice.   
 
These four elements of the new accountability agenda (which correspond to the questions ‘who’, 
‘how’, ‘where’, and ‘for what’) are still mainly an aspiration rather than a concrete reality.  But 
efforts to put them into practice are more widespread than ever.  In their most promising forms, 
they offer disadvantaged people opportunities to operationalise rights and to shift the terrain of 
governance from technical solutions to a more immediate concern with social justice.  As ever, 
there is a need to distinguish what is new from what is useful.      
 
This remainder of this chapter is organized as follows:   
 
Part II defines accountability, setting out its multiple dimensions, contrasting the principle of 
accountability with its practical manifestations, and distinguishing it from the allied concept of 
voice while highlighting the critical role of certain kinds of voice in promoting accountability.   
 
Part III demonstrates the variety of ways in which a lack of genuine accountability has deprived 
disadvantaged people of the opportunities that a more democratized and globalized world has 
promised, but failed, to deliver.   
 
Part IV details the distinguishing features of the new accountability agenda, surveying a range of 
experiments and innovations that have sought, with mixed results, to operationalize it.   
 
Part V reflects on the main lessons of this new agenda, offering some suggestions on 
considerations that must be borne in mind if this emerging agenda is better to serve the interests 
of poor people.      
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PART II – DEFINING THE CONCEPTS 
 
 
2.1 What is accountability? 
 
Accountability is often derided as a cure-all development buzzword: a fit subject for exhortation, 
but something that in most parts of the world is rarely achieved because it demands too much 
compassion of the powerful and too much undiluted civic virtue from ordinary citizens.  To 
people weary of hearing about accountability – movements demanding it, governments promising 
to deliver it, aid agencies ‘promoting’ it – the concept lacks both practical relevance and 
analytical content.  The sheer ubiquity of the term means that there is much truth to these 
criticisms.  But significantly less so if the virtuous connotations presumed in popular usage are 
replaced with a more clinical, value-neutral definition.   
 
Simply put, accountability describes a relationship where A is accountable to B if A is obliged to 
explain and justify his actions to B, or if A may suffer sanctions if his conduct, or explanation for 
it, is found wanting by B.
1  Accountability is thus a relationship of power.  But it denotes a 
specific variety of power: the capacity to demand someone engage in reason-giving to justify her 
behavior, and/or the capacity to impose a penalty for poor performance. 
 
Even on the basis of this rudimentary definition it is possible grasp at least two key distinctions. 
 
The first is the difference between the two key actors in the accountability drama: the ‘object’ of 
accountability, the one obliged to account for his actions and to face sanction, and the ‘agent’ of 
accountability, the one entitled to demand answers or impose punishments.  Many public bodies 
are both objects and agents of accountability.  Legislators are accountable to voters, but are also 
legally empowered to hold executive agencies to account.   
 
Second, we can distinguish between the two basic forms of accountability: having to provide 
information about one’s actions and justifications for their correctness, and having to suffer 
penalties from those dissatisfied either with the actions themselves or with the rationale invoked 
to justify them.  These aspects of accountability are sometimes called answerability and 
enforceability.  They can also be thought of as weak and strong forms of accountability.  Being 




In practice, answerability and enforceability are equally important.  Both are necessary; neither is 
sufficient.  A system that provides for sanctions alone, without a formal process of reason-giving, 
can make judgments about either the validity of conduct or the appropriateness of sanction both 
less good and less fair.  Moreover, there are often complicated divisions of labour in 
accountability relationships.  Those entitled to demand answers from power-holders are not 
necessarily the same as those put in charge of deciding on and doling out penalties.  In some 
                                                 
1 The basic components of this definition are drawn from Andreas Schedler, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’, in A. 
Schedler, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New 
Democracies (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 14-17. 
2 Ibid, pp. 14-15.           Page 6 of 88 
   
instances, government agencies can enforce sanctions against politicians on the basis of 
explanations supplied to private agents in civil litigation.  In other cases the information a firm 
provides to a regulatory agency can, when made public, stimulate a sanction in the form of a 
consumer boycott.   
 
In other words, reality has a way of complicating definitional precision.  A consideration of the 
practical operation of accountability systems highlights four further distinctions crucial to 
understanding why accountability is of direct relevance to human development.    
 
First, actually existing accountability systems force us to confront the difference between de jure 
and de facto lines of accountability.  In the real world there is very often a difference between 
whom one is accountable to according to law or accepted procedure, and whom one is 
accountable to because of their practical power to impose a sanction.  Which is why the stripped-
down definition of accountability is shorn of moral content: it does not specify who plays the 
roles of A and B, the objects and agents of accountability.  In principle, of course, politicians are 
answerable to citizens.  But in practice they are often more immediately concerned with the 
sanctions wielded by corporate interests, such as the withdrawal of campaign finance.   
 
The conduct of governments, for instance, is often driven by the rewards or punishments offered 
by other governments or by international organisations.  In aid-dependent developing countries, 
de facto accountability in many spheres of government activity is to external donors rather than to 
domestic institutions such as parliament, since the withdrawal of international grants and loans, 
or the threat of doing so if certain policy actions are not taken, constitutes a serious sanction.  
But, again, the reality is more complicated: when aid conditionalities are not adhered to and 
donors do not deliver punishments as promised, developing country governments come to realise 
that their accountability to aid donors is less strict than it might seem on paper.  Such 
governments might, in practice, only be required to ‘answer to’ aid donors – that is, to inform 
them of their actions (and inactions) and to explain the reasons for them, including the 
circumstances that led to non-compliance with conditionalities.   
 
When we hear people talking about the need for accountability, they are usually referring to one 
of two things – either ways of making de facto accountability relationships correspond more 
closely with those stipulated in law, or else insisting that moral claims be encoded into law, or at 
least be followed in practice.  Either way, the emphasis is on placing a check on the authority of 
the powerful, both because their actions affect those with relatively less power (who nevertheless 
possess certain rights) and because those who hold state power do so, implicitly or explicitly, in 
the name of people who constitute a political community.   
 
In common usage, then, ‘accountability’ is shorthand for democratic accountability – 
accountability to ordinary people and to the legal framework through which governance is 
effected.  Accountability is conventionally conceived as a way of providing citizens a means to 
control the behavior of actors such as politicians and government officials to whom power has 
been delegated, whether through elections or some other means of leadership selection.  That 
actors in the private sector have come to assume many more powers than they once did in large 
part explains why they have come to be seen as legitimate objects of direct , rather than mediated, 
accountability.  Their manifest power over the public sphere has subjected them to a demand that           Page 7 of 88 
   
they be treated as holders of the public trust, and therefore a growing insistence that they answer 
to ordinary people, not just state institutions, for their actions, and perhaps suffer direct sanctions. 
 
The concept of accountability can also be firmly located within the framework of democratic 
rights and obligations, to which recent Human Development Reports have reaffirmed their 
commitment, while arguing for a version more attuned to the interests of poor and disadvantaged 
people.  As one writer put it, “Governmental accountability – that is, the duty of public officials 
to report their actions to the citizens, and the right of the citizens to take action against those 
officials whose conduct the citizens consider unsatisfactory – is an essential element, perhaps the 
essential element, of democracy”.
3  Because of its renaissance over the past decade, the term 
accountability is explicitly used in recent constitutions like South Africa’s.  But its basic 
components – such as the obligation on governments to inform citizens of their actions and to 
justify them – have been prominent at least as far back as the United States Constitution, which, 
to take but two examples, requires the president, ‘from time to time’, to provide congress with 
‘Information of the State of the Union’ and when vetoing any bill to publicly state his objections 
to the bill, which are then to be published in the congressional journal.   
 
The second distinction of relevance to the practical operation of accountability systems is 
between vertical forms of accountability, in which citizens and their associations play direct roles 
in holding the powerful to account, and horizontal forms of accountability, in which the holding 
to account is indirect, delegated to other powerful actors
4.  Elections are the classic form of 
vertical accountability.  But also in this camp are the processes through which citizens organize 
themselves into associations capable of lobbying governments, demanding explanations and 
threatening less formal sanctions like negative publicity.  Vertical accountability is the state being 
held to account by non-state agents.     
 
Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, consists of formal relationships within the state 
itself.  It exists when one state actor has the formal authority to demand explanations or impose 
penalties on another state actor.  Horizontal accountability takes a large variety of forms.  
Executive agencies must explain their decisions to legislatures, and can in some cases be 
overruled or sanctioned for procedural violations.  Political leaders hold civil servants to account, 
reviewing the bureaucracy’s execution of policy decisions.  Bureaucracies are themselves 
constituted according to accountability relationships, subordinates answering to their superiors in 
a chain of command that ultimately leads back to political representatives, who wield a variety of 
sanctions.  Accountability systems also empower independent agencies, such as regulatory 
bodies, auditors-general and anti-corruption commissions, to engage in detailed scrutiny of the 
actions and decisions of bureaucrats and politicians.  The judiciary subjects all of these entities, 
and the relations among them, to further mechanisms of accountability by assessing their 
consistency with legal norms and the constitutional division of powers.  In short, governments 
constrain themselves, at least in theory, through a complex web of accountability relationships in 
which the right of ‘agents’ of accountability to demand information and explanations is matched 
by the obligation of ‘objects’ of accountability to provide them, under threat of sanction. 
 
                                                 
3 Robert S. Barker, ‘Government Accountability and its Limits’, Issues of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 2 (August 2000). 
4 Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal of Democacy, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 55-69.           Page 8 of 88 
   
The third key distinction that must be borne in mind when examining the operation of 
accountability systems is the difference between ex post and ex ante accountability.  Ex post 
accountability is, in a strictly definitional sense, the only true form of accountability.  Holders of 
power are expected to take actions, the impacts of which can be assessed only after the fact by the 
agents of accountability, who may choose to impose sanctions if explanations for the decision, or 
its outcome, are deemed insufficient.  But ex ante accountability does exist – for instance, when 
the decision-making process is subjected to questioning before an action is finally approved, as 
when government spending plans must be defended under cross-examination by opposition 
legislators, in which case the exercise of sanction can take the form of parliamentary rejection or 
substantial amendment.  The distinction between ex ante and ex post accountability checks helps 
to underscore the degree to which the frequency of scrutiny and public justification is an 
important variable affecting the capacity of accountability systems to alter the incentives facing 
power-holders.     
 
Fourth, it is essential to note that accountability is not synonymous with either the widely used 
term ‘responsiveness’ or with a subjective sense of responsibility.  Responsiveness is the desired 
attitude of power-holders towards ordinary citizens: we wish them to be responsive to the 
concerns and problems of citizens, to listen with impartiality and fairness to divergent views, and 
to subject all expressions of need and interest to publicly-agreed rules for weighing and assessing 
the merits of claims and cases.  Conventionally, public sector actors have a duty to be responsive 
to the members of the public with whom they interact, but to account for their actions to their 
seniors, who account to the legislature and the executive, to financial auditors, and to higher court 
judges.  The responsiveness of public-sector actors is not governed by the same set or intensity of 
rules, checks, and constraints as the accountability of these actors.  Responsiveness is a product of 
a somewhat intangible relationship between citizens and the state, a relationship based upon a 
culture of democratic tolerance, shared understandings of norms and morals in public conduct, 
and an ethos of public service based upon the trust which publics must, of necessity, place in 
bureaucrats, the police, politicians, and the judiciary when these bodies are accorded the right to 
act as custodians of the public interest.   
 
The idea of responsibility is also closely related to accountability, and is also distinguished by the 
lack of formal compulsion.  In other words, an actor may feel responsible for taking action to 
improve the lot of poor people, but may not be required, technically and legally, to account for 
her actions or non-actions.  Responsibility, then, corresponds quite closely to the notion of moral 
accountability – being accountable to other people by virtue of your shared humanity rather than 
because of some formally stipulated contract that can be enforced according to an agreed set of 
standards.  That businesses speak of corporate social responsibility rather than corporate 
accountability is not a mere difference of terminology.  It is based upon the understanding that 
measures taken to mitigate the ill-effects of business activity fall into the category of voluntary 
action, commitments which are not to be enforced.   
 
The boundaries of accountability are, however, in a constant state of flux.  Political engagement 
of late has been geared towards pushing voluntary self-regulation into enforceable commitments 
– though not necessarily through state regulation.  The objective is to transform the grudging 
admission among powerful actors that their influence over the lives of ordinary people amounts 
to moral responsibility into a more concrete set of mechanisms for achieving de facto 
accountability.            Page 9 of 88 
   
 
 
2.2 How is accountability different from ‘voice’, and why do they matter for human 
development? 
 
Voice is a metaphor for the variety of ways in which people express beliefs and preferences.  
Voice can be expressed individually or collectively.  It can stake out original claims or react to 
official decisions.  Moreover, any of these variants may be peaceful or socially disruptive, and 
may take place within the arenas of civil society, between and inside political parties, through 
interactions between citizens and state institutions, or within the state itself.  The ‘voice’ of 
socially excluded groups may be elicited as part of consultative exercises by public and private 
power-holders, with no promise that their views will be acted upon, or it can be asserted by right, 
with a legitimate expectation of consequent action.  These distinctions do not exhaust the range 
of conceptual quandaries associated with the term, but are suggestive of the many factors that 
must be considered when seeking to understand the concept of voice or its application to 
problems of human development.   
 
The term ‘voice’ is drawn from Albert O. Hirschman’s classic study Exit, Voice and Loyalty: 
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States (1970).  Hirschman classifies voice as 
just one of three strategies through which people seek to exert influence.  The other two – when 
they exist as practical options – are exit and loyalty.  Exiting implies seeking an alternative to the 
existing organisation, when one is formally available, or else making do with some informal 
substitute.  Loyalty implies improving one’s prospects through attachment to the centers of 
power.  In the context of governance, ‘voice’ is understood to describe how citizens express their 
interests, react to governmental decision-making or the positions staked out by parties and civil 
society actors, and respond to problems in the provision of public goods such as education and 
health services, infrastructure, or defense.   
 
If discussions of accountability have grown tiresome, the same is doubly true for the recent 
preoccupation with voice.  Through sheer repetition, the heart-felt plea that decision-makers must 
hear the voices of the poor has lost whatever resonance it might once have commanded.  Simply 
listening to these voices, and doing nothing to respond to their insistent demands, has discredited 
the idea that promoting voice is central to improving human well-being.  The voicing of 
preferences or judgments divorced from the necessity of consequent action is akin to shouting in 
the void – somewhat cathartic but ultimately ineffective.  This has led critics to dismiss the 
‘participation industry’, by far the fastest-growing sector of the aid and development business, as 
little more than purveyors of a sophisticated form of faith-healing.   
 
There is much truth to this.  The vast majority of participation exercises empower people only by 
default – by indirectly disseminating information about government initiatives and beneficiary 
entitlements, or by bringing isolated people together into self-help groups or users’ associations 
required under programme guidelines.  But the information provided is selective by nature.  And 
the groups formed under such externally imposed circumstances are not easily sustained.  Nor do 
they readily adapt themselves to other collective purposes.   
 
Arguably, the most empowering effect of exercises designed to capture voice is completely 
unintended, which is to catalyze indignation at their failure to produce action.  Whether initiated           Page 10 of 88 
   
by government agencies, non-governmental organizations, private-sector businesses, or party 
pollsters, attempts to elicit the voices of ordinary or marginalised people are ultimately conducted 
on terms dictated by the organizers.  They are ‘by invitation only’.  They are the powerless 
answering to the powerful.  Genuine accountability reverses this relationship, making the 
powerful answer to the stifled majority in whose name they act, under threat of sanction.  Hence 
the growing desire to demote voice and focus on accountability.  It is a logical progression.   
 
Or is it?  The fact is that voice and accountability are conceptually distinguishable, but 
inseparable in practice.  For there to be answerability – the obligation of power-holders to justify 
their decisions and actions – someone has to be asking the questions.  And if these questioners 
are to be drawn from beyond the ranks of government itself, then ordinary people must be 
endowed with voice.  But the voice presumed in accountability relationships is very different 
from that of the irate but passive focus-group participant.  The genuinely ‘questioning voice’ has 
access to information about the context in which decisions were taken, including the legal 
requirements governing the actions of power-holders and the public promises made prior to 
action.  Information is never ‘perfect’, and asymmetries will always be a feature of the 
relationship between accountability objects and the agents that seek to hold them accountable.  
But the obligation that power-holders engage in reason-giving, that they rebut charges of 
incompetence and ulterior motive, forces a crucial transition from passive to active voice.  
Participation, within a relationship of accountability, becomes interrogation.      
 
By comprehending the role of voice in the pursuit of accountability, it is possible to see that, in 
addition to its intrinsic value as a freedom that allows people to express beliefs and preferences, 
voice is related to human development instrumentally as well.  There are in fact two ways in 
which voice is linked to human development by way of accountability.  For not only is voice 
used to interrogate power-holders for their decisions and actions, or to render a judgment on the 
need for sanction or the form it should take; the freedom to express opinions – the interplay of 
many voices – is the means by which societies collectively evolve the standards of justice and 
morality against which the actions of the powerful are to be held accountable.  It is this 
‘constructive role’ for voice – a second type of instrumental value – that has been particularly 
evident in the emergence of a new accountability agenda.
5   
 
                                                 
5 Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 10, no. 3 (1999), p. 11.           Page 11 of 88 
   
 
 
PART III – HUMAN DEVELOPMENT DENIED: HOW AND WHY A LACK OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY HARMS THE POOR 
 
If nothing else, recent studies of poverty’s multi-dimensionality reinforce an important point: that 
people experience deprivation across a variety of fronts.  The World Development Report 2000-
01, for instance, sees poverty as characterized by a lack of assets, security and power.  Because 
the multiple forms of deprivation interact with and sometimes reinforce one another in 
unexpected ways, neither the World Bank nor the many other organizations that produced global 
poverty reports to coincide with the new millennium
6 can be faulted for failing to distinguish 
between causes and manifestations of poverty.  They are often one in the same.   
 
This holds true for accountability as well.  Being unable effectively to demand accountability is 
both a part of being poor and one of the reasons why poor people remain poor.  But it is 
nevertheless worthwhile to look at the ways in which some of the critical deprivations that afflict 
the poor can be traced back to a lack of genuine accountability.   
 
This chapter examines deprivations facing poor people with respect to four key areas necessary 
for human development, including access to: 
 
1.  Sustainable Livelihoods, particularly land and fair wages. 
2.  Capability-Enhancing Services, particularly education and health-care. 
3.  Decent Environmental Quality, particularly clean air and unpolluted water. 
4.  Physical Security, particularly freedom from abuse (and neglect) by police.   
 
A range of accountability institutions are supposed to prevent the systemic abuses that lead to 
these deprivations, or to punish those responsible for them and thus deter future violations.  That 
they fail with depressing regularity is evident from the persistence of these deprivations.   
 
As the analysis of case-study examples in this section of the report suggests, however, the 
reasons for institutional failure are not reducible to corruption, defined generically as the abuse 
of public office for private gain.  The failure of accountability institutions – especially those that 
allow human deprivation to thrive unchecked – is caused by two inter-related, but analytically 
distinct phenomena: capture and bias.   
 
The category of capture consists mainly of corruption, but also other forms of undue influence 
that do not, technically speaking, constitute corruption in that they stem from the intimidation 
faced by officials (from, for instance, politicians and the criminal underworld) rather than from 
an interest in direct pecuniary gain.   
 
                                                 
6 For instance, International Fund for Agricultural Development, Rural Poverty Report 2001: The Challenge of 
Ending Rural Poverty (Rome, 2001); Asian Development Bank, Fighting Poverty in Asia and the Pacific: The 
Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Asian Development Bank (2000); and UNDP, Overcoming Human Poverty 
(New York, 2000).           Page 12 of 88 
   
Bias-related accountability failures, on the other hand, occur when the poor remain disadvantaged 
because of built-in impediments to the reduction of the deprivations they face.  This takes at least 
two forms.   
 
First, accountability institutions may simply have no remit for punishing officials whose actions 
produce a pattern of bias against the poor.  In other words, their terms of reference focus on 
procedural correctness rather than the achievement of positive outcomes for the poor.  Even when 
policy or programme design – the eligibility for a welfare entitlement, for instance – is clearly 
biased against underprivileged sections of society, accountability systems are often unable to take 
action, or at least perceive themselves to be impotent to intervene.   
 
Second, there are often anti-poor biases built into the mechanisms through which disadvantaged 
people are entitled to use accountability mechanisms directly, such as the access restrictions that 
face litigants who might wish to seek judicial remedies against powerful state or non-state actors.       
 
The human development deprivations discussed in this section have their roots in the failure of 
four main accountability institutions, each of which fails for reasons of both capture and bias, as 
indicated in the descriptions below:   
 
  Reporting systems within bureaucratic hierarchies, in which subordinates are 
accountable to their superiors, but in which disciplinary procedures are either 
insensitive to the special conditions facing the poor or too remote from the sites of 
injustice that require remedy, allowing collusion between officials and their 
supervisors.  
  Oversight or regulatory agencies that fail to take action against the public or private 
bodies over which they exercise jurisdiction, either due to outright corruption or the 
undue influence exerted by political leaders or interest groups.  
  Electoral systems that fail to create incentives for representatives to promote the 
interests of the poor, or which are infested with fraudulent practices or legally 
permissible avenues for influence peddling.  
  Judicial proceedings that provide little direct or indirect protection for the poor 
because of the limited access they provide, their use of foreign languages, their 
reliance on investigative machinery of biased executive agencies, or simply bribery of 
judges and court officials.   
 
Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that real world case studies of the sort discussed 
below have a way of spilling beyond conceptual boundaries.  Though they are invoked to clarify 
rather specific issues, it should be understood that many of the examples cited relate to more than 
one type of deprivation; that any type of deprivation will, inevitably, have been produced by 
failures in more than one sort of accountability institution; and that each of these failures will 
have been caused by a combination of both bias and capture.   
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3.1 Sustainable Livelihoods 
 
As with the other three categories of deprivation, the opportunities for disadvantaged people to 
engage in sustainable livelihoods is impaired by the failure of accountability institutions.  A good 
deal of this is due to the anti-poor ‘bias’ variant of accountability failure.  Economic policies 
routinely discriminate against people working in the informal sector, and in ways that can be 
remedied only by thoroughly overhauled accountability institutions, such as new performance 
criteria for programme administrators linked directly to pro-poor outcomes.  But corruption and 
other forms of ‘capture’ also impede the ability of accountability institutions to defend the 
livelihood prospects of the poor.   
 
The ability of the poor to achieve market gains, for instance, suffers as a result of corruption.  Not 
only does the unchecked draining of public resources for such public goods as education and 
healthcare impair the market prospects of the poor, but the failure to enforce laws regulating 
market behaviour – which is due more to corruption than administrative incompetence – has dire 
consequences for many of their number.  In the industrial sector, these largely concern labour and 
occupational-health standards.  In rural settings, the problems include land-tenure arrangements, 
credit-market regulations, minimum wages for agricultural workers, and the collusive practices of 
officials charged with enforcing standards in the buying and selling operations of market centres.  
While these examples concern the economic relationships of the poor as producers, it is essential 
to recognise the ill effects that can also befall them as consumers.  When policing of the market is 
lax, collusive relationships between firms and other organised economic agents (such as 
agricultural cooperatives) can impede whatever scant benefits poorer citizens may have been able 
to derive from their productive activities or from redistributive programmes implemented by the 
state. 
 
Access and secure title to land are among the most important assets that can help people to 
improve their chances of a better life.  However, many public actions ostensibly designed to 
promote access to productive resources fall prey to accountability failures.  The Colombian 
government’s National Land Reform Institute (Instituto Nacional Colombiano de Reforma 
Agraria, or INCORA) was founded in 1961 to reduce the gross inequalities in rural land 
ownership.  Though INCORA’s average annual budget in the late 1980s was roughly US$140 
million, its work ‘produced little visible effect’.  Land reform legislation passed in 1994 failed to 
produce better results for the poor.  Parliamentary questions raised from time to time sought to 
obtain at least a degree of answerability.  But this form of oversight is a blunt instrument for 
securing accountability.  The lack of more specific mechanisms of accountability within the 
programme itself was the more serious problem.  The legislation provided for a ‘land purchase 
grant’, but the way this was structured ‘created incentives for collusion between sellers and 
buyers to overstate land prices, divide the surplus between them, and let the government foot the 
bill’.
7  The poor were not in on this cozy arrangement.  Conventional financial monitoring of 
such transactions was never going to be able to stamp out such abuses.  On paper, the 
transactions appeared legitimate.  This accountability failure was largely one of bias rather than 
capture.   The same is true of the role of local tribunals in failing to arrest the secular erosion of 
women’s land rights in Uganda (see Box 1). 
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Denial of Women’s Land Rights in Uganda 
 
Access to and control of land is essential to women’s livelihoods in rural Uganda, where they 
provide 80% of agricultural labour, supplying their families both with food and income from the 
sale of cash crops.  But unresolved tensions between customary and civil law with regard to 
women’s land ownership rights, as well as class and gender biases and outright corruption in the 
local tribunals for adjudicating land disputes, has produced a secular erosion of women’s land 
rights.  A study of the densely-populated Kabale District in south-western Uganda shows how 
local tribunals routinely fail to uphold women’s land rights in their disputes with male relatives 
over the sale of family and homestead land.  These disputes often involve adult sons or male 
relatives harassing elderly widows to relinquish the portion of their husband’s land they have 
inherited, or else husbands selling family land without consulting their wives.   
 
Under customary law in most parts of Uganda, women have fairly secure rights to land use, if 
not ownership, rights which are protected by the longstanding custom requiring husbands to 
consult their wives on land sales.  Under the country’s new Land Act, they also have fully equal 
rights to purchase property, but only 7% have the financial means to do so.  Women rely, 
therefore, on community respect for their land rights under customary law.  Village Local 
Councils (LCs), the lowest level of Uganda’s local government system, share concurrent 
jurisdiction with magistrates over customary matters.  When women in Kabale take their land 
disputes to these tribunals, however, they are confronted with demands for substantial informal 
payments, and they are not in a position to out-bribe their male relatives in order to obtain a 
favorable ruling.  There is also collusion between land sellers and council members to reject 
women’s pleas.  Frequently the LC members themselves have purchased the land in question, 
and there is evidence that LC officials are amassing sizeable land holdings in part by denying 
the justiciability of women’s land claims and their right to withhold consent to a land sale.  LC 
officials also obstruct women’s efforts to appeal negative rulings at the LC level by misinforming 
female litigants as to procedures for appeal, provoking delays that force appellants to file late 
and pay penalties.  
 
Neither the local government department nor the Ministry of Justice have made provisions for 
combating these biased and corrupt legal processes at the local level.  The evident gender bias 
in the functioning of LC tribunals is not checked by any local accountability system, and electoral 
processes are inadequate to correct for this because of women’s difficulties in winning seats on 
the LCs, or in taking a stand against local patriarchy even when they do.  
 
Source: Lynn S. Khadiagala, ‘The Failure of Popular Justice in Uganda: Local Councils and 




Accountability institutions have also fared poorly in the task of ensuring that poor and vulnerable 
people have access to credit for productive purposes.  This happens both directly and indirectly.  
The indirect form arises when failures related to other sorts of livelihood concerns take their toll 
on the ability of people to access credit.  A study of the Kenyan case found that a lack of formal           Page 15 of 88 
   
educational attainments and insecure title over land were the main reasons why, in particular, 
rural women who try to diversify livelihoods through enterprise activities are denied credit.
8  The 
terms of reference for regulatory structures would need to be substantially redesigned for them to 
hold formal credit agencies accountable for biases of this sort.  Fieldworkers on the Bangladesh 
government’s anti-poverty rural micro-finance programmes are known to favor better-off 
villagers for credit, even though they are above the poverty line.  This happens in NGO 
programmes as well.
9  And field workers have been known to turn a blind eye to the fact that 
loans intended for poor women may be used by their husbands instead, sometimes leaving wives 
with responsibility for generating repayments.
10 
 
The more direct route by which oversight mechanisms fail to ensure access to credit for the poor 
involves their inability to detect or prosecute cases of corruption in government credit 
programmes.  This is particularly important as corruption in formal credit markets can affect the 
rates offered through informal sources.
11  A study by Transparency International Bangladesh 
found that people accessing credit from the formal banking sector paid a direct bribe of between 
2-20% of the loan value.  This wide range reflected the diverse socioeconomic profile of 
respondents, but the ‘[l]arger percentages are extorted from uneducated rural applicants’.  
Moreover, these farmers faced higher demands for bribes than the more affluent borrowers 
seeking commercial loans, ‘because the bribe is usually shared with government officials that 
may be involved in the loan review process’, including the many functionaries at the local level.  
The bribes received by local officials ‘percolate up to District and higher levels and neutralize the 
monitoring function of the administrative hierarchy’.
12 
 
But these fees are just for obtaining the loan.  In order to obtain an assurance from rural branch 
managers of state owned banks that they will not actually have to repay the loan, borrowers pay 
up to 50% of the value of the loan.  These promises are not generally honoured, but an audit by 
Bangladesh Bank, revealed that branch managers had forgiven at least 1.6 billion taka in interest 
payments without authorization.  These practices have other unfortunate knock-on effects on the 
chances of improving accountability systems.  The very fact that poorer Bangladeshis are forced 
to collude in such illicit transactions – and to pay a fee for the right to access credit under such 
                                                 
8 Kimuyu & Omiti, ‘Institutional impediments to access to credit by micro and small scale enterprises in Kenya’, 
IPAR Discussion Paper 26 (Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, 2000) 
9  Imran Matin, ‘Mis-Targetting by the Grameen Bank: A Possible Explanation’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 29, No. 4, 
October 1998, pp: 51-58, R.D. Montgomery, D. Bhattacharya, and D. Hulme, ‘Credit for the Poor in Bangladesh: 
The BRAC Rural Development Programme and the Government Thana Resource Development and Employment 
Programme’, in D. Hulme and P. Mosley (eds.), Finance Against Poverty (London: Routledge, 1996); and Anne 
Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta, ‘Who Takes the Credit? Gender and Power in Rural Credit Programs’, World 
Development, vol. 27, no. 1 (January 1996). 
10 Rutherford, Stuart, ASA: The Biography of an NGO, (Dhaka: Association for Social Advancement, 1995); Brooke 
Ackerly, Brooke, ‘Testing the Tools of Development: Credit Programs, Loan Involvement, and Women's 
Empowerment’, IDS Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 3 (1995), pp. 56-68. 
11 Manash Ranjan Gupta and Sarbajit Chaudhuri, ‘Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in 
Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis’, Economica, no. 254, (May 1997), pp. 331-343. 
12 Jamal Munshi, ‘Corruption in the Banking Industry in Bangladesh’, Working Paper, Transparency International 
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conditions – undermines their willingness to play a role in demanding accountability or 
protesting against corruption.    
 
The Transparency International study also notes a range of means by which unsuspecting farmers 
are duped, including one confidence-trick in which illiterate people are persuaded to sign papers 
that they are told entitle them to a grant.  In fact, they have unwittingly agreed to pay back a loan 
for up to five times the amount of the ‘grant’ funds they are given.  The remaining 80% goes to 
the con-men , who form a ‘corruption syndicate’, including local government representatives and 
police officers, ‘to perpetrate the scam’.  The Transparency International study is clear that the 
negative impacts on the poor are the result of multiple accountability failures, each of which 
reinforces the other.   
 
Members of Parliament, the Bureau of Anti-Corruption, the Judiciary, and the Police, 
that might have served as monitoring devices for the people are also agents of the 
political party that controls MOF [Ministry of Finance].… The Parliament's Standing 
Committee on Finance is the people’s oversight agent that is supposed to discipline the 
MOF but it too is subject to stronger agency relationships to political parties. 
 
Obtaining employment and safe working conditions, and getting paid a fair wage (or at least what 
was due), is another aspect of livelihood security that has continued to elude many of the world’s 
poor.  Accountability institutions such as labour inspectors have in many cases failed to make any 
impact, and often make things worse by simply taking bribes in exchange for non-enforcement of 
regulations.  The labour inspectorate of the Portuguese government is facing just such charges.
13  
This form of corruption also drives up ‘employment-related’ costs, reducing what employers are 
willing to spend on wages, benefits and occupational safety measures that would actually help 
workers trying to eke out a living. 
 
As for the self-employed, the obstacles faced by the poor in obtaining formal business licenses 
pushes them into both economically and legally marginal activities such as sex work, scavenging 
or street hawking.  Yet these same marginally illegal practices make the poor vulnerable to 
blackmail and bribery by officials, thus trapping them in self-reinforcing circuits of corruption 





Making a Tough Job Much Tougher: Corruption in Regulating Rickshaw-Pulling in Delhi 
 
Rickshaw-peddling is a physically demanding, dangerous, and poorly-paid job.  The dangers 
and low rewards to this work are exacerbated by the failure of official regulatory systems to 
uphold safety regulations and limit the numbers of cycle rickshaws on the roads.  In Delhi, for 
instance, there are simply too many rickshaws on the streets – at least twice the legally 
sanctioned number of 50,000 choke the roads.  Most are in poor repair, to the point of making 
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the job of rickshaw-pulling thoroughly dehumanizing.  In spite of the fact that there are simple, 
cheap and accessible technologies available for upgrading cycle rickshaws and making the job 
of pulling them less physically depleting, rickshaw wallas do not invest in these because they do 
not own their rickshaws.  Instead, they pay over double the value of a new rickshaw every year 
in rents to rickshaw contractors.  A new rickshaw costs between Rs. 2,500 – 3000, and the daily 
rent paid by a rickshaw-walla is Rs 17 – 20, or Rs 7,200 a year.   
 
Why do rickshaw-wallas not buy their own rickshaws in order to make bigger profits, and use 
some of that money for rickshaw-upkeep?  Why does the state not support this by better 
regulating the number and quality of rickshaws on the roads?  In fact, regulations do exist to 
control the number of rickshaws and to ensure that they meet safety standards, and this is done 
primarily by licensing rickshaws for the low cost of Rs 27 per year.  In practice, this licensing 
system is the starting-point for municipal officials and police to extract, on an arbitrary basis, 
rents from rickshaw-pullers.  
 
For instance, to obtain a license in the first place, at least Rs 500-600 of ‘speed money’ per 
rickshaw must be paid.  This license, however, does not guarantee immunity from police 
harassment.  The Municipal Corporation of Delhi frequently rounds up rickshaws, ostensibly to 
check their legal status, yet even owners of those that are licensed must pay a bribe of between 
Rs 30 and Rs 300 to have their vehicles released, over and above the daily storage fees 
charged while they are held by the Corporation.  In addition, the Corporation can fine even 
license-holding rickshaws for a number of violations, such as missing accessories like reflectors 
or mud-guards.  Fines are Rs 100 per vehicle.  The raids are a pretext for bribery, not a means 
of improving road safety. 
 
The unsurprising consequence of this system of arbitrary capture and charging of rickshaws is 
an erosion of any incentive to invest in safe and efficient cycle rickshaws, let alone to pay for a 
license.  Large contractors operating fleets of extremely poor-quality rickshaws arrange to by-
pass some of this police predation by purchasing licenses in bulk, paying hefty monthly haftas to 
the police, and recovering those costs from the daily rent paid by rickshaw-wallas. 
 
Source: Madhu Kishwar, ‘A Half Step Forward: The Thwarting of Economic Reforms in India’, 




The opportunity even to have or keep a job is eroded by practices that over-ride, due to political 
connections, the working of accountability institutions.  Many of China’s former state-owned 
factories became unviable as a result of asset-stripping and outright looting by managers, making 
the chances of reviving them under private ownership almost unthinkable.  This has become an 
increasingly regular feature of the country’s capitalist transformation, reducing employment 
prospects for disadvantaged people.
14  And the inability of the anti-corruption agencies to take 
action in anything other than a symbolic (and highly politicized) fashion has increased the 
incentive for managers to embezzle resources, since they can do so with impunity.   
 
The nascent efforts of China’s independent union movement to counteract such tendencies have 
run up against these problems as well as the familiar constraints on the exercise of voice in the 
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context of limited political pluralism.  And even in other, more liberal, political systems, the 
power of unions to act as an effective force to demand accountability has received setbacks from 
duplicitous government action.
15  In Sri Lanka the government’s Board of Investment sets up 
officially mandated ‘worker councils’ in free-trade zones that act as an impediment to the 
emergence of active unions capable of either defending workers rights directly or insisting that 
enforcement agencies perform their functions properly.  In Mexico, too, President Fox has failed 
to address the problem of these ‘protection unions’.  And rather than applaud the efforts of the 
employees’ union of Philippine Airlines to engage in voluntary wage restraint in order to assist 
the rebuilding of the company and protect their jobs in 1999, the president’s response was to 
override institutions for ensuring worker protection (including the courts) by proposing a strike 
ban and curtailing the right to association of employees.
16 
 
Another example of an institution that fails to provide accountability in the interest of workers is 
India’s Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR).  The BIFR is supposed to 
ensure that ailing industries which receive government bailout packages adhere to the associated 
terms and conditions.  These usually stipulate that government funds are earmarked for 
investments to upgrade plant and machinery in the hope of reviving the firm’s competitive 
position, and thereby saving jobs.  But not only does the BIFR not keep effective watch on the 
uses to which the company managements put the funds – or compel other government agencies to 
monitor or report on these activities – the BIFR refuses even to make public the terms of the 
revival agreements so that other actors in civil society can make inquiries to see if these are being 
fulfilled.  In many cases, union officials that are allowed access to the relevant documents are 
themselves bought off by company managements, with law enforcement agencies taking a cut to 
continue protecting these collusive relationships.
17 
 
Though there has been much discussion in recent years of the plight of child workers, and the 
need for international agreements to outlaw the most egregious forms of child labour, it is 
important to note that legislation exists in many countries, but is not enforced – another failure of 
accountability institutions.  Human Right Watch reports that Egyptian children employed by 
cotton-farming cooperatives work long hours, routinely face beatings at the hands of foremen, 
and are poorly protected against pesticides and heat.  Most of the children are also well below the 
country's legal minimum age of twelve for seasonal agricultural work, according to the report.  
The Egyptian government has a responsibility to ensure compliance with the country's 1996 
Child Law, but it fails in this duty by permitting cooperatives to employ children well below the 
minimum age for seasonal agricultural employment and without regard for the law's provisions 
governing the days and hours of children’s work. The cooperatives have further subjected 
children in their employ to routine ill-treatment and failed to provide them adequate protection 
from occupational hazards, in violation of both the Child Law and relevant international 
conventions.
18 
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16 Philippines Human Rights Update, vol. 13, nos. 3-4 (1999). 
17 See Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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Finally, while the issue of environmental quality is addressed in a separate section, below, it is 
worth observing that unchecked environmental degradation also destroys livelihoods, particularly 
of poor people engaged in the primary sector or those with no access to formal employment.  To 
take just one example, the people of Manicani in the Philippines have suffered as a result of 
siltation and soil erosion, which has devastated the opportunities for livelihoods in fishing and 
farming.
19  People’s organizations have appealed to a wide range of accountability institutions to 
halt the activities of the Hinatuan Mining Corporation, but to little effect.  Each agency has 
insisted that the responsibility lies elsewhere. 
 
 
3.2 Capability-Enhancing Services 
 
Appropriate and affordable basic services are essential for the poor to enhance their human 
capital base and to make the most of their physical assets such as credit or land.  The key services 
for building human capital are education and health care.  These are more effective when 
supported with other services such as sanitation, drainage, and waste collection, piped water, 
housing, roads and public transportation, without which health problems and time constraints on 
productivity can increase.  Whether these services are provided by the state or the private 
sector
20, all over the world poor people experience serious obstacles to accessing and fully 
benefiting from basic capability-enhancing services, obstacles which are a combination of 
corruption and of bias in service delivery and design.   
 
Poor people in need of health care may have to travel great distances for treatment, may be 
obliged to pay bribes to be seen by a health professional, may not receive appropriate treatment 
or may even be mis-treated or humiliated, and may leave ashamed, unwell, vowing never to 
return.  Poor children may not be able to attend school because their parents cannot afford the 
‘informal payments’ which must be made to ensure that the teacher attends class.  The school 
may be too far away, the quality of teaching too poor, or the risks of abusive treatment by 
teachers too high to make attendance worthwhile.    
 
It is well-known that elite biases among both designers of basic services and those who staff them 
produce a marked preference for urban and high-cost tertiary-level social services, such as 
hospitals and universities, as well as for new and high-technology investments in infrastructure, 
rather than in maintenance of existing facilities or their extension to poorer areas.  This skewed 
distribution of basic services reflects the lack of voice of the poor in determining the types of 
public services that should be available, their physical location, terms of access to services, and 
                                                 
19 Philippines Human Rights Update, vol. 14, nos. 3-4 (2000).    
20  There is much current experimentation in both developed and developing countries today with privatisation of 
public services and public-private partnerships in service delivery.  Private sector engagement in the provision of 
basic pubic services is supposed to increase efficiency through competition.  The introduction of profit motives in 
service delivery is supposed to increase responsiveness to consumer choice, and also, in principle, to distance 
political considerations from decisions on service design and delivery.   See for instance, Richard Batley, ‘Public-
Private Relationships and Performance in Service Provision’, Urban Studies, vol. 33, nos. 4-5, pp. 723-751; or the 
discussion of this issue in World Bank, The State in a Changing World: World Development Report 1997 (New 
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the nature of interactions between service providers and clients.  This lack of voice, in turn, stems 
from a failure in representative politics that carries over to a lack of vigilance in national 
budgeting exercises that could, in theory, ensure that funds are devoted to primary-level services.  
Elite bias in public-service design and delivery is also reinforced by high-level corruption, which 
directs public funds away from basic social services and into investments that produce bigger 
commissions for corrupt officials, such as defense contracts and large-scale infrastructure 
construction projects, and diverts funds from the types and levels of services which the poor most 
desperately need, such as spending on text books and teacher training.
21 
 
Corruption in public-service funding and delivery has other distinct consequences for the poor.  
First, the poor simply have fewer options than wealthier service users for ‘exit’ – for replacing 
poor-quality public services by selecting from a range of private providers.  For the poor, the 
costs of private provision may be even higher than the legal and illicit costs of public sector 
services, because private providers may impose surcharges for servicing the physically remote, 
unsafe or unpleasant living areas of the poor.  For instance, in Angola, one NGO has found that 
poor people on the rural fringes of the capital city of Luanda pay hundreds of times more than 
those in built-up areas for their water supply as a consequence of having to purchase water in tiny 
quantities from private suppliers.
22   
 
Second, when it comes to everyday retail corruption, poor service users, because of their low 
social status and perceived lack of capacity to organize to expose corruption or press complaints, 
may be under more pressure from providers to pay bribes than wealthier service users.  Where the 
poor are seeking their livelihoods in marginally illegal activities, such as sex work or gathering 
forest produce, their legitimate ‘voice’ is even weaker, thus increasing their vulnerability to the 
predatory interests of government officials.  For instance, police officers in Delhi pay 
exceptionally high ‘commissions’ to their bosses for transfers to red-light areas, where earnings 
from bribes are known to be high and regular.
23   
 
Third, the illicit payments made by the poor represent a much greater proportion of their meager 
incomes than do payments made by wealthier service users, therefore impoverishing them 
further.   
 
Accountability instruments such as administrative reporting procedures, professional and service-
level performance standards, and oversight bodies often fail to correct for the social biases 
embedded in application procedures for basic services that end up disqualifying the most needy 
applicants. Long-distance travel, literacy or mastery of a non-local language, or eligibility 
requirements which demand possession of scarce formal documents, become insurmountable 
access barriers to basic services and act as screening mechanisms to exclude poor clients.  In 
Thailand, a string of exclusions are triggered by the requirement that households supply a formal 
registration number given by municipal authorities in order to apply for water or electricity 
                                                 
21  P. Mauro, ‘The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure’, IMF Working Paper 
WP/96/98, (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1996). 
22  ‘Development Workshop—Angola’, in One World Action, Influence and Access – Local Democracy and Basic 
Service Provision (London, 1999), p 23. 
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connections.  Informal housing erected in low-income or slum neighborhoods generally does not 
qualify for formal registration.  Yet, without this registration number, parents cannot register the 
birth of their children, and without birth certificates, later on these children will not be able to 
enroll in school.
24  In Egypt, an identity card is needed in order to qualify for state services such 
as social security, pensions, credit programmes, as well as to get a passport, driving license, or 
register a complaint with the police.  A gender bias in the distribution of these cards creates 
access barriers to essential public services, particularly for female heads of household (see Box 
3).  Accountability institutions will remain unable to address these problems until they adopt new 






Female Heads of Households’ Access to Social Security 
 
In Egypt, without an identity card, the poor have great difficulty accessing subsidized goods, 
social welfare services, or getting their children into school.  Identity cards, however, are not 
evenly distributed by gender.  Because a woman’s name can be added as a dependant on her 
father’s and later her husband’s identity card, girls and women tend not to be issued their own 
identity cards.  Great care is taken to ensure that all boys and men, however, have ID cards, as 
Egypt’s policy of compulsory conscription relies upon monitoring ID cards to ensure that all 
eligible men are drafted into the army, and men are penalized if they do not have their ID cards 
in order.   
 
The registration of women as dependants on their fathers’ and husbands’ ID cards has two 
implications for their capacity to access public services.  First, it means that their engagement 
with public service providers is mediated by male relatives, and presumably only done with male 
approval, thus reproducing aspects of female subordination to men within the family.  Second, in 
cases of separation or divorce where women have left husbands or their natal families, they are 
left without a formal identity card of their own, and thus are stripped of an essential access 
requirement to the very public services for which they now have the greatest need.  One Cairo-
based NGO working with rural immigrant female heads of household in slum areas found that 
large numbers of these women lacked identity cards, and did not, therefore, access state welfare 
services.  Yet the procedures for obtaining one were utterly intimidating to the illiterate women 
with whom they worked.  They included obtaining a birth certificate, which necessitated a return 
to their natal village and embarking upon a string of applications there, and also obtaining the 
support of two government employees to confirm the applicant’s identity and stamp her form.  
Even when these near-impossible, time-consuming and costly requirements were met, the final 
hurdle was filing the application in a police station, where women feared they would be subject 
to harassment and unnecessary delays. 
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Source:   Iman Bibars, Victims and Heroines: Women, Welfare, and the Egyptian State, 
(London: Zed Press, 2001), p. 17-19; Heba el-Kholy, ‘Panel discussion on women-headed 




Where poor people overcome access barriers to public services, they may encounter a fresh set of 
problems:  contemptuous treatment by service providers, or else discrimination in service 
provision that endows poor clients with less of the public resource which is their due.  Examples 
abound of high-handed, patronizing, rude, or outright abusive nurses, teachers, police, and local 
government officers (see Box 4 on the abuse of maternity patients by nurses in South Africa).  
Service providers may distinguish clients for abuse on grounds other than class.  For instance, 
girls in many schools in Africa and elsewhere are the targets of sexual harassment and even rape 
by male teachers.
25   
 
Where service providers use their discretion to deny full services to their least privileged clients, 
patterns of discrimination may follow class, race, ethnic, or gender lines.  Health care workers in 
India, for example, selectively provide less information on contraceptive choices and side-effects 
to poorer women or women from remote areas.
26  In Benin, elite and peasant patients receive 
radically different types of care from the same overworked nurses and midwives in the same 
service.
27  Accountability institutions that do not punish this behavior, or even reward it – when, 
for instance, school teachers are not punished for sexually abusing students, but pregnant girls are 
forced to leave school – are in need of reform.  Accountability and responsiveness problems at 
this level are a product of difficult work conditions and an inadequate or non-existent 
professional service ethos.  Workers who are demoralized, under-paid, and poorly resourced will 
seek to control the variety of demands which clients place upon them by limiting the information 
about services that they offer, limiting their contact with socially marginal clients, and 






Abuse of Patients by Nurses in South Africa 
 
Research on primary obstetric public health services in black and colored areas of the Western 
Cape Province of South Africa documents abusive treatment of maternity patients by midwives 
                                                 
25  Fiona Leach and Pamela Machakanja, with Jennifer Mandoga, Preliminary Investigation of the Abuse of Girls in 
Zimbabwean Junior Secondary Schools, UK Department for International Development, Serial No. 39 (London, 
2000), pp. 17-20. 
26  N. Murthy, ‘The Quality of Family Welfare Services in Rural Maharashtra: Insights from a Client Survey’, in M. 
Koenig and M.E. Khan (eds), Improving Quality of Care in India’s Family Welfare Programme: The Challenge 
Ahead (New York: Population Council, 1999). 
27  C. Sargent, Maternity, Medicine, and Power:  Reproductive Decisions in Urban Benin (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989).           Page 23 of 88 
   
and nurses.  Abuse of women in ante-natal clinics included expressions of contempt, moral 
lecturing of unmarried mothers, and violation of patient confidentiality.  Abuse of women patients 
in labour and post-natal women included verbal assaults, unreasonable demands to clean the 
floor or the linen, deliberate neglect of women in pain, and physical assaults such as slapping or 
beating women before, during, and after delivery.  Abuse varied in intensity according to the 
class, race, and marital status of patients, with young black single mothers coming in for 
particularly punitive treatment.  Nurses and midwives also imposed demanding entry-point rituals 
on expectant mothers, in order to limit their own work burdens and, in the process, socialize 
pregnant women into deferential attitudes towards the medical staff.  For instance, in one 
obstetric clinic in an African township (Kwazola) with a quota of 30 new patients per day, nurses 
told expectant mothers that in order to be sure of a booking for their delivery, they would have to 
begin queuing by 3:00 or 3:30 a.m. for the 7:00 a.m. opening.  Many pregnant women were 
reluctant to travel at that hour, given the distances they had to cover, the lack of public transport 
in the middle of the night, and the dangers of attack in the townships.  This draconian 
requirement, however, kept bookings low, much lower than the clinic’s quota. 
 
Abusive treatment of clients is enabled by failures in formal and informal accountability systems.  
Formal systems of administrative control, performance assessment, and grievance-redressal, 
fail to register or punish maltreatment of patients.  Although procedures exist to sanction staff 
who abuse patients, senior managers in the medical system say they can only act if specific 
complaints are made by patients.  But patients rarely register formal complaints for fear of 
victimization and further abuse, or because their contact with the obstetrics system is so 
irregular that there seems little point in investing in improvements.  Incentive and promotion 
systems likewise fail to note or punish abuse of patients, partly because the local nursing culture 
condones controlling behaviour.  Salaries are at their lowest in primary health care clinics, and 
good performance at this level of the health care system does not trigger a rise through the 
ranks.  On the contrary, primary obstetrics clinics can be the ‘retirement posting’ for nurses or 
midwives whose careers are felt to be over.   
 
Informal accountability systems – the professional nursing ethics imparted through training and 
socialization in health facilities, or through nurses’ professional associations – may even 
exacerbate these problems.  Ideologies of patients’ inferiority and nurses’ intellectual and moral 
superiority, not an ethic of care and respect for patients, tend to be transmitted in these arenas.  
These accountability failures, combined with the relatively weak voice of a dispersed female 
clientele who are not in contact with the service in a sustained way over time, produce a poor-
quality service and a longer-term negative impact on maternal health care. 
 
Sources:  Rachel Jewkes, Naeemah Abrahams and Zodumo Mvo, ‘Why do Nurses Abuse 
Patients?  Reflections from South African Obstetric Services’, Social Science and Medicine, vol. 
47, no. 11, 1998, pp. 1781-95; and Shula Marks, Divided Sisterhood (Johannesburg: 




Failures in reporting, audits, and disciplinary procedures within service bureaucracies allow 
corruption to thrive.  The checks on impropriety which should occur via the upward flow of 
reporting and accounting within bureaucracies are easily undermined by collusion between 
superiors and subordinates.  The clearest expression of this are the ‘cuts’ received by higher-level           Page 24 of 88 
   
officials for any illicit incomes earned by lower-level staff from bribes or sheer theft of funds, as 
seen in the example of the distribution of earnings from public works programmes in Nepal (Box 







Systematized Corruption in Nepal’s Public Works Bureaucracy 
 
The cost of diverting or disabling the accountability mechanism represented by each point in 
administrative hierarchies at which officers report on their actions, or are subjected to oversight 
reviews or audits, is represented by the payments that lower-level officers pay to those higher 
up. In Nepal as elsewhere corruption is said to be ‘systemic’ in that it pervades most of the 
public administration, and ‘systematized’ in that there is a ‘ladder’ of payments out of illicit 
earnings from lower to higher officers in the hierarchy.  These payments follow fairly 
standardized percentages or ‘cuts’ of the illicit earning.  Sometimes called ‘commissionisation’, 
this puts great pressure on lower-level civil servants to charge bribes to clients or simply to 
misappropriate funds meant for public goods.  In the Department of Roads and Irrigation, a 
typical distribution system for the distribution of ‘black money’ is as follows: 
 
-10% to the district audit office 
-10% to local politicians; or if they are not there, to local engineers and overseers 
-25% to the direct overseer 
-15% to the district engineer 
- 35% to the overseeing accountant, the Department, and the Ministry in equal amounts 
- 5% for entertainment costs. 
 
This arrangement reflects the bargaining position of each control point on the government 
hierarchy.   
 
Posts within the civil service are ‘auctioned’ according to the rents likely to be earned.  A large 
extractable surplus is made in new infrastructure projects through rigged bidding processes for 
contracts, over-invoicing for materials and labour, manipulation of labour productivity norms and 
wage rates, and routine outright seizing and resale of subsidized materials or grain for labour 
payments.  In the case of anti-poverty public works programmes such as Food-for-Work or 
drought relief rural works programmes the result of over-estimation and under-invoicing is that 
40%-50% of budgeted resources are shared among cooperating contractors, government 
engineers, local bureaucrats, ministry supervisors and auditors. 
 
Sources:  Patrick Meagher, ‘Roads Without Destinations: A Case Study of Governance and 
Rural Infrastructure in Nepal’, Working Paper no. 246 (College Park, Maryland: Center for 
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, January 2000), pp. 4-5, 15-17; M. Beier, K. 
Upadhyaya, and H. Achanga, ‘Using Food-for-Work to Promote Self-Help and Participation: 
Experiences form a Nepalese Emergency Project with Long-term Benefits’, Mid-Term Evaluation 
for the Ministry of Forestry (Kathmandu, 1993); Edward Clay, ‘Rural Public Works and Food-for-
Work: A Survey’, World   Development, vol. 14, no. 10/11 (1986). 
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Beyond the failure of audit institutions and oversight agencies to control for corruption in funding 
for and the delivery of services, inadequate disciplinary and reporting systems within the public 
administration are the greatest culprits for the many exclusions, humiliations and poor-quality 
services endured by the poor.   Performance standards used to asses quality in public services 
may fail to measure whether access barriers to the poor have been lowered, or to assess whether 
their particular needs in relation to services such as health, education or housing are addressed.  
Regulatory oversight bodies and licensing systems run by independent or government-supported 
professional bodies are very unlikely to report to the disadvantaged clients of services; their 
reporting patterns are oriented towards the top levels of the bureaucracy and government.  
Informal accountability institutions that cultivate quality controls among service providers, like 
the peer reviews and self-regulation that are provided by medical associations or teacher training 
systems, may not only fail to encourage professionals to address the particular problems and 
needs of the poor, but usually function to preserve the self-interests of professionals over their 
clients. 
   
 
3.3 Decent Environmental Quality 
 
Stories of poor people suffering ill health or losing their livelihoods as a result of environmental 
degradation emerge with depressing regularity in newspaper articles, NGO briefings, and the 
reports of government agencies and international organisations.  Rivers polluted by industrial 
effluents, once-fertile soil become too salty to farm.  The causes of policy failure are often 
complex, involving local contingencies and forces operating from much further afield.  But the 
disastrous impacts on the well-being of the poor can almost always be traced back to a lack of 
genuine accountability.   
 
This may seem simply a different way of expressing a familiar grim fact – that those who suffer 
have no power, or no ‘voice’ in the decisions that affect their lives.  But this is not always, strictly 
speaking, the case.  There is often ample scope for free expression: the chance to march in protest 
demonstrations, speak at local public hearings, comment on the findings of environmental impact 
assessments.  But the offending projects – whether government dams (see Box 6) or private-
sector factories – so often go ahead anyway.   
 
Why?  Because officials responsible for assessing risks and enforcing regulations have few 
incentives to perform either task with the diligence which they are duty-bound to employ.  The 
chances of being penalized for faulty decisions after the fact – even when they were made in the 
face of clearly articulated, fully documented and logically incontrovertible opposition – are 
minute.  Which means that at the time clearly environmentally disastrous projects are being 
approved, the formal obligation of public office-holders to answer for their provisional decisions, 
to justify them on the basis of firm and independently verified evidence, are met with shoddy 
reasoning and cavalier indifference – mockery of answerability.  In other words, when the 
institutions of ex post accountability are lacking, ex ante voice has almost no chance of being 
heeded.   
 
The effects of both sorts of failure have been felt by Thai villagers living in the basin of the Mae 
Klong river.  They have borne the environmental brunt of industrialization in the region.  After a           Page 26 of 88 
   
local dumpsite used by the Siam Pulp and Paper Company was flooded in 1996, people in the 
villages of Wang Sala and Chuk Matum were exposed to contaminated water from their wells.  
People who were already poor were forced to pay for water from clean sources.  In theory, the 
firm’s activities were subject to a range of regulatory controls.  Regulations of the Ministry of 
Industry, administered by its Factory Control and Inspection Bureau, oblige firms to line the base 
of waste disposal sites with plastic sheeting in order to protect the soil from contamination.  In 
addition, rules issued by the Science and Technology Ministry’s Pollution Control Department 
required sites to have their foundations compressed by a mechanized roller, so that the soil would 
be compact enough to minimize the risk of leakage.  The inability of these agencies to enforce 
these rules is a classic form of accountability failure.  While no credible proof of corruption was 
produced to explain this failure, officials in Thailand’s regulatory agencies (like those in many 
countries) are notoriously prone to bribery by those who should be the subject of their scrutiny.   
 
But in the case of Wang Sala, two other, more subtle, causes were at work besides corruption.  
First, the failure of accountability agencies to perform their allotted functions was hampered by 
the existence of intermediaries.  Siam Pulp and Paper did not directly perform the site 
preparation, nor was it directly involved in the haulage, waste disposal or site management 
activities.  Its much smaller subcontractor could more easily conceal its activities from regulators.  
Second, the ability of direct pressure by local residents to compel government agencies to take 
action was limited by their already insecure livelihood prospects.  For many, employment with 
the company was their only hope of a better wage.  Fear of losing their jobs made them refrain 
from open criticism or protest action.  One local youth told a visiting researcher: ‘My parents 
warned me not to speak out against the factory, because that is where I can get a job in the 
future’.  Intimidation – linked to, but distinct from, corruption per se – is a major reason why 
there is insufficient pressure on regulators to enforce rules that should protect the poor. 
 
Corruption, on the other hand, is a major reason why accountability institutions in South-East 
Asia have failed to stem the air pollution problems that afflict the region.  In 1995 Indonesia 
placed a ban on burning forest to clear land, but plantation owners regularly flouted it.  The 
executive director of the Rubber Association of Indonesia explained that burning was much 
cheaper than manual clearing, and that paying off local officials to turn a blind eye to persistent 
violations was relatively simple and straightforward.  Bribes in fact flowed into many levels of 
the bureaucracy, and were shared out up and down the administrative hierarchy, ensuring a 
conspiracy of silence in which supervisors were almost guaranteed not to penalise junior officers 
for their obvious failure to enforce regulations, and juniors (if they knew what was good for 
them) returned the favour by not whistle-blowing on their senior colleagues.  It was only when 
the annual ‘haze’ began to spread over Malaysia and Singapore in 1997, forcing Indonesia to 
declare a national emergency, that international embarrassment catalysed a crackdown.  This did 
little more than show up the lack of domestic accountability.
28   The fact is that the 1997 burning 
was not the worst to have affected Indonesia, and poor farmers had long suffered ill-health and 
damaged crops.  But not only had they not been protected; the government had pinned the blame 
on farmers’ ‘slash-and-burn’ agricultural practices.   
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Though Indonesia’s government has stepped up indirect forms of accountability in more recent 
years – for instance naming and shaming corporate culprits – Malaysia has not taken the idea of 
information-led accountability to heart.  Even when Indonesian forest fires were affecting 
Malaysia in the summer of 2001, the Malaysian government still refused to release data on the 
extent of air pollution or its likely health effects, fearing bad publicity would harm the tourist 
industry.  This is consistent with the failure of Malaysia’s regulatory bodies to skirt 
accountability by siding with powerful interests rather than with ordinary or disadvantaged 
citizens.  The country’s Clean Air Action plan was torpedoed by a group of influential ministers 
in 1994 on the grounds that it would be ‘too costly’.
29   
 
Accountability agencies not only fail to protect the environmental quality experienced  by the 
poor, they often collude in covering up serious abuses.  In November 1998, nearly 3000 tons of 
toxic waste were dumped in an open field in the southern town of Sihanoukville, Cambodia.  
Scavengers combing through the waste soon fell sick.  One person reportedly died.  Instead of 
conducting the thorough investigation they had promised, Cambodian politicians arrested 
protestors who had blamed corruption for the failure of the authorities to uphold environmental 
standards.  A few low-level officials were arrested, but these are widely seen as scapegoats.  
Back-up mechanisms of accountability also failed.  As a Human Rights Watch Report put it, ‘the 
judicial process against those responsible for the public health menace falls short of providing the 
thorough investigation and accountability promised by the Cambodian government and ensuring 







Social and Environmental Impacts of Accountability Failures in Big Dam Projects 
 
The lack of accountability in large dams projects around the world has led to adverse social and 
environmental consequences for disadvantaged people.  The depletion of fish stocks, the water-
logging of land and the loss of forest cover have directly affected the livelihoods of poor people 
reliant on these vital resources.  The social costs include involuntary relocation of thousands of 
people, a high proportion of whom come from marginalised groups such as indigenous 
communities.  This in turn leads to many further deprivations including a decline in the standard 
of living, an increase in health problems (including infant mortality and morbidity), and livelihood 
insecurity due to the loss of common  property resources.  
 
Dam-building agencies have rarely been accountable, and have been notably un-transparent in 
the way they implement these projects.  The failures of the conventional channels of 
accountability – from elections to courts to regulatory bodies – stem from both outright corruption 
and more subtle forms of policy bias.  Both sources of failure are found in the much criticized 
World Bank-funded dam in Lesotho.  Allegations of large-scale bribery have been widespread.  
This, for some critics, explains why the project was initiated without the critical environmental 
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studies on erosion and downstream impacts.  Moreover, pervasive corruption in the project is 
thought to have made that the social fund, which accompanied this project of virtually no use to 
the affected communities.  Anti-poor biases in the operating procedures of the relevant 
accountability agencies were also in evidence: none of the regulatory bodies, nor even the 
courts, were prepared to challenge the fact that the poor in South Africa's townships, who suffer 
from water inequity dating to apartheid, will not be able to afford the project's expensive water.  
 
A more general bias-related accountability failure is the routine practice of overlooking gender 
differentials in the impacts of large dams. These include the widening of gender disparities in a 
society, either by imposing a disproportionate share of costs on women or through unequal 
allocation of benefits generated.  For example, in Sri Lanka, the Mahaveli project introduced 
tenure arrangements that undermined women's rights to own and control land. The Sardar 
Sarovar Project in India neither allocates land in the name of married women nor compensates 
them for the loss of income previously generated through the collection of forest products.   
 
Oversight mechanisms designed to increase the accountability of project implementation 
agencies for the impact of their actions on women have been a huge disappointment.  For 
example, even though the Asian Development Bank approved a gender policy in 1998, a review 
of its dam projects indicates that the projects were largely oblivious to gender aspects of forced 
displacement.  The World Bank's Operation Evaluations Department acknowledges that 
commitments to respect the specific needs of women have been ignored. The World 
Commission on Dams has issued excellent guidelines that include the need for informed and 
prior consent of indigenous people's and ethnic minorities, public acceptance before it is 
implemented and a thorough investigation of alternative projects.  But they risk being ignored by 
countries and by agencies such as the World Bank, which is in fact watering down its own 
resettlement guidelines. 
 
These norms continue to be flouted with impunity by national dam-building agencies. A good 
case in point is the proposed Ilisu dam in Turkey.  The project is expected to create a large 
reservoir of 300 sq kms, violating the rights of thousands of Kurdish people.  Internationally 
accepted practice dictates that an Environmental Impact Assessment Report (EIAR) for projects 
involving involuntary resettlement should include a full resettlement action plan.  The Ilisu EIAR 
has produced only a partial plan – failing, for instance, to incorporate an 'indigenous peoples 
plan' or to assess the legal rights of the Kurdish minority – and even this has not been disclosed 
to those affected by resettlement.  This undermines the capacity of opponents of the dam to 
demand further justification for the proposed actions.  It is clear that the mere existence of 
international guidelines cannot produce accountability if oversight agencies lack the political will 
to enforce them, or if – as is often the case – there is no one that can be held accountable when 
agencies pass the buck among themselves.  
 
Sources: Lyla Mehta, ‘Beyond the World Commission on Dams’, Science and Public Affairs 
(February 2001); World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for 
Decision-making (London: Earthscan, 2000), Corner House Research et al, ‘Resettlement: 
Review of EIAR for the Ilisu Dam and HEPP’, mimeo, September 2001. 
 
 
Another case of a cover-up – undermining the official transparency on which accountability must 
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for poor communities came to the attention of doctors at Dhaka Community Hospital (DCH) in 
1996.
31  But the government had been warned of contamination in 1984, and found at least one 
arsenic-contaminated well, though it refused to make the information public, and none of the 
oversight agencies was able to force it to do so.  Wells continued to be built.  In 1993 both the 
government and the WHO were officially informed through a letter sent by an Indian doctor, an 
international expert on arsenic.  But still no action was taken.  In 1995 a delegation of 
representatives of the government and the Bangladesh offices of UN agencies went to an 
international conference on arsenic poisoning in Calcutta but on their return they continued 
sinking tubewells and refused to acknowledge the existence of arsenic.  Internal accountability 
procedures were unable to force them to do so.  When the DCH attempted to expose the problem, 
its doctors were accused by the government of being ‘scaremongers’ and officials attempted to 
intimidate the media into not reporting news of the allegations.  
 
Finally, in January 1997, survey results from 14 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts were published 
showing high levels of arsenic toxicity in tubewell water.  It was another three months before the 
problem was publicly acknowledged in a WHO statement saying that arsenic in drinking water 
was a ‘Major Public Health Issue’ which should be dealt with on an ‘Emergency Basis’.  It was a 
further two years before UNICEF admitted publicly on US television that it had been ‘a part of 
the problem’.  Internal mechanisms within each of these agencies not only failed to fix the 
problem in a timely manner, but no disciplinary action was taken against officials responsible for 
the cover-up.  An indication of the government’s lack of commitment to seeking accountability 
was a warning from the Health Ministry to DCH staff who were organising a conference at which 
international experts were to debate the causes and solutions to the problem.  The Health Ministry 
cautioned them against allowing anything ‘subversive’ into conference documents, and insisted 
that these be submitted for official approval before the conference.
32 
 
The courts have in some instances filled the accountability gap created by failed regulatory 
systems, oversight mechanisms and political processes.  One study that documents the almost 
Kafka-esque bureaucratic breakdowns that have destroyed large parts of the urban environments 
inhabited by Calcutta’s poor also highlights some of the ways in which the judiciary has stepped 
in to take up the slack.  But even then it is mainly middle-class groups which possess the 
financial and social capital necessary to sustain public interest litigation cases on these issues.  
Investigative agencies and court officials tend to be dismissive of the evidence provided by 
poorer citizens, even when they form associations to press their claims.
33   
 
A study of the Nigerian oil industry highlighted the role of accountability failures within the legal 
system in producing detrimental environmental and social impacts.  Adverse effects faced by the 
poor included soil, water and air pollution, and the loss of arable land.  In this case, the capacity 
of the courts to handle highly technical detail – and their refusal to award damages or uphold 
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convictions of perpetrators – in the face of claims by judges that they are ‘unqualified’ to rule 




3.4 Physical Security 
 
The poor are often the primary victims of violent crime and human rights abuses, whether 
committed by fellow citizens or by state agents such as the police.  Certain types of violations of 
physical security affect specific vulnerable groups almost exclusively.  Crimes such as rape and 
domestic battery, for instance, are mostly suffered by women and children, while racial and 
ethnic minorities can be subjected to systematic, organized physical assault.   
 
While physical insecurity is itself a form of diminished human development, it also undermines 
health and well-being, and causes poor people to shy away from investing in their futures or 
broadening their income-generating efforts.  Girls may not be sent to school for fear of sexual 
assault on the way there or in the classroom.  Where violence is perpetrated by the police, and left 
unpunished by the courts, the poor rarely expect to receive fair treatment from state officials.  
They may avoid engaging with the state and accessing the public services that might help them 
out of poverty.  The physical abuse of the poor and other socially marginalised groups by security 
personnel fundamentally weakens the state’s role as a guardian of the moral order and a protector 
of its citizens.  One reaction to a lack of safety and security is for communities to form self-help 
policing initiatives that can evolve into vigilantism, compounding the security problems of rival 
social groups, and undermining general respect for the law.   
 
In some countries, the police, far from acting as defenders of public order and security for all 
citizens, can be the agents dispensing violence and terror.  Or they can preside over polarized 
justice systems, by under-policing or ignoring lawlessness and violence in poor communities, 
whilst protecting the property and rights of the wealthy.  Latin America is one of the regions in 
the world that suffers from very high levels of police abuse of suspects and prisoners, as well as 
the abuse of lethal force for the suppression of social movements or for the control of crime in 
poor neighborhoods.  Police impunity in many Latin American countries is a legacy of years of 
military authoritarianism, where not only are the police accustomed to controlling, rather than 
protecting, but where the state’s apparatus of coercion has sometimes been deliberately shielded 
or exempted from the institutions of democratic constitutionalism and civilian control as part of 
the deal struck by military authorities in transitions to democracy.  In Columbia, and until 
recently, Brazil, the police were subject to their own system of justice through military courts 
whose conviction rate for torture and the abuse of deadly force is very low.   
 
Outside of periods of political repression under dictatorships, the main victims of physical abuse 
in police custody, and arbitrary use of lethal force, are the poor and racial minorities.  In Brazil, 
killings by the military police, who do much of the patrol work in urban areas, amount to a 
substantial proportion of all intentional homicides, particularly targeting young men and people 
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of African descent in low-income areas.
35  Though the military police have justified these killings 
as a means of controlling violent crime, studies of the thousands of police killings over the years 
show that more than half of those killed had never had any contact with the criminal process, and 
few were even suspected of a violent crime when they were shot.
36  Those who are arrested are 
likely to experience physical abuse in custody, or even torture, which reformers in the civil police 
system have acknowledged to be a common practice.
37   
 
This kind of police violence, which involves street shootings of suspects of ordinary crimes and 
routine physical abuse or even torture of suspects, amounts to vigilantism, bypassing the criminal 
justice system and tackling crime by eliminating criminals outright.  It is vigilantism that 
specifically targets the poor.  The police rarely kill middle-class people.  Today in Latin America, 
the individuals targeted for killing, arrest and abuse in custody are those who commit the crimes 
of the poor, such as petty theft or illegal squatting.  In some countries, the police are supported in 
this crusade against the poor by laws which give them extensive powers to detain categories of 
people deemed a threat to the status quo.  In Venezuela, the 1939 Vagrancy Law allows police to 
detain persons deemed a social threat for up to five years.  In Argentina, police edicts allow the 
federal police to detain people for up to 30 days for vagrancy, drunkenness, or even cross-
dressing.   
 
That impunity in the exercise of police powers constitutes a form of ‘social cleansing’ is 
supported by evidence indicating that the victims of police excesses are not just those accused of 
specific crimes, but also social outcastes, such as homosexuals or street children.
38  Other social 
groups whose associational power might threaten the political dominance of urban elites are also 
targeted.  In Brazil and Mexico, the police have been associated for generations with killings of 
peasant squatters and union leaders in rural areas, to a degree that amounts to outright 
suppression of social movements.
39 
 
Multiple accountability failures produce this impunity in police behavior which fundamentally 
erodes the physical security of the poor.  The administrative systems to discipline the police are 
weak.  According to human rights monitors, police disciplinary systems are untransparent and in 
some countries, such as Ecuador and Paraguay, entirely unresponsive to complaints of torture.
40  
A report on pervasive police abuse in the United States reinforces this point: 
 
Perhaps most important, and consistently lacking, is a system of oversight in which 
supervisors hold their charges accountable for mistreatment and are themselves reviewed 
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and evaluated, in part, by how they deal with subordinate officers who commit human 
rights violations. Those who claim that each high-profile case of abuse by a ‘rogue’ 
officer is an aberration are missing the point: problem officers frequently persist because 
the accountability systems are so seriously flawed.
41 
 
The organizational culture of the police, which should act as an accountability institution by 
supporting professionalism and respect for the law, reinforces the difficulties of checking police 
lawlessness.  It is characterized by tolerance for police brutality that acts as a rite of passage, 
inducting newer recruits into violent behavior, implicating them in misconduct, and thus 
discouraging them, and more senior officers, from whistle-blowing or pursuing reforms from 
within.  This culture of corruption and brutality is exacerbated by problems common to the public 
services in developing countries: police are often under-trained, under-paid and under-respected, 
and therefore lack incentives to eschew the incomes and privileges which they earn through 
extortion and cultivating a climate of fear.  Thus inadequate financial auditing to expose illegally 
acquired income is also a missing accountability ingredient here. 
 
But the biggest culprit for the failure to establish democratic control over the police is the 
judiciary.  Judicial systems support the police’s assault on the poor by prosecuting and convicting 
crimes committed by the poor, and not elite crimes, such as tax evasion or financial crimes.  The 
judiciary also fails to prosecute crimes from which the poor suffer more than other groups, 
particularly violent crimes in low-income neighborhoods or in rural areas.  Brazil’s Pastoral Land 
Commission notes that of the 1,730 killings of peasants, rural workers, trade union leaders, 
religious workers and lawyers committed between 1964 and 1992, only 30 cases had been 
brought to trial by 1992, and just 18 of these resulted in convictions.
42   
 
Not only does the judiciary show much less zeal in prosecuting crimes committed by the middle 
class than those committed by the poor against the property of the middle class, the judiciary has 
not been diligent in investigating or punishing police abuses.  One reason for this is police 
interference with investigations and trials.  Forensic evidence is tampered with or destroyed, and 
both witnesses and prosecutors are intimidated with threats of violence.
43   
 
Many countries lack effective agencies of oversight to regulate and reform police and justice 
systems, such as police complaints authorities or ombudsmen, independent judicial commissions 
or national human rights commissions.  Where such agencies exist, they can be directly 
undermined by the police if they appear likely to threaten police impunity.  For instance, in the 
Mexican state of Sinaloa, the president of the Human Rights Commission, Norma Corona Sapien, 
was murdered in 1990, and a police commander was accused of the killing.  During the trial, six 
prosecution witnesses were murdered.
44  The ability of Human Rights bodies to contribute to 
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accountability can also suffer when they are ‘captured’ by individuals or groups lacking 









Why More Commissions are Not the Answer: The El Salvador Case 
 
The Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights (PDDH) was created in 1992 to combat 
democratic misuses of state authority, based on the classic model of the Swedish Ombudsmen. 
Eduardo Peñate Polonco was elected to head the PDDH in 1998 while under investigation by 
the same body for his previous conduct as a trial judge, including charges of corruption.  The 
bitter political wrangling that accompanied this appointment demonstrates that, in practice, 
concepts such as judicial independence prove much less straightforward than expected.  
 
Public recognition and support for the PDDH grew during the mid-1990s, yet the government 
was simultaneously ‘de-institutionalizing’ it, by among other actions, steadily reducing its budget.  
It was soon clear that the Assembly was not going to reappoint the activist Procurator.  After a 
long deadlock over who to appoint as successor, the main parties finally found they could agree 
on Penate.  At this time, he had nine complaints filed against him on such grounds as 
retardation of justice and violation of legal principles.  The leftist FMLN withdrew support, but the 
rightist parties (the PDC, ARENA and PCN) remained firmly behind Penate, and so the 
appointment was confirmed. 
 
In the following year, the PDDH ‘suffered a sustained loss of credibility due to high staff turnover, 
apparent mismanagement of funds, and a visibly reduced emphasis on the investigation of 
human rights complaints’.  A strong Procurator is not perceived to be in the partisan interests of 
the ruling legislative coalition.  CSOs and parties with a stronger stake in the PDDH’s vitality 
have been too fragmented and ineffective to resist.  
 
Source: Michael Dodson, Donald W. Jackson, and Laura O'Shaughnessy, ‘El Salvador’s 
Procurator for the Defense of Human Rights and the Dilemmas of Institution-Building’, Human 





Corruption and intimidation of the judiciary account in part for the failure to prosecute police 
impunity.  But a bias in favor of police impunity and against a fair hearing for the poor is built 
into several important procedural aspects of the legal system.  For instance, most Latin American 
justice systems rely heavily on the written dossier, putting a great value on confessions and other 
declarations by suspects and witnesses.  This is characteristic of continental civil code traditions, 
in contrast to concentrated oral hearings.  Human rights activists argue that judicial systems that           Page 34 of 88 
   
consider confession the key form of evidence create incentives for the use of torture.
45  The 
emphasis on written procedures also creates access barriers – alienating non-Spanish speakers 
and illiterates – and encouraging a delegation of judicial powers to poorly trained and 
inadequately supervised para-legals who have to prepare written dossiers on the basis of which a 
judge decides a civil case.  This is a delegation of power to a  less accountable actor, and it 
creates huge potential for abuse.  Other access barriers that keep the poor from prosecuting 
abuses against them more effectively are laws of legal standing, which make it impossible for the 
poor to sue the government collectively in civil suits (for instance in public interest litigation) and 
thus overcome informational, financial, and psychological barriers to holding officials to account.  
 
Perhaps the most disturbing accountability failure behind the inadequate prosecution of crimes of 
violence against the poor is at the level of public tolerance for police brutality directed against the 
poor.  Although Latin American publics are as scandalized as any other by gross abuses of lethal 
force, particularly in the cases of police massacres of prisoners and suspects, many observers 
comment that there is a high level of approval for policing aimed at containing ‘dangerous 
classes’ and protecting the property and privileges of elites, even if this impinges on the right of 
the poor to physical security.  A Brazilian human rights advocate, for instance, argues that 
‘throughout the continent, impunity is virtually assured for those who commit offences against 
victims considered “undesirable” or “subhuman”’, and that the law and the police serve as a form 
of ‘border guard’ not just protecting elites, but acting as an elite instrument of domination and 
oppression.
46   
                                                 
45  Ligia O. Bolivar, ‘Comments’, in Mendez et al (eds), The (Un)Rule of Law…, p. 43. 
46   Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, ‘The Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America: Introduction’, in Mendez et 
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The institutional failures described in the previous section, and the stunning range of human 
deprivations they have permitted to persist, have catalyzed demands for the creation of more 
effective ways of delivering genuine accountability for the poor.  But the heightened rhetoric 
about the importance of holding the powerful to account, and the proliferation of institutional 
experiments designed to operationalize this lofty aim, are only partly attributable to 
dissatisfaction with conventional mechanisms for checking the abuse of power.  In the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, two huge currents of social, economic and political change have 
altered the understanding of accountability and profoundly influenced efforts to improve the 
functioning of accountability systems.   
 
The first is democratization, or the great wave of transitions from authoritarian rule that saw 
scores of countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe adopting more or less 
liberal, representative systems of governance during the 1980s and 1990s.  These political 
changes were accompanied by heightened expectations about the ability of representative 
government to improve respect for human rights and foster the redressal of past inequities.  But 
the extent to which democratic systems in developing countries have resolved problems of social 
inequality, poverty, and conflict has been highly uneven.  Democracy has not necessarily reduced 
social inequalities.  Poor people, women and other socially excluded groups usually do not find 
themselves or their interests represented in politics.  The role of traditional political parties in 
shaping inclusive policy platforms is being undermined by corruption, a loss of faith in party 
politics, or by identity politics designed to advance the interests of narrowly defined social 
groups.  Many new democracies are facing profound destructive challenges as citizens’ 
expectations of responsive governance are left unfulfilled.  In some developed countries, low 
voter turn-out, declining party membership, and pervasive distrust of politicians, are also 
expressions of public skepticism about the responsiveness and accountability of public actors.  
The failures of liberal democracy are seen to have broken the direct link between people’s voice 
and the accountability of public office-holders, ills which systems of representation were 
originally intended to cure.  Key institutions that are part of conventional accountability systems 
in representative democracies, such as political parties and legislatures, are seen to have become 
less reliable as instruments for articulating and aggregating voice or for enforcing sanctions 
against improper public-sector actions.   
 
The second, and related, current of change affecting accountability systems is globalization.  
Historically, liberal representative institutions were forged within the confines of sovereign 
nation-states and are associated with a territorially bounded definition of citizenship.  Yet the 
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world have empowered a new range of actors – such as multinational corporations and 
transnational social movements – whose actions often escape popular control and yet affect 
greatly the survival prospects of the poor.  The influence of the IMF or the World Bank, or the 
disciplines of global capital markets, can severely limit the range of policy options facing 
governments – or are at least seen to be limiting them.  Global diasporas can alter the political 
balance back ‘home’, and change the ways that social groups perceive and pursue their interests.  
This proliferation of non-state and transnational actors poses enormous challenges for 
conventional accountability institutions.  Conceived around state-run oversight mechanisms, they 
are increasingly unsuitable for protecting the interests of ordinary people lacking access to the 
benefits of this globalized world.  
 
None of this means that people have given up on the possibility of accountability.  In fact, 
globalization has arguably heightened expectations of accountability by creating a convergence 
of standards (most notably, despite continued disagreements, in the area of human rights), by 
extending the geographic reach of legal regimes and bringing misdeeds to the attention of the 
global media audience.  Democratization, moreover, has raised the ability of publics to voice 
their discontent with the current arrangements for delivering accountability.   
 
Nor have the challenges posed by imperfect democratization and unbalanced globalization led 
people to abandon the possibility of redesigning conventional institutions like electoral systems, 
courts, bureaucracies and auditing agencies.  Arguably, the bulk of the world’s efforts to improve 
accountability consist of what are by now fairly mainstream initiatives at fixing these traditional 
pillars of accountability:  
 
  Electoral reforms, such as variants of proportional representation systems and ‘reserved 
constituencies’ for disadvantaged groups;  
  Legal and judicial reforms, such as the creation of human rights commissions or 
specialized bodies for the promotion of women’s interests;  
  Civil service reforms, such as result-oriented management schemes and market-based 
approaches to service delivery; and  
  Reforms to systems of public-sector oversight, such as the worldwide spread of anti-
corruption commissions, ombudsmen, auditors-general and parliamentary public accounts 
committees, and the proliferation of programs designed to increase the technical capacity 
of those that already exist.    
 
But while these kinds of efforts are widely regarded as necessary, they are increasingly viewed as 
insufficient for the scale of accountability-related deprivations facing a world of blurred 
jurisdictions in which new concentrations of power threaten the stability of long-accepted 
institutional forms.   
 
It is these sorts of concerns that are driving the emergence of a New Accountability Agenda. 
 
Many readers will question whether anything so grand as a new agenda yet exists – a view that 
reflects a healthy skepticism about such bold claims.  There are, after all, a great diversity of 
agendas, and these are constantly in flux, changing in response to the unfolding of events.  But 
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the making, and to outline its main features.  The Report’s other function – that of advocacy – is 
to promote the refinement of this agenda to ensure that it supports the objectives of human 
development.   
 
But of what does this new agenda consist?  Above all, the new accountability agenda is 
characterized by an expansion of accountability along the many dimensions of this concept.  To 
put this slightly differently, there is now a wider spectrum of legitimate responses to the 
fundamental questions that must be asked when seeking to understand the reality of 
accountability.  That is, the defining features of the new accountability agenda emerge from the 
answers to the questions ‘who’, ‘from whom’, ‘where’, ‘how’, and ‘for what’ – that is:  
 
  Who is seeking accountability?  
  From whom (or what) is accountability sought?   
  Where (in which forums and over what extent of geographic coverage) is 
accountability being sought?   
  How (through what means) are the powerful being held to account? 
  For what (which actions, and against which norms) is accountability being sought?   
 
Elaborating the contours of the new agenda along five different dimensions is a daunting task.  
Fortunately, its inherent logic reduces the number of analytical categories considerably.  For 
while the impetus for a new agenda emerges from these five questions, the actual manifestation 
of the new accountability contains, in fact, only four key elements: (1) a more direct role for 
ordinary people and their associations in demanding accountability across (2) a more diverse set 
of jurisdictions, using (3) an expanded repertoire of methods, and on the basis of (4) a more 
exacting standard of social justice.   
 
These four elements of the new accountability agenda thus correspond to the questions ‘who’, 
‘where’, ‘how’, and ‘for what’.  As we shall see in Section 4.1, the question ‘from whom’ 
becomes less relevant when we recognize that the institutions from whom accountability is being 
sought are, more or less, the same as they have always been, and that it is the New Roles being 
played by those who seek to hold them to account that is the most significant change underway. 
 
Further compression is achieved by examining two of the key questions – where accountability is 
sought, and how – in tandem, largely because they are so closely linked in terms of the practical 
operation of the new accountability agenda.  Thus section 4.2 examines the New Methods for 
seeking accountability (the ‘how’) that have emerged in response to the changing shape of 
accountability jurisdictions (the ‘where’).   
 
This leaves just one remaining question: For what are the powerful being held to account?  
Section 4.3, on New Standards of accountability, focuses on the changing norms against which 
the actions of power-holders are being judged. 
 
Thus, the diverse efforts that are seeking to fill the gaps left by the failure of conventional 
accountability institutions, and which arguably comprise a new agenda in the making, are 
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1.  ‘New Roles for Accountability Actors’ 
2.  ‘New Methods across New Jurisdictions’ 
3.  ‘New Standards of Accountability’ 
 
Making sense of something as diverse and amorphous as the sometimes ill-defined pressure for 
greater justice in the world – which, arguably, is what accountability for human development is 
all about – is a task fraught with methodological difficulties.  Choices must be made.  
Accountability initiatives could, for instance, have been sorted according to the specific activities 
for which power-holders are being held to account, such as public spending, corporate behavior, 
and the promotion of national security, or the instruments used to promote accountability, such as 
market mechanisms and global treaties, or even the actors involved in these processes such as 
international organizations and transnational civil society networks.  In fact, each of the 
subsequent chapters in this Report is focused on either an activity, and instrument or an actor.  
But for their larger relevance to be grasped, it is necessary to situate them first within the currents 
of thinking and practice that comprise the emerging agenda. 
 
The real-world examples used to illustrate the importance of each of the new agenda’s key 
features are not necessarily typical of accountability relationships as a whole.  They are instances 
that capture what is emerging, and what might be built upon by people and institutions concerned 
to make the actions of the powerful better able to produce opportunities for poor and marginal 
people to improve their lives.  Moreover, none of the experiments is ideal, either in conception or 
execution.  Some of the most promising will be difficult, if not impossible, to replicate exactly.  
And while all are capable of helping to orient accountability towards the objectives of human 
development, some will be of more help than others.   
 
 
4.1 New Roles for Accountability Actors 
 
There is a widespread perception of a vast expansion in the type and diversity of actors involve in 
accountability processes – that is, in the range of agents seeking accountability and objects being 
held to account.  This is not, strictly speaking, true.   
 
There has, however, been an increase in the sheer number and visibility of both agents and 
objects.  National chapters of the Berlin-based Transparency International continue to be born, 
and the proliferation of national Human Rights Commissions persists.  This clearly raises the 
number of agents out there.  New objects, from whom accountability is sought, are also to be 
found: the World Trade Organisation, established in 1995, is perhaps the most obvious case, but 
multinational corporations are often cited in this connection as well. 
 
And yet, while some of the actual organisations themselves might be newly established, the range 
of actors – both agents and objects – has not really expanded much at all.  The essential types 
remain the same.   
 
Agents demanding accountability, such as international NGOs, have long been with us, as have 
investigating commissions.  The idea of civil society organisations acting as accountability agents 
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for vertical accountability.  There is also a remarkable constancy among the type of objects being 
held to account.  Even that most high-profile of ‘new’ accountability objects (the global 
corporation) is not only not new, but has long been subjected to accountability demands: 
multinational firms have had to answer to regulators in home and host governments, to 
shareholders, to trade unions, to the courts and to publics at large.  Even the WTO’s predecessor, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), was answerable to the member-states of 
which it was collectively constituted.   
 
What has changed are the tools used by agents to achieve their objectives, and the area over 
which they seek to impose accountability.  Both of these issues – and indeed the inter-relation 
between the geographic scope of operation and the choice of technique – are addressed in the 
next section (4.1) on ‘New Methods across New Jurisdictions’.  And objects of accountability 
must adapt not only to these new methods, but also to rapidly changing norms of conduct, the 
subject of the subsequent section (4.2) on ‘New Standards of Accountability’. 
 
These two dimensions of change, however, imply a third, which is that accountability actors – 
even if they are still recognizably the same – find themselves playing new roles, performing 
alongside actors with whom they had rarely shared the stage.  No actor has been liberated from 
type-casting more than civil society.  Their dramatic range expanded, citizens and their 
associations are playing three new roles: 
 
1.  First, they have assumed positions as quasi-official agents, either attempting to substitute 
for failing state accountability institutions, or participating directly in formal 
accountability processes as fully vested players.   
 
2.  Second, they are playing a more central role in creating new formal accountability 
mechanisms.  Rather than just being self-replicating, civil society is driving the 
proliferation of official institutions that seek accountability from governments, business 
and other objects.   
 
3.  Third, civil society organisations have themselves increasingly become objects of 
accountability.   
 
In the discussion that follows, we treat these three trends in turn, focusing the analysis on the 
extent to which each new role has (and has not) opened spaces for disadvantaged people to 
benefit from changing relationships of accountability.   
 
 
4.1.1 Direct Engagement in Accountability Functions 
 
To understand the significance of citizens and their associations participating directly in official 
accountability mechanisms, it is helpful to return to the distinction between horizontal and 
vertical forms of accountability.  While citizens and civil society have traditionally been 
relegated to participation in vertical channels of accountability – voting, advocacy – they have 
now begun to take part in those horizontal channels which, because they involved state agencies 
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words, the search by citizens and their associations for new roles has caused the vertical-
horizontal distinction to blur.   
 
This blurring represents a shift towards augmenting the limited effectiveness of civil society’s 
watchdog function by breaking the state’s monopoly over responsibility for official executive 
oversight.   This new ‘hybrid’ form of accountability
47 is not hugely widespread, but a number of 
recent examples do suggest insights as to how citizens might prompt more satisfactory 
performance from authorities, or even see sanctions enforced for manifestly poor decision-
making or outright corrupt behaviour.  For instance, the Podar Cuidano, an Argentine civil 
society organisation (see Box 8), has played a role similar to that of an electoral commission, and 






Shifting Roles for Non-State Actors: The Poder Cuidano in Argentina:  
 
The case of the Poder Cuidano in Argentina exemplifies two of the key shifts underway in the 
roles undertaken by accountability actors.  First, by closely monitoring the internal workings of 
political parties, the PC is a civil society organization that has assumed some of the 
accountability functions that previously were exercised solely by state agencies such as the 
electoral commission.  As one analysis put it, the PC has ‘filled the vacuum left by government 
institutions that were supposed to bring transparency to the electoral process, but failed.’
48  
Second, the PC’s scrutiny of political parties demonstrates the extent to which parties, like many 
other traditional agents of accountability, have increasingly become the objects from whom 
accountability is sought.   
 
The PC’s approach to ‘developing mechanisms of citizen control’ involved the creation of, first, a 
database of Argentine politicians – including their professional profiles and political platforms – 
and then subsequently, ‘a project aimed at full-fledged financial disclosure of electoral 
campaigns for the Federal District’s city council (1997 and 2000) and for presidential elections 
(2000).
49  This kind of transparency, which included candidates declaring their personal assets, 
did not in itself provide all of the elements of accountability.  But it did add an increased element 
of answerability to complement the process by which an enforcement mechanism – in the form 
of voter choice – could be exercised by ordinary people over their elected representatives.  In 
this sense, it was a substantial step towards making ‘politicians more accountable to public 
opinion by requiring them to comply with normative standards of democratic 
governance…turning what has traditionally been either a passive or partisan voter into an 
                                                 
47 Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins, ‘Hybrid Forms of Accountability: Citizen Engagement in Institutions of 
Public-Sector Oversight’, Public Management Review, vol. 3, no. 3 (September 2001), pp. 363-83. 
48 Luigi Manzetti, ‘Keeping Accounts: A Case Study of Civic Initiatives and Campaign Finance Oversight in 
Argentina’, Working Paper No. 248 (College Park, Maryland: Centre for Institutional Reform and the Informal 
Sector, 2000), p. 35. 
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informed citizen’.
50  Moreover, the data on personal assets could then serve as baseline 
information against which successful candidates’ financial rectitude could subsequently be 
assessed by comparing their assets prior to election with those held after a term in office.   
 
The PC also created a methodology whereby the spending of parties during election campaigns 
could be monitored.  This is ordinarily a job for an electoral commission, but where such 
institutions are not fulfilling this important function, a space has been created for non-state 
actors to assume these duties – in some cases in partnership with the state, and in others in a 
direct bid to shame the relevant state institutions into performing their appointed functions more 
effectively.
51   
 
Sources: Luigi Manzetti, ‘Keeping Accounts: A Case Study of Civic Initiatives and Campaign 
Finance Oversight in Argentina’, Working Paper No. 248 (College Park, Maryland: Centre for 
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, 2000), p. 35;  Roberto de Michele, ‘The Role of 




But by far the clearest case in which the vertical and horizontal forms of accountability are being 
hybridized is found in the north Indian state of Rajasthan, where a grassroots organization called 
the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), or Workers and Farmers Power Association, has 
turned ordinary people into financial auditors, substituting for inefficient and corrupt official 
auditing agencies.  Its investigations have in many cases catalyzed state agencies to then continue 
the process of tracking expenditure.  And the result has been legislative reform to the system of 
local government so that, throughout Rajasthan, village-level accounts now must be subjected to 
scrutiny by a village meeting to which all residents are invited.   
 
The MKSS’s campaign to secure minimum wages for employees on government drought-relief 
works revealed the role of corruption in the underpayment of wages.  It became clear that local 
authorities were billing the central and state governments for amounts that far exceeded what 
workers were paid.  To combat this and other forms of fraud that deprived the poor of 
development resources – such as inflated estimates for public-works projects, the use of poor-
quality materials and over-billing by suppliers – access was required to key financial documents 
that have long been kept secret by local officials.  The MKSS needed not just aggregate balance 
sheets, but also supporting documentation, like employment registers and bills submitted for the 
purchase of materials, which could then be cross-checked against official data. 
 
Until a right-to-information law was passed in Rajasthan in 1999 – largely as a result of the 
protest and lobbying efforts of the MKSS – its activists obtained this documentation by appealing 
to the virtue of sympathetic bureaucrats.  But its key innovation was the jan sunwai (or ‘public 
hearing’), an open-air forum where the government’s official records are presented alongside the 
testimony derived from interviews with local people.  The information is read aloud to assembled 
villagers, who are invited to give further testimony that identifies discrepancies between the 
official record and their own experiences as labourers on public-works projects or applicants for 
                                                 
50 Ibid, p. 37. 
51 Roberto de Michele, ‘The Role of Civil Society in Fighting Corruption: The Experience of Argentina’, mimeo, 
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means-tested anti-poverty schemes.  Through this direct form of ‘social audit’ many people 
discovered that they had been listed as beneficiaries of anti-poverty schemes, though they had 
never received payment.  Others were astonished to learn of large payments to local building 
contractors for works that were never performed.  This approach depends upon a principle of 
collective and very local verification of official accounts, as it is only at the local level that the 
many small diversions of funds, which go unnoticed in massive formal audits, can be detected.     
 
The involvement of civil society organizations in the once-closed arena of financial auditing is in 
many ways a natural extension of the movement over the past decade for citizens’ groups to 
participate in budgeting.  This has taken two main forms – formulating the budget, and analyzing 
it after the fact – which correspond to the categories of ex ante and ex post accountability outlined 
in Part II of this chapter.  Perhaps the most well-developed examples of participatory budget 
formulation are to be found in the experience of the municipality of Porto Alegre, Brazil.
52  
Budget analysis by civil society organizations – either after they have been initially presented for 
legislative endorsement, or indeed after they have been executed – has also flourished in recent 
years, and indeed budget analysis from a gender perspective is one of the accountability tools 
discussed in this report.  But while both may be important in helping to provide a framework in 
which a more precise form of answerability might be engendered, neither possesses the potential 
for catalyzing the enforceability that is implied by direct involvement of citizens in detailed 
auditing functions.  This is because discrepancies located in financial accounts can serve as 
documentary proof of malfeasance, and thus trigger sanctions against those who abuse the public 
trust.   
 
There are, however, some indications that the focus is shifting from the ‘softer’ form of 
accountability found in budget analysis to the ‘harder’ variety represented by popular auditing.  
An early move in this direction was the work of the Mexican civil society network FUNDAR, 
which helped to bring an end to the use of a Presidential secret account that operated 
independently of congressional approval.
53  In Canada, Native American women have ‘broken 
ranks’ with their tribal communities to form something called the First Nations Accountability 
Coalition.  Affiliated groups in British Columbia have organized meetings at which they ‘prod 
tribal leaders to open up closely guarded tribal accounts for public scrutiny’.
54  In the summer of 
2000, one of the movement’s leaders collected testimony at 13 public hearings across Canada, 
and presented the findings, in the form of a 200-page report, to the Canadian Parliament.  The 
First Nations Accountability Coalition faces one of the same obstacles as the MKSS: official 
secrecy.  Despite Canada’s progressive freedom of information legislation, and the fact that many 
tribal budgets are largely funded by the federal government, the accounts are not made publicly 
available.   
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53 Warren Krafchik, ‘Can civil society add value to budget decision-making?  A description of civil society budget 
work’, Background paper for the Exploratory Dialogue on Applied Budget Analysis as a Tool for the Advancement 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, International Budget Project, mimeo (Washington, D.C, n.d.). 
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The notion that citizens and their associations are legitimate participants in accountability 
processes conventionally confined to state agencies is increasingly found in mainstream 
development organizations.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) required of all 
countries seeking debt relief under the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
(HIPC2) must spell out not only national priorities for combating poverty, but also mechanisms 
for monitoring the achievement of the stipulated objectives.  Involvement of civil society 
organizations in monitoring the achievement of poverty targets is in some cases limited to 
participation in data analysis activities.  But in a few cases it has gone beyond this, and indeed 
beyond the monitoring of aggregate expenditure outturns across major budget headings.  In 
Uganda, a tripartite system (involving government, NGOs and donors) for tracking the flow of 
funds from the finance ministry through line ministry accounts down to service-delivery units 
such as schools has begun operation.
55  Similar plans are afoot in Malawi, where the Malawi 
Economic Justice Network, a coalition of civil society organizations, is seeking to extend this 
concept all the way down to the auditing of input purchases, whether schoolbooks, maize seeds 
or medicines.
56   
 
These rather exceptional cases must be clearly distinguished from other forms of citizen 
engagement that often amount to little more than ‘barking dog’ advocacy on the margins, as 
when citizens monitor public perceptions of service delivery to highlight discrepancies between 
popular opinion and official records of targets met.  In the absence of openings for direct citizen 
influence on service providers, one civil society response is to publicise details about the gaps 
between government commitments and actual delivery, in the hope of embarrassing officials into 
a response.  A good example of this is the ‘Report Card’ method used by the Public Affairs 
Centre, an NGO based in the south Indian city of Bangalore.  Report Cards on urban services 
reflect the findings of public opinion surveys conducted in low-income neighbourhoods in major 
Indian cities.  They report on the perceived quality and appropriateness of a range of public 
services.  They are compiled by professional survey teams, using quantitative methods, in the 
hope that the unimpeachably rigorous research techniques will enhance the credibility and 
legitimacy of the results.   These surveys have both merits and shortcomings,
57 but most 
importantly they do not involve financial or even actual performance auditing, and thus do not 
represent a challenge to the state’s monopoly over horizontal institutions of accountability.   
 
On the other hand, when such mechanisms are combined with other, more systematized, forms of 
institutionalizing voice, more substantial movement in the direction of genuine accountability can 
result.  Fiszbein found that in Colombia citizens’ direct participation in service delivery, 
combined with instruments for surveying local opinion, ‘promoted accountability’ by increasing 
citizens’ awareness of local governments’ actions, thereby enhancing their ability to assess the 
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validity of government justifying rationales
58.  Increased participation led to increased demands 
for effective local governments, which in turn increased the political costs of inefficient and 
inadequate public decisions.  One result was that local authorities began sanctioning bureaucratic 
personnel (mainly through transfers) in order to satisfy local expressions of voice.   
 
It is important to recognize that the movement towards direct civil society participation in official 
accountability processes has taken shape only gradually, and they have drawn inspiration from 
existing institutions.  In countries with long-established democracies and constitutional rights 
regimes, such as India and the USA, citizens and their associations have used their right to 
litigate as a way of bringing themselves directly into what were once closed official processes.
59  
Indeed, principles of hybrid accountability are inherent in judicial branch of government.  It is 
clearly an institution of public oversight, operating in the mode of horizontal accountability – one 
part of the state checking potential abuses by others.  But when adjudicating cases brought by 
members of the public, the judiciary’s orientation shifts to allow it to act as a mediator between 
the otherwise incommensurable vertical and horizontal axes.  It is through this means that citizens 
can begin entering the horizontal process of in-depth monitoring of government.  Using the tools 
available through litigation, individual citizens and activist groups become part of an official fact-
finding process.  Discovery motions lead to the availability of government-held information that 
can incriminate officials who may never have expected such detailed scrutiny of their decisions. 
 
Moreover, courts in some countries are being reformed to increase access and direct participation 
of poor people.  This has involved making legal language less archaic, and removing some of the 
power of intermediaries.  Through the expanded jurisdiction for Public Interest Litigation (PIL) 
in some countries, people’s organizations have achieved a rare level of direct involvement in 
generating accountability to the poor.  (Another important development is the growing 
application of international human rights law in domestic courts, or the growing recourse to 
international tribunals when domestic options have proven unsuccessful – discussed in further 
detail in Section 4.2.1). 
 
In many countries the law only allows the injured party or an individual with a direct legal 
interest to bring a case to court.  This has posed obstacles to access to justice for the poor, since, 
acting in an individual capacity, they may lack the resources (legal literacy, money to meet the 
costs of litigation, etc) to file a case.  Also, the focus on an individual plaintiff makes it difficult 
to bring cases of concern to a broad class of disadvantaged citizens.  In recent years countries 
such as South Africa, India, and Bangladesh have liberalized the rules of standing so that anyone 
acting on behalf of a person or a group of people can bring a case to court.  This simple change 
has greatly enhanced poor people’s access to justice.  One of the main innovations of India’s 
celebrated Public Interest Litigation (PIL) movement is also a simple procedural reform, initiated 
by the judiciary itself: any citizen is allowed to file a case simply by writing a letter to the court.  
This has had an enormous impact on widening access to justice for the poor and other categories 
of marginalized people.  The PILs filed by such people or their supporters have resulted in legal 
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and policy reform addressing bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, the social oppression of 
women and ‘backward’ caste groups, industrial pollution and environmental degradation, the 
treatment of displaced persons, and state violence.  Indian courts have also experimented with 
other procedural changes such as the use of non-adversarial proceedings and the appointment of 
commissions of inquiry to report on matters of common interest to the poor. 
 
Organizations representing groups of disadvantaged people have litigated directly against state 
accountability institutions themselves, charging them with failing to perform specified duties – 
whether due to incompetence, corruption, inadequate resources, or insufficient legal authority.  
By using court discovery procedures to obtain sensitive information, non-governmental actors 
have demonstrated the role that state oversight agencies should have assumed.  And by engaging 
in the process of demanding reason-giving, in a forum that institutionally requires formal 
responses, PIL has had at least a symbolic impact, and in some cases has arguably contributed to 
the mobilizational capacity of the litigating organizations, thereby strengthening other forms of 
voice.  Even so, the proportion of poor people (or their organizations) able to use courts and legal 
process effectively remains minute.   
 
PIL has shown that it is possible for citizen-litigants to enter into legal-constitutional 
accountability institutions to become active demanders of answerability in a forum that carries 
the weight of enforceability.  This combination of answers and sanctions is precisely what most 
citizen-initiated approaches to ‘hybrid’ accountability aim to achieve.  However, there are 
important barriers to the effective use of PIL, particularly by poor people, including cost, time, 
biases in the courts, and the near-impossibility of having favourable decisions implemented by a 
hostile bureaucracy. 
 
PIL has arguably also triggered a subsequent interest by social movements in adopting, almost 
mimicking, legal processes.  This has taken the form of procedurally complex public hearings, of 
which the MKSS’s approach is but one variety.  Non-governmental groups in a range of countries 
hold ‘public hearings’ when formal accountability institutions – such as environmental 
regulators, police investigators, or human rights commissions – fail to provide information, 
consult citizens or conduct thorough investigations.  This is particularly true for controversial 
infrastructure projects likely to have damaging environmental impacts, such as large dams (see 
Section 3.3).  The logistical arrangements surrounding the collection of evidence, both for one-
off hearings as well as for the researching of faux-official ‘status reports’ on incidents of police 
violence, are formidable and represent a ‘legalisation’ of social action.  Instead of demanding an 
enquiry, such activist-led initiatives conduct enquiries themselves, and if successful in conveying 
their evidence to a larger constituency, are sometimes in a strong position to demand at least ex-
officio inclusion in official investigations.  
   
The substitution of citizens’ informal institutions for state accountability institutions inevitably 
runs into problems of legitimate authority, controls on power, and at the same time, limited 
impact.  Where such institutions function as, in effect, surrogate courts, without a democratic 
mandate or due and universally applied process, and with, in the end, rather limited resources for 
investigating official wrong-doing, some miscreants may evade prosecution, while others may 
become scapegoats.  It is precisely for this reason that the MKSS stages its public hearings 
infrequently, and with great care, and is now focusing its efforts on generalizing this process 
through the recently reformed local government institutions.  But these problems points to the           Page 46 of 88 
   
desirability and indeed necessity (from a civil society point of view) of ensuring that efforts to 
engage in horizontal accountability functions have as their ultimate objective inclusion as equal 
participants in formal state institutions of oversight. 
  
 
4.1.2 Civil Society Involvement in the Creation of New Official Accountability Institutions 
 
By instigating the creation of new international regimes on issues like the environment, human 
rights and gender discrimination, NGOs are playing roles in forging new inter-state 
accountability institutions.  While there are several historical precedents for this type of activity – 
the international anti-slavery movement in the 19
th Century being the classic example – over the 
past decade transnational civil society networks have grown deeper and broader, creating new 
moral and epistemic communities.  
 
Keck and Sikkink see growing ‘transnational advocacy networks’ as comprising non-
governmental research or advocacy organizations, local social movements, foundations, the 
media, churches, trade unions, parts of intergovernmental organizations and parts of national 
governments.  Their tactics involve generating politically usable information, calling upon 
symbols and stories to make sense of situations to distant audiences, and holding powerful actors 
accountable for their previously stated policies or principles.
60 
 
One of the first global-level successes occurred when NGO advocacy on environment issues 
played a substantial role in the adoption of the Montreal Protocol on Substances Depleting the 
Ozone Layer in 1987.  Comparable achievements became more common in the late 1990s.  
During that period, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council emerged as an important 
interlocutor of the UN’s most powerful body, while the Jubilee 2000 Campaign changed thinking 
and policy on poor countries’ international debt.  NGO mobilization played a significant part in 
forcing governments to abandon secret negotiations for the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investments in 1998.
61  One of the most clear-cut successes was on the banning of antipersonnel 
landmines, which went from being seen as conventional weapons to anathema in a relatively 








The Role of Civil Society in the Creation of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty 
 
The International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL), a diverse NGO coalition, was the prime 
mover in the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty of December 1997, which banned the use of anti-
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personnel landmines. Later that year, the ICBL, along with its founder Jody Williams, were 
awarded the Nobel peace prize for helping to create a fresh form of diplomacy. 
 
The ICBL contributed to a rapid reversal in international policies toward land mines.  It was only 
in 1995 that Belgium became the first country to pass domestic legislation banning the use of 
landmines.  Just 32 months later, 122 states signed the comprehensive ban convention.  
Representatives of NGOs were heavily involved in the process.  Many were included states’ 
delegations to preparatory meetings and review sessions, part of a new pattern of 
‘unconventional diplomacy’ involving civil society in international negotiation processes.
62 
 
In October 1996 a conference was held in Ottawa to promote a pro-ban movement.  It was 
attended by ICBL members and government representatives.  About fifty government 
representatives made a final declaration for an immediate and total ban.  A committee was 
established to draft the treaty in Vienna in February the following year, thus beginning the 
‘Ottawa process’.  As a result of the ICBL’s prodding, this process shifted away from the 
conventional (and slower) tracks – the Review of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons process and the negotiations within the UN Conference on Disarmament.  At the end 
of the Brussels conference held in June 1997, 97 countries signed what was known as the 
‘Brussels Declaration’ to demonstrate their commitment and willingness to sign the Ban Treaty at 
the end of the year. 
 
The significance of this case is that transnational civil society mobilized action on an issue that 
had previously been seen as the business of states alone.  Weapons and security are at the 
heart of state sovereignty.  NGOs played a major role in seeking to create an official 
intergovernmental mechanism through which states could be held accountable for commitments 
to humane standards in the conduct of warfare.  NGOs initiated the landmine ban by placing the 
issue on the international political agenda, resulting in intense media and public attention, or 
‘cognitive agenda setting’.  Perhaps as importantly, they helped to articulate and codify the 
landmines issue into international law by changing how governments perceived the legality of 
landmines and the effects of landmine use – which has been called ‘norm agenda setting’.
63  
NGOs thus became ‘moral entrepreneurs’ whose tactics included ‘grafting’ taboos from 
previously de-legitimized practices of warfare (e.g. chemical weapons) onto the landmine issue, 
and instigating and exploiting debates that put mine proponents on the defensive.
 64  It has also 
been noted that states have proved receptive to being ‘taught’ what is appropriate or useful, 
rather than just responding to external or internal material demand. 
 
Sources: R. Price, ‘Reversing the gun sights: transnational civil society targets land mines’, 
International Organization, vol. 52, no. 3, (Summer 1998); K. R. Rutherford, ‘The evolving arms 
control agenda: implications of the role of NGOs in banning antipersonnel landmines’, World 
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The Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) was indispensable to the 1999-2000  
Rome treaty establishing a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).  NGOs played an 
important role in supporting a series of regional conferences (Dakar, Guatemala City, Canberra) 
that spurred awareness and acted as training sessions on the issues raised by the draft text.  The 
CICC coordinated more than 200 NGOs attending the conference, and promoted new forms of 
interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors.  During the conference they 
were given space to do a tremendous amount of advocacy work, and the press likened the NGO 
influence to that of a major government.  The extent of ‘partnering’ with governments and the 
degree of consultation with the UN Secretariat provided a model for future negotiations.
65  
Another important element was the ability of NGOs to mold negotiations towards issues that 
affected marginalized groups.  Thematic caucuses, such those devoted to women’s and children’s 
issues, played a vital role in ensuring that issues like gender crimes and crimes against children 
were addressed in the treaty, and that adequate provision was made for victim and witness 
protection. 
  
NGOs have also played significant roles in following up international treaties and major 
conferences. In the follow up to the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, 
women’s NGOs have been very active in creating national institutional mechanisms for the 
advancement of women.  National machineries have a crucial role to play in monitoring the 
implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and are thus useful – though not 
unproblematic – mechanisms for accountability.  They have the difficult task of analyzing how 
government actions result in tangible changes in women’s lives.  For example, in Jordan, where 
the national machinery is composed of high-level government officials and representatives of 
civil society, each participating government and civil society body is required to submit regular 
progress reports,
66 which can lead to acrimonious disputes.  Despite these and other difficulties, 
civil society has demonstrated a capacity to bridge the gap between the creation of institutions for 
international accountability – bodies to which governments must answer – and the establishment 
of national mechanisms that can engage in domestic enforcement action against agencies that fail 
to fulfill these commitments. 
 
 
4.1.3 From Agents to Objects 
 
Private actors such as national and local NGOs, religious associations, political parties and 
international public actors such as the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF, which have been so 
important in seeking to improve national accountability institutions, are increasingly themselves 
coming under the glare of public scrutiny to answer for their use of resources and the relationship 
between leaders and members.  In part this is motivated by a desire to avoid charges of the ‘pot 
calling the kettle black’.  Those challenging corruption must show themselves to be beyond 
reproach.  Political parties are coming under scrutiny for this reason, with particular attention 
being paid to the ways they obtain campaign finance, as well as to their mechanisms for 
leadership selection and internal democracy (see Box 8 on the Podar Cuidano). 
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The interest in holding non-public actors to account is also triggered by accountability 
conundrums caused by the growing power of these actors in public affairs.  At local levels, where 
NGOs and other private actors are taking on tasks conventionally managed by the state – for 
instance the delivery of social services, or the management of public amenities – the lines of 
accountability are becoming increasingly blurred.  The privatization of service delivery and 
some other state functions has confused the public perception of the formally accountable actor: 
is it the state or the private provider?  This has catalyzed the search for means through which 
communities can hold these actors directly to account.  At the international level the power of 
actors such as corporations or global economic institutions can have the effect of reversing the 
lines of accountability such that the state responds to these actors rather than the other way 
around.  This limits the mechanisms available to control their actions, and has provoked the 
extension of accountability jurisdictions into the global arena, which is an important focus of the 
next section (4.2). 
 
NGOs, though not subject to the same accountability relationships that govern the public sector 
or industry, are subject to the need to maintain their legitimacy with members and client groups, 
as well as credibility with funders and government agencies with which they interact.
67  
Nevertheless, there is increasing concern about generally weak accountability systems in 
development NGOs.
68  Accountability gaps can result in undetected and unprosecuted mis-
treatment of beneficiaries and staff, as well as financial irregularities.  For instance, in Orissa, 
India, where NGOs employ over 20,000 people, junior-level NGO workers have lodged a series 
of complaints of abusive treatment and even rape by superiors with the National Human Rights 
Commission and the State Women’s Commission.
69  A common accusation leveled at NGOs in 
many developing countries is that they are fronts for harvesting the foreign funds available for 
this sector.  These are known as ‘briefcase’ NGOs in Uganda.  Perhaps a more common problem, 
however, is that the lack of effective internal and external oversight mechanisms, combined with 
inadequate leadership and weak constituencies, places some NGOs somewhere between a 
confidence trick and plain inefficiency.
70 
 
In this context, some NGOs are keen to steal a march on their critics by cleaning up their internal 
accountability mechanisms.  Examples of NGO accountability innovations designed to build 
direct answerability to service users include social audits of project implementation and public 
audits of accounts.  This exercise can satisfy critics concerned about a lack of transparency in the 
use of foreign and government funds.  In the case of the public audit held by the Social Work and 
Research Centre in India in 1997 (see Box 10), this demonstration of probity and transparency 
served also to build the credibility of the SWRC’s support for anti-corruption campaigns in the 
state.  But where these new institutional mechanisms are not in place, less formal avenues of 
accountability can come into play to check abuses by NGOs.  As one report on the role of NGOs 
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in relief operations in Kenya put it: ‘Increasingly, the beneficiaries themselves decide who gets 
what’, which means that in practice, ‘the NGOs are accountable’.  One aid beneficiary was 
quoted in this report as saying that ‘if Oxfam misbehaves, we’ll tell the government: get them out 








Public Audits for Transparency in the Voluntary Sector 
 
Some development NGOs are taking steps to enable their memberships and critics to scrutinize 
their activities.  In July 1997 the Social Work and Research Centre (also known as the Barefoot 
College) in Rajasthan (India) threw open its books for public scrutiny.  In an extremely well-
publicized event, it convened a panel of assessors composed of eminent people from the media, 
judiciary, police, and social work to preside over a review of its spending over the previous ten 
years.  Over 300 villagers, as well as local and state-level politicians and the press, were invited 
to scrutinize records of spending on night schools, family planning camps, employment-
generation schemes for women, and projects on drinking-water and solar-lighting and 
reclaiming-wastelands.  Receipts, invoices and wage-employment registers were on display, as 
were details and statements of all bank accounts held by the NGO.  The salary of the director 
was revealed, as were the salary registers from 1986 to 1996 for 400 full- and part-time staff.  
Amounts received from foreign funders and government sources were detailed, along with any 
other sources of income such as awards from  foreign organisations.  Details of foreign trips 
taken by the director and others were provided.   
 
Though this was an impressive display of transparency, through which the SWRC was subjected 
to probing questions from its local constituents and outside critics alike, it is worth noting that it 
has not become institutionalised as an accountability mechanism, nor have rights or procedures 
been established to enable SWRC’s beneficiaries to review spending regularly, demand a 
justification for spending from the leadership or enforce sanctions for inappropriate spending.   
The exercise was a response to allegations from local and state politicians that SWRC was 
channeling foreign funds to a local organisations that was not registered to receive outside 
funds, not to demands from the membership to review spending. 
 
In contrast, victims of the devastating cyclone which hit the east Indian state of Orissa in early 
2000 did begin to pose questions about the uneven coverage of NGO and government relief 
operations.  To answer to these concerns, Action Aid India held village-level ‘social audits’ in 
Orissa to review its emergency work.  These were public hearings to audit the Food-for-Work 
relief programmes and the delivery of other relief supplies like housing material and emergency 
rice.  They served as an opportunity to criticize the organization of relief-delivery and to air 
complaints abut the composition of disaster-recovery committees – for instance, about the 
exclusion of women from these committees.  They enabled the NGO to provide a more 
appropriate service.  But, like the SWRC’s public audit, though this method imposes 
requirements of answerability on the NGO leadership, it does not provide NGO clients with 
means of enforcing sanctions should the need arise. 
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Sources: Bunker Roy, ‘Transparency in the Voluntary Sector: A First Step’, Economic and 
Political Weekly, 29 November, 1997; ActionAid India,  ‘Social Audit Update’, Super Cyclone 





Successful national and global NGOs are undergoing organizational transformations which make 
them more closely resemble large corporate bodies than the small voluntary societies from which 
they originated.  Historically they have tended to substitute informal control mechanisms, which 
rely upon the incentives created by shared ideologies or faiths, for the ‘harder’ accountability 
mechanisms involved in formal bureaucratic reporting measures.  This is now proving inadequate 
to inculcate huge new staff cohorts with the same degree of probity and selfless commitment 
shared the organizations’ founders, or to ensure consistency in service quality across far-flung 
operations.  Breakdowns in the capacity of ideology, religious morality or socialization to 
promote probity are evident in reports of financial scandals and human rights abuses within faith-
based organisations.  These scandals are driving previously subordinated and newly empowered 
memberships to insist on new and explicit controls on religious leaders, as well as socially just 
standards of accountability to enable churches to catch up with changes in social norms, for 






Box 11  
 
From Solidarity to Accountability:  Faith is not Enough to Ensure Probity 
 
Christian Churches around the world are being subjected to increased calls for accountability, 
both to prevent corrupt practices and to satisfy members’ demands for just treatment. 
 
In 1998 the eighth assembly of the World Council of Churches adopted a series of 
recommendations aimed at empowering women against oppressive structures. An open letter 
from members (entitled ‘From solidarity to accountability’) called for churches to fulfill their duties 
of solidarity with women, including breaking the culture of silence around violence and abuse 
and creating restorative justice processes for victims.  In response the assembly agreed, among 
other things, to encourage churches to provide opportunities for women to speak out about the 
issues of violence and abuse, and to encourage the use of languages and policies to combat the 
exclusion of people from leadership positions on the basis of gender, age, race, cultural 
background and disability. 
 
In 2001 a major new campaign was launched demanding that the Vatican be held accountable 
for the measures it is taking to protect women against harassment.
72  A demonstration was held 
outside the Vatican’s UN Mission in July 2001 following reports in the US National Catholic 
Reporter (16 March 16 2001) of the sexual harassment, exploitation and even rape of Roman 
Catholic nuns by priests.  According to supporters, despite being briefed on the facts of sexual 
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violence against nuns in 1995, the Vatican has taken no action to end this abuse.  One of the 
many petitions of this campaign calls for the Vatican to reveal measures it has taken to secure 
justice for women; to cooperate with local civil authorities by providing evidence and assisting 
with the prosecution of Catholic church officials involved in rape and other sexual violence; and 
to issue a public apology for all forms of violence against women, including sexism, committed 
by its church officials.
73 
 
There are numerous other cases of increased calls for accountability in churches, including 
financial accountability to guard against corruption.  The Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) church’s 
recent troubles included scandals over interest-free loans to church officials and the misuse of 
the Parsonage Exclusion as a tax benefit.
74  Members for Church Accountability is a group of 
SDA church members concerned about improving accountability within the SDA church.
75 
Arguing that recent events (including an elder’s resignation after being ‘involved with business 
entrepreneurs’) have exposed flaws in the church’s leadership structures, they concentrate on 
three areas: reform in financial accountability; policy-compliance reform; and representation 
reform.  
 
Sources:  http://members.aol.com/advmca/home.htm; 
http://www.truthorfables.com/Members_for_Church_Accountabilty.htm; 
http://www.8thdaycenter.org/AccPetit.htm; http://www.calltoaccountability.org   
 
 
The new levels of scrutiny to which non-public and global economic institutions are being 
subjected are even prompting them to ensure that their own internal accountability mechanisms 
can compensate for inadequate pubic accountability mechanisms when they engage in co-
production of services, or participate in new oversight agencies.  This appears to be a concern 
driving the World Bank’s approach to creating a new pubic oversight agency for monitoring the 








Accounting for Oil Revenues in Chad 
 
 
Chad is expected to experience something of an oil boom in the years to come.  The emerging 
institutional set-up for ensuring that the riches help to benefit the country as a whole – and in 
particular the poor majority – is a good example of how new pressures for accountability force a 
range of key actors to adapt.   
                                                 
73 http://www.8thdaycenter.org/AccPetit.htm  
74 http://www.truthorfables.com/Members_for_Church_Accountabilty.htm  
75 http://members.aol.com/advmca/home.htm            Page 53 of 88 
   
 
The World Bank has been the object of increased demands in recent years – from both 
protestors and the governments that collectively own a controlling interest in the Bank – to 
increase its accountability to disadvantaged people in the countries in which it operates.  The 
World Bank is, in financial terms, a small player in the deals being struck between the 
Government of Chad and the international oil companies.  So the issue of how the government 
accounts for the funds provided by the World Bank is much less critical than the larger question 
of how to ensure that the government’s share of the oil proceeds is not stolen or wasted by 
officials.  But the Bank’s participation in the project provides critical bridge financing and is 
crucial in cementing the deals with oil companies, because it signals that the Government is a 
reputable player.  The Bank is using this leverage as a way of pushing the government and the 
oil companies into creating a novel accountability mechanism.   
 
Because of the fear that the oil firms and the government will collude to skim off funds from the 
oil revenues, the Bank has insisted on the creation of an ‘independent accountability board’.  Its 
mission will be to oversee not only the negotiation of agreements and the collection of funds, but 
also to ensure that a percentage of the oil profits is ploughed into social development.  The 
board will include several representatives of civil society organisations as full members.  There 
are substantial fears, however, that this kind of arrangement will encounter difficulties, and in the 
absence of elements of a larger accountability system – functioning courts to adjudicate disputes 
in the functioning of the board, and a strong electoral commission to make elections more free 
and more fair – this kind of mechanism on its own will fail to safeguard the interests of the poor.  
Perhaps more importantly, the means for ensuring the accountability of the board’s non-
governmental representatives are inadequate.  Even if their commitment to financial probity 
could somehow be ensured, the forms of intimidation to which they could be subjected by 
politicians who command the security services are uniquely broad in scope, making 
independence of action by this agency unlikely. 
 
Part of the pressure on the World Bank to insist on these kinds of oversight mechanisms stems 
from earlier accountability failures in Bank-funded projects.  A recent independent report on the 
need to learn lessons from past mistakes referred specifically to the Chad pipeline project.
76  
The report recalled the massive displacement produced by the Guatemala’s Chixoy Dam, built in 
late 1970s and early 1980s with financing from the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank.  The Guatemalan military massacred the Amerindian Rio Negri community 
which was in the way.  The report argues that the World Bank could have done more to prevent 
this atrocity – in effect substituting internal for external accountability as an interim measure.  
The context of civil conflict is common to both the Guatemala and Chad cases, and the report 
demands that the Bank insist upon more accountability, less impunity, and a greater willingness 
to share information broadly.  
 
Sources: ‘Chad's Wait for Its Oil Riches May Be Long’, New York Times, 16 May 2001; World 
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4.2 New Methods across New Jurisdictions 
 
The increasing extent to which actors in accountability relationship are assuming new roles 
inherently implies the emergence of new methods.  For instance, direct citizen involvement in 
auditing, of the sort mentioned in the discussion of the MKSS, involves new means of securing 
financial autonomy: the public hearing.  It is nevertheless helpful to treat these two aspects of the 
emerging accountability agenda separately so that the other factors driving the adoption of new 
methods can be discerned, and their implications for the objective of enhancing human 
development more clearly understood.   
 
This section examines new methods that have emerged as a result not merely of there being a 
greater number of actors in the accountability business, but because of the new opportunities that 
arise as a result of the changing nature of boundaries.  It thus focuses on the relationship between 
‘where’ accountability is being sought, and ‘how’ it is being sought.   
 
The survey of new methods begins from the premise that we are witnessing a general 
reorganization of ‘accountability jurisdictions’, the spaces within which accountability can be 
legitimately sought.  This reorganization – the ‘where’ – has three key dimensions, each of which 
has changed the way people and institutions have sought to place checks on the powerful (the 
‘how’): 
 
1.  First, a geographically expanded legal sphere, as well as the ability of civil societies to 
engage in surveillance across national borders, has produced efforts to make human rights 
abusers answer for their actions, and to make firms and governments liable when they fail 
to comply with international environmental and labor regulations, no matter where these 
abuses occur.   
 
2.  Second, the reorganization of accountability jurisdictions has also been manifested by the 
proliferation of local-level arrangements for ensuring fairness in resource distribution and 
in seeking justice.   
 
3.  Third, the borderless world of cyberspace has created not only a new site of 
accountability; it has also thrown up new ways of bringing people together to demand it.   
 
 
4.2.1 Globalizing accountability jurisdictions 
 
Accountability (like impunity) no longer stops at national boundaries.  Ex-heads of state enjoying 
domestic immunity for human rights abuses are being charged under the domestic laws of other 
states, and arrested for trial or extradition when they travel.  Corporations that profit from abusing 
labor rights or ignoring environmental protections in host countries are being chased by their 
victims to courts in the corporations’ home bases.  These initiatives are globalizing jurisdictions 
for the prosecution of violations of human and environmental rights.  Other initiatives are 
somewhat less adversarial, and involve controlling large corporations through new regulatory 
devices (process standards) monitored through self-governing structures that involve states, 
international agencies, private firms and NGOs.  It is, in other words, not just the scope of           Page 55 of 88 
   
accountability jurisdictions that are being stretched in these cases; the methods for demanding 
answers and enforcing punishments are evolving too.   
 
Accountability of Former Heads of State 
 
The initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions by national courts using domestic law against 
human right abusers in other countries is heralding a new era of judicial activism and 
restructuring accountability jurisdictions.  International legal instruments for trying crimes 
against humanity such as international human rights regimes and specialized war crimes courts 
(Nuremberg, Tokyo, the UN Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda) 
have been in existence for half a century.  But some contemporary human rights prosecutions are 
altering the geographical, institutional and legal space for holding human rights abusers and 
corrupt officials to account.  
 
The best example of this are the efforts since 1996 to hold General Augusto Pinochet, leader of a 
military government that ruled Chile between 1973-1990, accountable for crimes of kidnapping, 
torture, and murder committed while he was in power.  What makes this case a departure from 
other efforts to hold former dictators accountable for crimes in office is that a single country, 
Spain, was asserting its jurisdiction primarily through domestic, not international, laws (See Box 
13).  Thus a former dictator was threatened by a legal action brought not through an international 
court, but rather through a unilateral decision made in the judicial system of a single country.  
The appeal by national courts to universal jurisdiction to punish the most heinous crimes against 
humanity means that sovereignty cannot be claimed as a cover for domestic atrocities, and that 










In July 1996, the Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon began proceedings in a Spanish federal 
court against Pinochet and other Chilean military junta leaders and members of the DINA (the 
secret police) for kidnapping, illegal detention, torture and murder committed in Chile and other 
countries between 1973-89.  Garzon was able to do this because of the deep penetration of 
international human rights law into the domestic legal order in Spain.  In the mid-1980s, 
jurisdiction for universal crimes (crimes against humanity) was inscribed into the Spanish Penal 
Code and other bodies of domestic law.  The Spanish Constitution also notes that ‘validly 
enacted international treaties, once officially published in Spain, shall form part of the internal 
legal order’.
77  Spanish law also recognizes the principle of ‘individual international 
responsibility’, a key statue in international law which expressly denies immunity attached to the 
official capacity of a person accused of a crime against humanity.  These provisions enable 
Spanish courts to prosecute offenses perpetrated by non-Spanish actors, including state 
functionaries, against non-Spanish citizens.   
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Two years later, a Spanish extradition request obliged the British government to put Pinochet 
under arrest while on a visit to the UK for medical treatment.  After protracted preliminary 
questions in the British courts dealing with the immunity of a former head of state, and the scope 
of the extradition enquiry, Pinochet faced extradition and trial in Spain for torture and conspiracy 
to torture.  This was eventually dropped on health grounds, and he was returned to Chile.  The 
decisions of the Spanish courts and the UK House of Lords which interpreted international law to 
override the immunity of a former head of state empowered Chilean legal activists, such as 
prosecutor Juan Guzman, to challenge the Chilean amnesty for Pinochet, and several months 
after his return the Chilean Supreme Court upheld an appeals court decision to lift Pinochet's 
amnesty and the immunity of other army officers.  Using international law, the Chilean judiciary 
was emboldened to gather testimonial and forensic evidence of mass graves and concentration 
camps, and Guzman brought 105 civil actions against Pinochet.  In early 2001, judicial 
proceedings against Pinochet were again dropped on health grounds (dementia), but trials of his 
subordinates are on-going.  
 
In spite of the failure to prosecute Pinochet directly, this case has signaled the end of impunity 
for public acts in violation of international law.  A direct consequence of the Pinochet 
proceedings was the arrest in February 2000 in Senegal of Chad’s former dictator, Hissene 
Habre.  This was the result of a civil, not a state action, when Habre’s victims – survivors of 
torture and terror – traveled to Dakar to testify in court.  In this case the domestic legal system 
was unable to uphold the action.  Habre’s arrest was overturned by another court and the judges 
were fired.  
 
Sources: M. Feitlowitz, ‘The Pinochet Prosecution: The Genocide Controversy’, 
(www.crimesofwar.org, 2001); R.  Lagos, and M. Munoz,  ‘The Pinochet Dilemma’, Foreign 
Policy, (Spring, 1999) pp. 26 – 39; and R.J. Wilson,  ‘Prosecuting Pinochet: International Crimes 
in Spanish Domestic Law’, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 21 (1999 ), pp. 927-979. 
 
 
The cases of private prosecutors seeking to make human rights charges against ex-heads of state 
from other countries has implications for the balance of power between politicians and the 
judiciary in domestic accountability relationships.  The increased willingness of judges to apply 
European and international law in the face of executive resistance, and the support for this by a 
public tired of impunity, raises the importance of judicial review as a means of holding pubic 
bodies legally accountable, and implies a shift of power from politicians to judges.  Trans-
national rights regimes such as the European Charter, with its 50 rights that underpin European 
life, and the 1998 European Human Rights Act, raise the possibility of the development of 
constitutional rights that transcend national rights regimes, giving more power to individuals and 
the judicial system in relation to politicians.
78   
 
Another implication of cases where international law is used by one country to try perpetrators of 
atrocities that occurred elsewhere is that accountability relationships may be viewed on a global, 
not a national scale.  The assertion of universal jurisdiction for crimes in international law 
enables states to take unilateral action against human rights abusers, no matter where they come 
from, when the opportunity arises.  This was the case with the June 2001 convictions of two 
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Rwandan nuns in Belgium for genocide.  In this case, the state was prosecuting on the basis of an 
international law that allows its courts to hear cases of atrocities committed by war criminals 
seeking sanctuary on its territory, even if the atrocities occurred abroad.
79   
 
The global reach of activist judges and the assertion of universal jurisdiction for crimes against 
humanity have raised concerns about the unevenness of this means of accountability.  The 
emerging trend of bringing civil actions against human rights abusers is inevitably opportunistic:  
arrests cannot be made unless the individual in question has left the security of his or her own 
country.  Actions so far, therefore, have been rather sporadic, and this kind of judicial activism 
does not represent the coordinated and comprehensive investigation and trial of human rights 
abusers that is needed to hold them to account.   
 
The growing need to address human rights abuses in a more comprehensive and continuous way 
than provided for through specialized war crimes tribunals has produced pressure for institutional 
developments in two directions:  first, for the establishment of a permanent international 
institution with global jurisdiction – an International Criminal Court – and, second, for more 
effective prosecution of human rights abuses at their source, through indigenous local legal 
instruments such as the local justice tribunals in Rwanda (discussed below).   
 
While war crimes tribunals provide the forum for trying prominent human rights abusers, they 
are inevitably highly selective: not only are very few people tried, but very few wars are 
considered for judicial investigation.  Inevitably such selectivity implies that global power 
relations determine what actions and individuals will be tried.  In response to this problem, there 
has been a push for a more permanent international criminal court that could function more 
autonomously of geopolitics.  In 1999 in Rome, 120 countries agreed to establish a global legal 
institution, an International Criminal Court.  These types of international legal institutions hold 
citizens of sovereign states accountable to global society, not just to citizens of their own 
countries.  Other supra-national legal institutions have been used by domestic civil society groups 
to hold states and their domestic legal systems to account for failing to protect the rights of their 






Using Supra-National legal Institutions to Address Domestic Human Rights Violations 
 
In 1998, the Budapest-based European Roma Rights Centre took a case of torture and 
degrading treatment of a Roma in police custody to the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg.  The Roma Rights Centre represented a Roma teenager, Anton Assenov, who had 
been beaten by Bulgarian police.  The European Court ruled against the Bulgarian government 
in finding that it had violated Assenov’s rights to physical security in police custody.  It also ruled 
against the government for failing to make an official investigation of the incident.  This was a 
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landmark ruling in that it extended the scope of international law by making the right to an 
investigation part of the right to be free of official mistreatment. 
 
Source:  Mary McClymont and Stephen Golub,  Many Roads to Justice, (The Ford Foundation, 




Although international human rights law is increasingly internalized to the domestic legal 
regimes of countries that sign international human right treaties, enforcement mechanisms remain 
weak.  For instance, although the rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Latin 
America are accepted as binding by 21 of the 34 members of the Organization of American 
States, very few of these have enforcement mechanisms built into their national laws.  It is often 
left up to NGOs and other civil society groups to monitor Inter-American Court rulings and see 
that they are enforced in domestic courts.  
 
Litigating Against Corporations 
 
Multinational corporations are the second major target of judicial activism through 
geographically expanded legal jurisdictions.  UNCTAD estimates there to be 60,000 parent 
corporations world-wide, with over half a million foreign affiliates.
80  This is a burgeoning set of 
transnational actors which are felt to have growing influence over economies but to be 
insufficiently accountable for the impact of their activities on the environment or the welfare of 
workers.  The failures of both developed and developing country governments to defend 
domestic interests in the face of these companies’ commercial activities are feeding the 
perception that governments are increasingly upholders of commercial interests at the expense of 
human development or environmental protection.  
 
Central to an emerging ‘foreign direct liability’
81 legal instrument is the notion of holding parent 
companies to account in their home jurisdictions for the actions of their subsidiaries elsewhere.  
Actions are brought by citizens (and occasionally states) that have experienced negative 
environmental or health impacts as a result of corporate activity.  Cases include litigation in the 
US against Texaco over its environmental impacts in Ecuador; Unocal in relation to alleged 
human rights abuses associated with its investment in Myanmar; Freeport McMoran over the 
environmental impacts of its copper mine in Irian Jaya; and against Union Carbide following the 
Bhopal disaster (where the state of India was itself the plaintiff on behalf of the victims).
82  In the 
UK, actions have been brought against Rio Tinto over its Rossing uranium mine in Namibia, and 
against Thor chemicals for mercury poisoning suffered by workers in its South African mercury 
recycling plant.  In Canada the mining company Cambior faced litigation over pollution from its 
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United Nations, 1999). 
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Options’,  Hastings Comparative and International Law Review (March 2001). 
82  In the Bhopal case, the decision of the lower court in the US was that the US was not the appropriate legal forum 
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gold mine in Guyana.  Central to all of these claims is the demand that home countries accept 
increased responsibility for regulating the negative extraterritorial impacts of multinational firms. 
 
This form of transnational litigation takes two lines of argument.  Most of the US-based litigation 
is concerned with corporate compliance with the norms of international law, using the 1789 Alien 
Tort Claims Act which allows foreigners to bring civil claims against a party in the US that has 
violated laws or treaties to which the US is signatory.  Alternatively, litigation in the UK or 
Canada (and to some extent the US also) is concerned to make parent companies ensure that their 
behavior as direct investors elsewhere matches the standards of care that would be expected of 
them at home.  Foreign litigants acquire legal standing on the basis of an English legal provision 
which allows courts to hear a case if there is no other appropriate legal forum.  A recent House of 
Lords judgement allowed 3000 South Africans to bring an action against an English asbestos 
company in the UK rather than in South Africa where the injuries were sustained, because a lack 
of appropriate legal representation meant that the South African litigants would not likely enjoy 
full access to justice in their home country (See Box 15).  Aside from the still unresolved 
implications of this decision for company law (which separates the identities of parent companies 
and their subsidies, thereby limiting parent company liability), this decision takes courts into 
politically sensitive decision-making about judicial systems and the administration of justice in 
countries hosting multinational operations.   
 
So far not one of the major foreign direct liability cases has resulted in a clear win for the 
plaintiffs, though some cases (for instance against Thor Chemicals in the UK) have been settled 
out of court.  However, these efforts have usefully opened up corporate governance for scrutiny, 
and triggered efforts to re-work company law in the light of economic globalization in order to 
end the legal fiction that parent companies are distinct from their subsidiaries.  Legal challenges 
to the impunity of corporations in exploiting labor or environmental resources have prompted 
greater corporate interest in establishing and adhering to voluntary production and social 
standards, to which we turn next.  However, adversarial legal tactics have potentially negative 
effects.  Instead of prompting greater transparency from corporations as they become more 
concerned about good practice, a legal risk-management approach might result in greater secrecy 
about environmental and human rights impacts.  Framing corporate accountability as a matter of 
holding firms to production and environmental standards which apply in their countries of origin 
may be difficult to justify if different environmental or social standards are deliberately chosen 








Justice Away From Home:  Prosecuting Asbestos Poisoning 
 
A group of South Africans suffering from asbestos-related conditions contracted while working 
                                                 
83   Ward, ‘Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability…’, p. 12           Page 60 of 88 
   
for Cape Asbestos SA (Pty) Ltd during or before the 1970s were told they could sue the British 
parent company, Cape plc, which pulled out of South Africa in the 1970s and now works in 
asbestos removal.  Cape closed its British operation in 1968 because of the high incidence of 
asbestos-related disease, but let the South Africa operation go on for another decade. 
 
In 1979, when Cape sold its South African operations, no trust fund had been established and 
no medical scheme was put in place.  Many former workers have asbestosis, a disease that 
destroys the lungs and eventually kills its victims, has no cure, and can lie dormant for up to 40 
years. 
 
Cape had argued the case should be fought in South Africa on the grounds that it was the most 
natural jurisdiction.  The Law Lords’ decision in mid-2000 to uphold the plaintiff’s appeal for the 
case to be tried in the UK meant that for the first time British courts have been confronted with a 
group action from foreign workers. 
 
If the case were moved to South Africa, the five Law Lords found, ‘the probability is that the 
plaintiffs would have no means of obtaining the professional representation and the expert 
evidence which would be essential if these claims were to be justly decided. This would amount 
to a denial of justice’.
84  The verdict upheld the Law Lords’ groundbreaking 1997 decision to 
allow former Rossing Uranium engineer and throat cancer patient Eddie Connelly to pursue his 
case in England because funding was not available for a trial in Namibia.
85 
 
The South African government had approached the House of Lords at the same time as the 
plaintiffs.  ‘The allegations against Cape did not take place in a legitimate legal system and the 
new South African Government cannot afford to determine every wrong of the old regime 
through its judicial system’, the South African government noted in its submission.  The 
discriminatory health and safety laws, which left South African workers unprotected, or 
significantly underrepresented, against known risks as a matter of South African law were 
against the law of humanity’.
86 
 
In May 2001 a trial date was set for April 2002.  At the time of writing Cape plc was said to be 
considering proposing an out of court settlement. The number of claimants involved had grown 
to over 4500, although at least 60 had died while the proceedings continued. 
 






Alternatives to Litigation: Voluntary Certification Schemes 
 
An increasingly popular alternative to litigation as a method for pursuing accountability is the 
development of schemes for voluntary certification.  ‘Process standards’ – and programs for 
certifying adherence to them – continue to proliferate, but their common characteristic is the 
                                                 
84 Multinational Monitor, vol. 21, no. 9 (September 2000). 
85 http://www.whitelung.org/alerts/cape.html   
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desire to increase the reliability of the information on which consumers make decisions.  They 
are based on a belief that a good proportion of consumers are willing to pay more for products 
that have been produced in ways that minimize negative social and environmental consequences.  
They are a method for coping with the uncertainty and lack of familiarity that arises when 
transactions take place across jurisdictional boundaries – that is, where neither government-
imposed criteria of accountability, nor the capacity of governments to enforce them, are uniform.   
 
One of the most familiar programs is Rugmark, a scheme that certifies products that are created 
without child labor (See Box 16).  Programs like Rugmark arise not only as a way of avoiding the 
costs and difficulties of private litigation, but also as a means of overcoming the political and 
practical problems of enforcement mechanisms based on the threat of government-imposed trade 
sanctions.  Proposals for sanctions-based regimes are a major point of controversy in discussions 
on the shape of the international trading system.  Detractors – including most developing country 
governments – see them as a threat to their sources of comparative advantage, and a disguised 
form of protectionism.  Advocates of regimes for enforcing labor and environmental standards 
through the use of sanctions see them as the only method with strong enough ‘teeth’ to force 







Rugmark: Certifying  Child Free-Free Production  
 
The Rugmark initiative was established in 1994 to address the problem of child labor in hand-
knotted carpets in South Asia. It was set up by consumer groups, carpet manufacturers, bilateral 
donors such as the German Agency GtZ and international organisations such as UNICEF.  
Manufacturers perceived a potential threat to the carpet industry from the possibility of external 
boycotts.  Under the Rugmark scheme, goods made without child labor are labelled as such and 
production facilities are monitored and inspected. In addition, education is provided for child 
workers who lose their livelihoods when firms agree to be bound by the terms of the scheme. 
Funding is derived from 1 percent of the market value of carpets from importers for schools and 
training programmes and 0.25 percent of the value of the carpets from exporters for financing 
inspections.  The first school was opened in 1996 and a rehabilitation centre run by the South 
Asian Coalition on Child Servitude was also established. In the first year of Rugmark’s operation, 
unannounced inspections revealed 760 children working illegally on 408 looms. By September 
1996, enforcement action had led to the decertification of 164 looms where violations had been 
found. While there have been some successes, the fear is that child workers may simply end up 
employed in more hazardous industries, and there are reports that many carpet manufacturers 
are moving from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh to neighbouring Bihar, where child labor is 
abundant, particularly to remote villages where monitoring becomes more difficult, if not 
impossible. 
 
Sources: J. Hilwitz, ‘Social labelling to combat child labor: some considerations’. International 
Labor Review, vol. 136, no. 2 (1997); UNICEF, State of the World’s Children 1997; M. Sharma, 
‘Marked for life’, New Internationalist, no. 292, p.29. 
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But in the case of trade standards on the use of child labor, practical difficulties arise that can 
make them counterproductive – for instance, driving dismissed child workers further into poverty 
– though in some cases novel multipartite agreements have been developed to cope with these 
complex circumstances (see Box  17 on the case of the Bangladeshi textile industry).  While the 
factors affecting the viability of trade-sanctions-based regimes may vary from issue to issue, the 
idea that they can undermine the very objectives they were meant to advance has reinforced the 
movement towards voluntary compliance schemes.  Despite this, a number of trade-sanctions-
based agreements are in existence, including provisions in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the US Generalized System of Preferences, and the recently negotiated bilateral trade 
agreements between the United States and Chile, Singapore and Jordan.  Nevertheless, the 
international political stalemate (partly but not entirely on North-South lines) on the question of 
permitting sanctions within the context of the World Trade Organization has made the voluntary 
certification route the main avenue of accountability efforts by default.  How much support they 





Box 17  
 
Dangers of Sanctions-Based Enforcement of Standards: Bangladesh Textile Industry 
 
 
In 1993, a news report broadcast in the United States exposed the employment of child labour in 
Bangladesh by contractors of Wal-Mart, a large US retailer.  The fear of consumer boycott led 
Wal-Mart to cancel contracts with Bangladeshi textile manufacturers.  In 1994 the threat of 
legislation in the US that would prohibit imports produced with child labour, and the possibility of 
further consumer pressure in the US to end US textiles trade with Bangladesh, resulted in 
mobilisation of the Bangladeshi textile industry to protect their trading relationships with US 
importers.  An estimated 50,000 children were dismissed.  A number of studies concluded that 
many of these children ended up in the informal sector in workshops subcontracted by textiles 
enterprises, working in worse conditions.   
 
Concerned about the impact on child workers and their families, the Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and ILO/UNICEF (supported by the 
Government of Bangladesh and the US Department of Labour) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) in 1995 to end employment for children under 14 years of age.  The 
agreement requires manufacturers to subsidise schooling for ex-child workers and pay stipends 
of US$ 6.88 per month to those that leave the factories to attend the schools.  It allows the ILO 
to design a monitoring system, offers employment to family members of ex-child workers, 
prohibits factories from hiring new underage workers, and ensures that factories re-employ ex-
child workers when their schooling is completed. The stipends and monitoring are jointly funded 
by the BGMEA, ILO and UNICEF. 
 
A 1995 survey found child workers in 43 percent of BGMEA member factories. By early 1998, 
only eight percent of BGMEA factories still employed child workers. The absolute number of 
children working in factories also declined.  In October 1998 only 35 children were found 
compared with hundreds of children earlier.  By 1999, 8,193 ex-child workers had been           Page 63 of 88 
   
withdrawn from the textile industry and enrolled in the education programme. This number 
gradually decreased to 3,351, as some children reached the age of 14 and were eligible to work. 
This also meant a drop in the number of schools established under the MOU.   
 
Sources: R. Rothstein, ‘The Starbucks solution: can voluntary codes raise global living 
standards?’, The American Prospect, vol. 7 no. 27 (1996);  CUTS, ‘Eradicating child-labour while 
saving the child - who will pay the costs?’, CUTS Briefing Paper No.5, (Jaipur: CUTS Centre for 
International Trade, Economics and Environment, 1999); ILO, IPEC action against child labor: 
Achievements, lessons learned and indications for the future (Geneva, ILO, 1999);  and 
Commonwealth of Australia, Report on Labour Standards in the Asia-Pacific Region. 




There are by now a vast array of standards-based schemes.  Indeed, as one review of the literature 
argued, ‘a major problem’ in promoting compliance, ‘lies with the large number of standards.  
Making sense of such standards can be a bewildering and complex undertaking’.
87  In practice, 
the proliferation of voluntary agreements has made it difficult for consumers – who in many 
cases represent the means of enforcement – to understand the criteria used to assess compliance 
with standards, or to be sure that the mechanisms for assuring compliance are effective.   
 
These problems have been manifested by embarrassing failures of the monitoring mechanisms 
used in these certification schemes.  The US-based Social Accountability Initiative (SAI), which 
assesses the production methods used by supplier firms, had certified that a footwear production 
facility in China’s Guandong province had satisfied the requirements of its SA8000 factory 
conditions standard.  But in 2000 when investigators from the US National Labor Committee 
inspected the factory, which is owned by a Taiwanese company, ‘they  found dormitory rooms 
packed with up to 28 people and work shifts that normally ran to 12 hours’.  Moreover, they 
learned that the management had recently fired workers who had gone on strike against 
withholding of wages and excessive hours, and that ‘[w]orkers had also been coached to lie to 
SA8000 inspectors’.
88   
 
These kinds of failures have been at least part of the reason why there has been renewed interest 
in a different variant of non-compulsory accountability promotion: the multilateral pact.  The UN 
Global Compact, because of its association with the Secretary General’s office, has been perhaps 
the most high profile, but it lacks many essential features of enforcement.  The Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, substantially revised in 2000, adopts a more complex structure – one 
that brings governments more directly into the process (See Box 18).  This most recent swing of 
the pendulum (moving governments into non-official processes) is, in a sense, the mirror image 
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Box 18   
 
Multilateral Codes of Conduct: State-Corporate-NGO Partnerships in Promoting Accountability 
 
In June 2000 33 countries signed up to an OECD-endorsed code of conduct for how firms 
should conduct business outside their home jurisdictions.  These Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises – a revised version of a procedure originally adopted in 1976 – include provisions on 
labor relations, environmental protection, consumer affairs, the promotion of local economic 
development, and even how to contribute to the fight against corruption.   
 
The way in which the Guidelines are to be used reveals important changes in the methods for 
achieving accountability.  Governments, rather than non-governmental human rights groups, are 
responsible for investigating allegations that firms are violating provisions of the code of conduct.  
But the complaints themselves need not be initiated by governments, though the exact rules of 
eligibility for who is authorised to initiate a complaint are a matter of controversy: there is still no 
consensus among governments, or between governments and business interests, on which 
agents are considered legitimate enough formally to demand answerability. 
 
The act of investigating the complaint rests with the National Contact Point, or NCP, a 
government office located within each of the countries that have endorsed the Guidelines.  The 
NCP, which in some countries is multipartite (with regularized involvement from trade unions, 
business associations and NGOs), is empowered to engage in negotiations with a firm that has 
been found to have violated one or more provisions of the code.  If the NCP is not satisfied with 
the firm’s proposed remedial action, or the implementation of the remedy, it is then able to issue 
a report about the allegations, its findings, and the outcome of the mediation talks with the firm.   
 
In other words. the function of answerability is subjected to a separation of powers (or division of 
labor), in which civil society can initiate demands for answerability, but only government officials 
are able actually to secure the answers through an investigative process.  The function of 
enforceability is also delegated to yet another sphere, the larger court of media and public 
opinion.  The NCP’s report on the findings of its investigations does not trigger formal regulatory 
or legal proceedings.  Media pressure and public opinion are expected to bear the full burden of 
catalyzing a popular backlash against erring firms.  Fear of a tarnished corporate image is 
deemed a sufficient incentive to prevent firms from violating the code of conduct in the first 
place. 
 
This type of accountability mechanism suffers from at least four key shortcomings.  First, like any 
system that puts power in the hands of a delegated representative, there is no guarantee that 
the NCPs will not become either directly corrupted, making them unwilling to pursue genuine 
cases with vigor, or else indirectly pressured by political forces acting on behalf of business 
interests that back them.  Second, mechanisms that rely on public pressure, or even the threat 
of consumer pressure, place a sometimes unrealistic faith in the ability of citizens to keep 
abreast of the latest information about corporate behavior, or even to care enough about it 
(when they are aware) to take punitive action such as changing their consumption patterns or 
signing petitions.  Too much may also be expected of the media, which is compromised in some 
cases by patterns of corporate ownership, as well as by its short attention-span.  Third, the 
enforcement mechanism relies on consumer power, which is more the province of the middle 
class than the truly disadvantaged.  This implies that accountability will not be directly to the 
poor, though depending on the nature of complaints investigated it could represent indirect           Page 65 of 88 
   
accountability in the interests of the poor.  Fourth, there is the risk that the complaints procedure 
could be abused.  The U.S. Council for International Business, which was heavily involved in the 
consultative process that produced the revised guidelines, fears that firms could have their 
reputations smeared by competitors, who would lodge complaints as a way of ‘grabbing market 
share’.  These kinds of opportunistic complainants would provide another chance for an 
unprincipled NCP to engage in corrupt behavior, in effect blackmailing firms with threats of 
negative findings even when there had been no wrong-doing.  Such vicious circles have been 
the bane of conventional accountability efforts, and despite the novel features of the OECD 
approach, they could very well re-establish themselves in a new guise. 
 
Sources: OECD Observer Policy Brief: The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(Paris, June 2001); OECD website (www.oecd.org); OECD, ‘Summary Report of the Chair of the 
Meeting on the Activities of National Contact Points’ (Paris, 21 September 2001), and Susan 






4.2.2 Alternative accountability mechanisms at the local level 
 
Political decentralization and devolution of development decision-making and budget control to 
the lowest possible level is assumed to produce increased public sector accountability.  This 
assumption rests on the principle of reducing the number of intermediaries between citizens and 
the decision-making, spending, and project-execution processes, with the expectation that citizen 
scrutiny and the responsiveness of public agents will both intensify with the shrinking of physical 
and social distance between the two.
89  A number of decentralization experiments take the 
principle of eliminating intermediaries as far as physically possible, by endowing respected local 
leaders with the legal responsibility to adjudicate disputes, or by assigning decision-making 
power and financial control over development projects to village assemblies, and entrusting small 
project execution teams, composed of the very people who will benefit from the investment, with 
responsibility to construct, operate, and maintain the project.  Citizen engagement in adjudicating 
local disputes, or in planning and even delivering services, make for a much more palpable sense 
of voice and influence in the public sphere than do more conventional forms of engagement such 
as voting for a candidate to represent one’s views, or lobbying through a civil society 
organization, where there is scant connection between one’s views and official actions.   
 
Local tribunals using customary law and employing respected local people as magistrates are, it 
is hoped, able to open up access to justice, take pressure off the courts, and speed up dispute 
resolution.  They are based upon the notion that reputation, trust and reciprocity can substitute for 
cumbersome formal procedures such as cross-examination, formal representation and the 
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collection of evidence.
90  This is the justification for setting up ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ 
mechanisms at the local level, an area in which there is currently much experimentation in Latin 
America.
91  The contemporary experiment to empower local tribunals in Rwanda to hear some of 
the backlog of cases of genocide to which the overstretched formal national and international 
justice system are unlikely to attend is another example (see Box 19).  There is much controversy 
over the appropriateness of these efforts to localise the accountability institution of the law 
through these parallel and informal justice systems, because they assign a morality to localities 








Traditional Yet Unconventional: Local Forms of Prosecuting Genocide Participants in Rwanda 
 
Given the procedural formality of the UN International Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, it is not 
surprising that the wheels of justice are moving very slowly.  Only nine cases have been decided 
since 1994 – eight convictions and one acquittal.  A widespread fear that endless delays will 
allow those responsible for acts of violence to escape punishment has catalyzed the search for 
new mechanisms of accountability.  The government is now seeking to adapt a traditional 
system known as Gacaca, or ‘justice on the grass’, which refers to the fields on which 
community elders adjudicate disputes.   
 
An important feature of Rwanda’s genocide was that, in terms of implementation, it was a 
decentralized affair.  Those who actively participated in the violence certainly received 
inspiration and direction from above, but the killing and maiming took place locally.  The only 
people who can provide testimony to the events are people from the locality.  So it is at this level 
that cases will be adjudicated, by local ‘judges’ selected by local people.  In October 2001, the 
process of identifying the quarter of a million people who will act as judges began.  Each citizen 
is entitled to volunteer names of suitable candidates of probity and rectitude to act as judges.  
Elections are only held if someone objects to a particular nomination.   
 
People charged with engaging in violence will be tried in the villages where their alleged crimes 
took place.  The judges will be assembled into 19-judge ‘benches’, and will collectively decide 
cases on the basis of testimony provided by local people.  The mainstream court system will 
judge those charged with ‘Category 1’ offences – ringleaders and those who were particularly 
cruel or responsible for the deaths of large numbers of people – but all others will face the 
Gacaca process.  The Gacaca judges will be given legal training, and are due to begin work in 
late 2002. 
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91 Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes within the Framework of the World-Wide Access to 
Justice Movement’, The Modern Law Review, vol. 56, no. 3 (1993), pp. 282-296. 
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It is too early to judge the effectiveness of this experiment, though it is clearly part of a wider 
trend towards adopting non-conventional means of ensuring accountability.  But the risk remains 
that the desire to substitute new methods for those that are seen to be failing the poor will 
overpower the necessity of learning from past mistakes.  The accountability of these new 
accountability mechanisms will need to be addressed.  But oversight institutions will find it 
difficult to monitor developments in such a large number of localities.  Decentralized initiatives 
are known to fall prey to skewed local power relations.  An even more alarming prospect, as the 
Economist magazine pointed out, is that there is ‘no guarantee that people involved in the 
genocide will not be selected as judges’.
93 
 





Community engagement in dispensing justice or managing projects is not synonymous with 
accountability. On the contrary, elite capture and the use of local funds to fuel patronage 
networks is one predictable outcome of devolved justice or project implementation.  To avoid 
this, some decentralization models have placed substantial accountability or vigilance tools more 
directly in the hands of local people.  Bolivia’s Law of Popular Participation empowers elected 
community leaders in Vigilance Committees to call for local audits and even trigger the 






 Local Vigilance Committees in Bolivia 
 
Bolivia’s 1994 Law of Popular Participation empowers democratically elected municipal councils 
to design and implement local development policies and programmes, with finance transferred 
from the central government.  Organizations Territorial de Base (Community Based 
Organisations) are given jurisdiction over a given territory and assigned rights and duties 
covering a range of social, infrastructural, productive and environmental matters.  Because they 
co-manage funds with the municipality, they are empowered to scrutinize the municipality’s use 
of assets and income.  The feature of the law of Popular Participation that is considered the 
most progressive is the creation of a new institution, the Vigilance Committee, composed of six 
elected CBO leaders.  It acts as a ‘watchdog’ on the municipal council, assigned the task of 
ensuring that community projects and priorities are reflected in municipal budgets and 
expenditures.  
 
It is also empowered to wield a legal instrument called a denuncia against local councils that are 
suspected of corruption.  The VC can call for regular audits of local government, and if it detects 
corruption, it can lodge a complaint with the national executive branch, which passes it on to a 
special committee of the Senate, which can in turn suspend central funds to the erring council 
until the case is resolved.  Although these Vigilance Committees can and have been captured by 
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elites, they have been able in other cases to expose corruption and unseat errant local 
politicians. 
 
Source:  James Blackburn and Jeremy Holland, Who changes?  Institutionalizing Participation in 
Development, (London; Intermediate Technology, 1998). 
 
 
Kerala offers perhaps the strongest model of devolved accountably responsibilities.  A new right 
to information at the local level opens for scrutiny all planning documents, including those 
related to beneficiary selection and estimates, bills and receipts for input to public works.  
Photocopies are supplied free on demand.  At the site of every public work, a daily notice lists the 
names of workers and wages earned, materials purchased with unit costs, quantities and transport 
charges.  This act of transparency has already revealed a tendency for women workers to be paid, 
illegally, less than men, and for all workers to be paid more than the nationally prescribed rates 
for anti-poverty public works employment.
94  
 
The selection of beneficiaries for national anti-poverty resources such as credit, subsidized 
housing and latrines, and homestead plots for landless people – normally a highly politicized 
process because of the use of these resources to reward clients in patronage networks – is subject 
to particularly intense public scrutiny in Kerala.  Numerical weightings – ‘relative backwardness 
points’
95 — are assigned according to criteria of need that are agreed in village assemblies.
96  
Eligibility criteria for anti-poverty benefits are published locally, and applicants must complete 
forms and attend a village assembly meeting at which all applications are publicly assessed and 
ranked according to the previously established criteria.  A sub-committee, composed of local 
politicians, government officials, citizen members of planning groups and volunteer resource 
persons, verifies the list of beneficiaries to ensure that no one is mis-representing their eligibility.  
The advantage of this system is that poor decisions can be disputed by appealing to publicly 
agreed and measurable criteria of need.  The great transparency in the composition and 
publication of beneficiary lists ensures that skewed resource distribution patterns (or attempts to 
disguise them) become more immediately apparent and may provoke citizen protests.   
 
In spite of this formidable array of measures for local accountability, there is relatively little take-
up in Kerala of opportunities to hold local officials to account.  Efforts to invoke rights to 
information about the basis for beneficiary selection can be met with delaying tactics or demands 
for payment.
97  Some of the pubic notice boards for posting local spending information have been 
transformed into cinema poster hoardings.  And there are plenty of accounts of malpractice in 
local spending, exclusion of the poor, women, and scheduled castes from planning and decision-
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making, including direct and sometimes violent suppression of their efforts to participate.
98  This 
attests to the limits of putting the onus of vigilance on those who have the least time for, and the 
most to lose from, challenging the local power-holders on whom they most likely depend for 
employment or patronage.   
 
Too many efforts to localize planning and service delivery through citizen engagement have 
enabled local elites to corner an undue share of government resources, or else have lost their 
initial energy through paralysis or a lack of technical sophistication.
99  The growing evidence that 
‘power at the local level is more concentrated, more elitist, and applied more ruthlessly against 
the poor than at the centre’
100 has in some contexts promoted a re-engagement of central 
authorities to support local people in their struggles against power-holders, or to defend minimum 
performance standards.  Recognised by students of local government as the ‘ironic paradox of 
decentralization’,
101 this selective engagement of central authorities in local service delivery has 
in some cases been successful in building the autonomy of service providers in relation to local 
elites, while at the same time building their direct accountability to service users.   
 
Selective central engagement to hold local powers to account has produced an important new 
model for service delivery, recently given the seemingly contradictory label of ‘accountable 
autonomy’.
102   This approach offers, on the one hand, better information to providers about 
client needs (and to clients about providers’ plans) through the device of regularly bringing the 
two together to review problems in service delivery and find local solutions.  This builds the 
responsiveness and direct answerability of providers at the local level.  On the other hand, central 
line managers remain involved in monitoring these local deliberative processes, ostensibly with a 
view to checking the tendency towards license or dissipation in local decision-making.  The 
involvement of central actors defends the autonomy of service providers in relation to local elites, 
and also back-stops local accountability mechanisms through externally-imposed oversight and 
sanctions.  One of the best-known examples of this approach to designing accountable and 
responsive local services is the Health Agent Program in Ceara state, Brazil (see Box 24).  
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Local School Councils in Chicago – A New Central-Local Partnership to Improve Schooling 
 
A crisis in Chicago’s education system, which by 1987 had been labeled ‘the worst in the nation’ 
by the then Secretary of Education William Bennett, triggered a profound reorganization of 
management and control systems to devolve considerable authority over day-to-day 
management and longer term planning to school staff and parents.  Since 1988, elected Local 
School Councils, with representatives of parents, the community, teachers, and the school’s 
principal, have governed Chicago’s schools, with powers that make the Chicago school system 
the most decentralized and participatory urban educational system in the US.  LSCs are 
responsible for hiring, firing, evaluating, and determining the job definitions of the principals of 
their schools.  They approve and monitor school budgets, develop three-year ‘School 
Improvement Plans’, and control discretionary state funds allocated to schools in poorer areas.  
This system creates the short feedback loop between planning, implementation, and results 
assessment – a way of combining ex ante and ex post accountability – which is one reason why 
local management is regarded as delivering services better tailored to community needs. 
 
Central authorities offer training to LSC representatives in order to build technical capacity (in 
budgeting, planning, and curriculum development).  Central authorities monitor performance 
outcomes in order to provide accountability in the school system.  When fewer than 15% of 
students score at or above national norms on standardized reading tests, the school in question 
is put on ‘academic probation’.  But rather than re-establish centralized direction over laggard 
schools, the first step of central authorities is to strengthen the quality of community engagement 
in school planning and problem-solving.  Frequently this means mediating deadlocked conflict 
on the LSC, or using publicity and open debate to expose and weaken the grip of particular self-
interested local groups over school management. 
 
This new structure is neither centralized nor decentralized.  It gives much more power to local 
educational staff and clients than the previous top-down and expert-based approach to schools 
management.  However, LSCs remain dependent on central offices for various kinds of technical 
support, and accountable to them for both process integrity and performance outputs.  The main 
corrective measure that central authorities impose on failing schools is not punishment, but a 
renewed investment (through community mobilization, dispute resolution and mediation, and 
building technical skills) in effective community collaboration over schools management.  This 
has the effect of altering the incentive structure of education providers – teachers and school 
principals report directly to parents, creating a client-centered, problem-solving approach that re-
directs their responsiveness reflexes downwards towards clients rather than upwards to 
superiors.  The result has been an improvement in test score performance of Chicago schools, 
even though in the decade that this experiment has been underway, students entering the public 
school system have become increasingly disadvantaged and less well prepared. 
 
Source: Archon Fung, ‘Accountable Autonomy:  Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago 
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The internet is an excellent example of the way in which the creation of new methods of 
promoting accountability (the question of ‘how’) coincide with the emergence of new arenas 
within which accountability can be pursued (the question of ‘where’).  The worldwide web and 
its associated toolkit of electronic mail, discussion lists and chat rooms offers new techniques for 
a range of agents seeking accountability.  For example, US states’ environmental agencies are 
using the internet to provide citizens with information, gather public input on agency decisions, 
and foster networks of interested citizens, even if they still offer limited opportunity for online 
interaction.
103  Korean civil society organisations have used the internet for advocacy and 
campaigning to make effective demands for political reform.  Although only reaching a portion 
of the population, their recent efforts included disseminating information about election 
candidates, and listing several who were deemed unfit for election.
104   
 
But the worldwide web is not just a tool for surveillance and communication, it is also a new, but 
geographically unconfined ‘space’ – a digital environment within which it becomes possible to 
both force answers from powerful actors about their behavior and mobilize other agents (official 
and unofficial) to impose punishments on those whose conduct is found unacceptable.   
 
Pursuing this logic, Allen Hammond and Jonathan Lash have asked whether the rise of 
something they call ‘Cyber-Activism’ is ‘creating a kind of civil accountability that imposes 
novel checks and balances on the power of global corporations, providing new ways of 
articulating and enforcing social values – in effect, giving rise to new forms of governance?’
105  
 
Cyber-activism, they argue, is indeed ‘an intensified, Internet-enhanced form of voluntary social 
activism directed against major corporations that run afoul of social or environmental 
expectations’.  They cite in this connection the process by which Nike was pushed into reforming 
itself.  After labor abuses at Nike production facilities in the developing world had been 
publicised through the internet, the company’s management initially tried to brush off the 
charges.  Eventually, it pursued a radically different strategy, and its CEO admitted publicly that 
‘[t]he Nike product has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime and arbitrary 
abuse’.  Finally, Nike used the internet to promote the reforms it was undertaking in order to 
improve the conditions of workers and the environments of the localities in which it operated, a 
strategy which other companies, most notably the oil giant Shell, subsequently adopted with 
much success.     
 
Another successful case is the campaign by Rain Forest Action and Greenpeace against Home 
Depot, the world’s largest lumber retailer, which resulted in the company’s management 
undertaking to cease sourcing timber from endangered forests and from suppliers that engaged in 
unsustainable harvesting practices.  The key feature of this campaign was that it involved not 
only these two well-known NGOs, but also a larger constellation of accountability agents that, 
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were it not for the internet, would have remained invisible, dispersed and rendered impotent by 
their isolation.  These included ‘hundreds of environmental organizations and grassroots groups 
that built public awareness through e-mail, Web sites, advertising and media stories and 
coordinated protests in stores across North America’.  As one commentator put it, ‘even as the 




Hammond and Lash refer to this general phenomenon as ‘civil accountability’, inferring that 
internet and communications technology have fostered a new form of civil society geared 
towards a new type of accountability-enhancing activism, operating in a new de-spatialized 
environment.  Some of the issue networks formed are catalysed by well-known organizations like 
Amnesty International, but  
 
their real power results from the actions of ad hoc communities of interest formed in 
cyberspace.  Such communities are not located in a geographical place, rarely have a 
formal structure, do not go through long periods of door-to-door solicitation and 
organizing, and do not raise funds from foundations.
107   
 
But while the ability of autonomous networks to defy the conventional constraints on activism is 
what makes them so promising as a more direct channel of accountability, it is their disregard for 
the conventions that underlie established accountability institutions that makes them problematic.  
In particular, the notion of due process is undermined by the immediacy of the reputational 
penalties imposed on both public and private actors.  Criteria for weighing information are 
usually vague and subject to change without notice, and the scope for malicious misinformation 
enormous.  Which is why the need for perhaps more formal accountability mechanisms to 
regulate this type of behavior is becoming more apparent, and the demand for it is growing.  
While it will never be possible to solve the problem of infinite regress – the need for watchdogs 
to watch over watchdogs, ad infinitum – the question of how to strike the right balance will 
similarly remain with us.  
 
For this reason, some web-based accountability agents are seeking to promote a more structured 
approach, employing more rigorous methodologies to provide information, on an ongoing basis, 
about the actions of powerful actors.  The press – a more conventional form of this activity – has 
always found it difficult to separate its news-reporting and editorializing functions.  Agents of 
‘cyber-accountability’ will be no exception.  Nevertheless, web-based organizations like 
Corporate Observer Europe, and many others like it, seek to engage in world-wide surveillance, 
using local affiliates to build a global picture of the activities of multinational firms.  They focus 
on creating transparency, rather than simply demanding that it be instituted, in the sense of taking 
information in the public domain or available through the work of local investigators, and 
actively disseminating it through the internet.  The underlying principle is that for dispersed 
voices to enforce accountability, passive transparency must be supplemented by active watching, 
and that this requires a coordinated, if unofficial, channel.   
 
                                                 
106 David Ignatius, ‘A Global Marketplace Means Global Vulnerability’, Washington Post, 21 June 1999. 
107  Ibid.           Page 73 of 88 
   
The World Resources Institute (WRI) is creating a particularly ambitious form of internet-based 
decentralized-yet-global surveillance.  They call it Global Forest Watch, and as with the other 
examples, it is not, on its own, a fully assembled accountability mechanism.  The objective is for 
it to serve as a tool that can enhance the substance of accountability relationships – informed 
questioning leading to more serious answerability.  Through a collaboration among more than 
100 scientists, the WRI in 1997 produced maps that indicated the location of what was left of the 
world’s old forests.  This information-supply catalyzed an interesting demand response from 
forest-protection groups in many countries.  Their concern was not simply in formulating a one-
off campaign to bring whoever was responsible for forest depletion to book, but rather in 
contributing additional information, in a uniform format, to build a more sustained instrument for 
pursuing accountability.   
 
The local groups will keep tabs on the activities of logging companies, and register their findings 
in the on-line database, including indications of where practices have violated internationally 
recognized sustainable-harvesting standards.  This will create a constantly updated visual 
representation of the world’s forest cover, including indications of the actions of individually-
named firms.  The aim of Global Forest Watch is to systematize the anarchy of fragmented 
surveillance to help it contribute a new tool to struggles for accountability – that is, ‘to become a 
kind of Human Rights Watch for endangered forests, a disciplined Internet community that 
ensures a fair and objective scrutiny of the practices of all forest product companies.’
108  
 
Another variant of cyber-accountability is to subject the detailed functioning of formal 
accountability institutions to scrutiny, and to publicize the findings in real-time form on the 
internet.  An important example of this is the work of the Public Service Accountability Monitor 
in South Africa (see Box 22).  There are serious questions about the potential for this type of 
initiative – external monitoring of accountability systems – to catalyze the sort of public outrage 
that would make them effective.  This reservation is all the more pertinent given the serious 
equity concerns inherent in the nature of the technology.  While the internet can help to publicize 
how the actions of the powerful negatively affect the poor, and in some cases reveal, in painful 
detail, the failures of accountability institutions designed to protect disadvantaged people, 
cyberspace is a forum that, in its current form, largely excludes the poor from active 
participation.  Accountability to the poor is replaced by what may be, for the time being, the 






Real-Time Monitoring of Accountability Processes 
 
The Public Service Accountability Monitor, based in South Africa’s Eastern Cape province, 
keeps track of ‘individual cases of misconduct and corruption and the reactions of the 
responsible departments to these cases’ and ‘monitors the performance of individual 
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departments’ compliance with regulations and implementation of disciplinary procedures’.
109  
The non-profit groups that operate this programme take advantage of the highly developed 
transparency and right to information provisions in the South African constitution and related 
legal instruments.  Were government accountability agencies not obliged to divulge details of 
their own oversight and enforcement activities, it would not be possible for the PSAM to subject 
them to an independent analysis to determine whether they are conforming to procedural 
standards, before posting the raw data and legal analysis on the web.  In other words, this is a 
non-official watchdog keeping the official watchdog under surveillance.  As the programme’s 
management puts it, their objective is to ‘follow-up’, in minute detail, the ‘cases of public sector 
corruption and maladministration…in an objective and politically non-partisan fashion’.   
 
The fairly straightforward methodology is based on verified information obtained through a 
standard process.  First, the PSAM compiles reports of ‘misconduct, corruption and 
maladministration’ by monitoring the press, and documents produced by the government’s 
Special Investigating Unit, the Auditor-General’s office, the Parliamentary public accounts 
committee and NGOs.  Each case is entered into the PSAM database, and assigned a 
researcher.  Based on consultations with legal advisors, the researcher analyses which 
regulations have been breached and which disciplinary procedures should have been 
implemented.  The researcher then conducts a thorough investigation in order to establish the 
basic details of the case, before conducting tape-recorded telephone interviews with 
representatives of the concerned departments.  The representatives are selected in consultation 
with the Director General’s Office of the Eastern Cape and, when police cases are involved, the 
Provincial Commissioner of the South African Police Service.  The interviews are based on a 
pre-prepared list of questions about the case and its relations to relevant legislation, 
management procedures and public service rules. 
 
A transcribed copy of the interview questions and case summary is sent to the Director-General 
of the Provincial Administration and the Speaker of the Provincial Legislature requesting them to 
take cognisance of the case and to pursue appropriate action.  Finally, the case information is 
published on line, including responses from all the actors involved.   
 
The starting point for the project is a belief that ‘when public resources are abused through 
corruption and maladministration it is ordinary members of society, and in particular the poor and 
unemployed, who suffer the consequences’.
110  ‘The PSAM believes that if public officials who 
have been found guilty of acts of gross misconduct, corruption or maladministration continue to 
be employed, this sets the precedent that misconduct will be tolerated by public service 
management’.  And for public officials to be held accountable, the public must ‘be reliably 
informed’ about not only the general level of service delivery outputs, but also ‘the performance 
of individual departments and officials within the public service’.  And on this score, the PSAM 
recognizes that there are serious institutional shortcomings to the accountability agencies in the 
South African system.   
 
The Auditor-General’s office is only able to obtain funds for its investigations from the 
government institutions it audits, and many of these refuse to pay, or claim a lack of funds.  
When audits do take place, the fact that it must await submissions from the relevant entities 
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being subjected to the audit means that its access to information is limited, in many cases, to 
general aggregate financial statements which cannot be cross-checked against other 
documentation. 
 
The Public Protector has the power to investigate and report on a wide range of activities within 
the public service, but the only interventions it can then engage in are ‘mediation, conciliation 
and negotiation’.  It has no enforcement powers, and its recommendations can be ignored by 
departments under investigation.     
 
The Heath Special Investigating Unit (SUI) cannot investigate any case until it has obtained 
authorisation from at least four different government departments, after which a Presidential 
proclamation may be forthcoming before it can investigate any case.  And while there are quasi-
judicial mechanisms – the Special Tribunal attached to the SIU – that may order any official 
found guilty to repay the misappropriated funds, and can recommend disciplinary action and 
criminal prosecution, the SUI itself ‘has no mandate to monitor or enforce these 
recommendations’. 
 
Visitors to the PSAM’s website can find regular updates on specific cases, or can receive 
automated email notifications of new updates.  A posting of 13 June 2001, for example, included 
new details of the Department of Agriculture’s failure to discharge its accountability function: it 
had, contrary to disciplinary procedures, not suspended an official convicted for the rape of 
colleague's 12-year old daughter.  While on bail pending the outcome of his appeal, he remained 
on the residential premises of the educational institution in which he worked, and raped another 
colleague’s daughter – a nine-year-old.  The PSAM dossier documents that the Department 
conducted no investigation and never charged the official with misconduct.  The PSAM also 
obtained and posted the Department head’s explanation for why no disciplinary measures were 
taken, which was that the matter was a subject of legal proceedings.  The PSAM then posted 
the relevant regulations that discredited this justification, and provided evidence that in fact the 
Department had no written record of the case at all.   
 





4.3 New Standards of Accountability 
 
New popular understandings of accountability are emerging that go beyond the conventional 
usage of the term.  These standards relate mainly to the conduct of power-holders (what they are 
accountable for), but also such related issues as the appropriate standard of evidence, the 
suitability of the proposed sanction, and the legitimacy of the chosen arena.  Accountability has 
traditionally been based upon an assessment of whether procedures have been followed 
diligently, not whether a desirable outcome has been produced.  To use the idea and mechanisms 
of accountability to pursue social justice is to elevate a popular expectation about democratic 
governance – that it should be responsive and egalitarian – into a formal objective of institutions 
of public oversight.  To assess accountability processes and failures from the perspective of social 
justice means bringing a normative concern with the quality of the outcomes of public decisions 
and actions to our review of the fairness of accountability procedures, or the soundness of 
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concerns with process integrity, but also respond to norms of social justice.  In the context of 
development, this means holding state and non-state actors accountable for their contribution to 
the opportunities for poor people to realize substantive freedoms.   
 
This final element of the new accountability agenda – the shift in the standards of probity and 
justice used in accountability relationships – is to some degree implicit in the previous three.  
When the actors in accountability relationships begin assuming new roles, and use new methods 
to do so across jurisdictions of variable size, inevitably the standards against which conduct is 
judged are bound to shift.   
 
There are, however, two reasons why it is useful to examine this element of the new 
accountability agenda separately. 
 
First, the appearance of social justice and equity as measures of accountability reflects the way 
new standards of public morality have emerged from successful challenges to failing or grossly 
biased accountability relationships in institutional arenas beyond the ‘official’ public sphere.  In 
arenas such as the family, market, and identity community, socially inequitable relationships 
have often been neglected or tolerated by the state on the grounds that they are best dealt with 
through voluntary mechanisms or through customary dispute resolution.  The rules governing 
accountability relationships – who must explain their actions to whom, who suffers sanctions 
from whom – are specific to each institutional arena, shaped by the contractual terms of the 
relationships into which individuals enter (e.g.: marriage, wage labor, charity-beneficiary).  As 
weaker parties to these arrangements elicit state support to combat sexism, racism, or other forms 
of disadvantage in these non-state arenas, expectations are created that institutions of public-
sector oversight should address these same social inequities in all of activities they audit, disputes 
they adjudicate and performances they evaluate.   
 
Changing norms are not just the result of there being new sorts of actors and new forums for 
seeking accountability; they are also an important cause.  Something must have changed in the 
perceived legitimacy of non-governmental actors for them to have become – as they have in some 
instances – accepted partners in state-run accountability institutions, or for women’s objections to 
sexism and autocracy in Christian churches to have received a response.  It is hard to escape the 
conclusion that there is a relationship of reciprocal influence between the processes of 
accountability (the relationships between agents and objects, and methods and arenas) and the 
standards to which these processes are expected to conform.  When previously excluded or 
overlooked social groups demand more direct accountability, systems of justice and standards of 
fairness must confront the reasons why they were overlooked or excluded in the first place, and 
begin to challenge the elitist biases which may have produced this exclusion.  
 
The second reason for examining the issues of standards separately is the on-going contestation 
over standards, with dominant parties in accountability relationships anxious to limit expectations 
about what they should be accountable for, and less powerful actors pressing to make the 
achievement of social-justice outcomes the measure of probity in public actions.  In the context 
of globalization, for instance, we have seen that some standards of accountability are lowered: 
deregulation and the competition for inward investment allows firms to choose locations offering 
the least onerous regulatory environments.  But globalization has in another sense driven 
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diffusing new understandings of basic human rights.  Globalization has also provided small non-
governmental organizations the technology required to network with counterparts around the 
world – and thereby to gain access to information on the activities of governments, firms, and 
even other NGOs, and ultimately to disseminate these damning reports to a worldwide audience 
of concerned citizens, state agencies and multilateral actors. 
 
The survey of the way changing standards are affecting the operation of accountability 
institutions examines three contemporary phenomena: 
 
1.  First, the problem of moral-procedural lag, where accountability procedures have not 
kept pace with changing popular expectations of probity and justice in public and private 
actions.  Often this happens because of the resistance of power-holders to upward revision 
in the standards of accountability; 
2.  Second, a move to specify citizen rights to accountability by expanding citizens’ rights to 
information or to litigate in cases of poor performance; and 
3.  Third, the trend towards rebuilding the sense of trusteeship and probity amongst public 




4.3.1 The Moral-Procedural Lag 
 
The phenomenon of a disconnect between more exacting standards of accountability and 
insufficient means for enforcing them still plagues efforts to hold corporations to account.  
Popular demands that even indirect impacts of corporate operations be subjected to a high 
standard of social justice and equity are have not been matched by reforms to domestic and 
international law.  In October 2001, at a hearing in the European Parliament, Premier Oil, a 
British petroleum firm, was accused by the NGO Earth Rights International of having been a 
party to human rights violations (including forced labor) through its operations in Burma. What is 
striking is how out of sync with changing standards of accountability was the firm’s official 
response to the charges.  According to Premier Oil’s Corporate Social Responsibility Officer, 
‘There are no international sanctions that do not allow our operation to go ahead there’ – a 
legalistic formulation that, while broadly technically correct, neglects the changing criteria 
against which powerful organizations are being judged in the court of public opinion, a barometer 
to which Members of the European Parliament are acutely sensitive.  As the  reporter for the 
London-based Guardian newspaper put it, Premier’s contention was that ‘it could not be held 
responsible for the behavior of troops it retained to protect its pipeline and employees’.
111  But, in 
fact, not only was the firm being held ‘responsible’; it was also being held accountable (in a 
strictly de facto sense) in that changing standards of public morality had forced it to at least 
answer for its alleged conduct. 
 
The idea of new standards of accountability against which actions are judged does not always 
involve more rigorous enforcement.  Most Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are based on 
the idea that officials who abused their power during authoritarian regimes are obliged to provide 
                                                 
111 Andrew Osborn, ‘British Oil Firms Accused of Burma Abuses’, The Guardian (London), 12 October 2001.           Page 78 of 88 
   
answers about their actions – for instance, what happened to disappeared persons – but that in 
exchange the state forfeits its right to impose penalties.  This is answerability without 
enforceability.  Indeed, answerability – the obligation to divulge the ‘truth’ – is obtained at the 
expense of enforceability because otherwise the still powerful offenders would not likely submit 
to a public cross-examination, preferring to hide behind legal protections.  There are doubts, as in 
the case of South Africa’s Truth Commission, about the value of voice delinked from 
institutional, as opposed to moral, accountability.  Some clinical studies have found that the 
victims of abuse, or families of those killed, derive little psychological benefit from these 
processes.
112  Some commissions can use the information obtained in order to mount further 
investigation and prosecution through normal judicial processes or administrative tribunals.  But 
even where they do not, truth commissions demonstrate a means of imposing new and exacting 
standards of answerability by enabling ordinary people to cross-examine their oppressors.   
 
 
4.3.2 Specifying Rights to Accountability 
 
In the face of the proliferation of more exacting standards of accountability, public-sector actors 
have tried to contain and channel citizen expectations through two diametrically opposed 
approaches to standard-setting.  The first approach is to publicize performance standards in order 
to focus the efforts of service providers on minimum and feasible performance, and to provide 
clients with a benchmark against which they can measure the quality of services they actually 
receive, and for which they can hold service providers to account – through citizen monitoring, 
for instance.  However, few standard-setting exercises, such as citizens’ charters or performance 
targets, provide citizens with a legal entitlement to pursue redress for sub-standard performance.   
 
A more radical response to new expectations of accountable performance is to extend to citizens 
full rights to information and rights to sue providers, or else statutory rights to the service in 
question (education, employment, health care).  This implies a more extreme vision of 
accountable public sector management than many states can entertain.  It reverses the political-
administrative control system from one in which the state controls society on the basis of a 
democratic mandate from the people, to one in which society controls the state more directly 
through legal accountability mechanisms. 
 
There is evidence that citizen command of rights to information and litigation has the effect of 
empowering citizens in relation to providers, and in some cases of triggering a public sector 
response.  In the case of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme in India, statutory 
rights to employment (and to unemployment benefits) give poor people the grounds to challenge 
collectively any failure on the part of local authorities to create jobs.  There have been a number 
of successful Public Interest Litigation cases which have secured government admissions of 
responsibility, though none yet has secured actual pay-outs of lost wages.  The Government of 
India has recently (August 2000) made education a statutory right.  This may yield some fruitful 
citizen monitoring and litigating efforts, particularly where universal access to education has been 
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further supported by such experiments as the Education Guarantee Scheme (soon to be followed 
by a Healthcare Guarantee Scheme) in the state of Madhya Pradesh. 
 
States have been more willing to grant citizens statutory rights in relation to controlling the 
excesses of market agents.  Here there is some very strong evidence of success.  A study that 
examined the effect on environmental regulation of the state-sponsored right-to-know and right-
to-sue provisions in the US found that such rights are highly effective in holding industrial 
polluters to account.  The study found that efforts to engage citizens in environmental regulation 
through the more conventional means of consultation, public hearings, and so on, tended to be 
cosmetic measures.  But states that armed citizens with the right to sue polluting industries, and 
with state-funded right-to-know programmes providing information on toxic emissions, had 
lower rates of toxic emissions over time.
113 
 
One problem with rights-based provisions for transparent governance, is that this is a demand-
driven approach which puts the onus upon citizens to demand their rights, or when these are 
denied, to initiate proceedings against service providers.  Demand-driven approaches can put 
certain categories of client in a disadvantaged position, if they are from marginalized groups who 
are unaware of their rights in the first place, or who are geographically or socially distant from 
providers and are therefore not well-equipped to press demands.  Rights-based approaches to 
service delivery do not necessarily oblige government workers to initiate, suo moto, a service or 
provide information to a particular client group.  A good example of a rights-based program that 
was stillborn for this reason is a Madhya Pradesh scheme which guaranteed tribals’ rights to their 
original land.  No land was ever returned, as few tribals were aware of this scheme, and few 
bureaucrats saw good reason to take on powerful interests controlling tribal land. 
 
It has been a constant theme of this chapter that transparency and access to information is 
essential to accountability, and standards of what constitutes genuine transparency are changing 
fast, if not faster, than the criteria against which the substantive actions of firms and governments 
are judged.  In this sense the new accountability agenda is about enriching the more conventional 
notions of accountability and ways of bringing it about.  The United States Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires all federal government agencies and departments 
to measure the results of programs and services they provide.  It is intended to improve program 
effectiveness by promoting a new focus on results, service quality and customer satisfaction.  It is 
thus indirectly a part of the new accountability agenda, in that such efforts help to increase the 
base of information on which agents of accountability can challenge officials.  Though not 
automatically linked to penalties for poor performance, such measures constitute an indirect form 
of answerability – by responding to the prefabricated question, ‘what have you achieved?’.  
Access to this information facilitates more direct forms of answerability by enabling auditors, 
legislators, and ordinary citizens subsequently to ask more pointed questions, such as ‘why, given 
the clear evidence of non-achievement, should we support continued expenditure?’  There has 
been a strong backlash against the proliferation of information and reporting requirements in 
public administration – measurable indicators, performance benchmarks, service charters – 
because they appear overly bureaucratic, excessively costly, and infinitely manipulable.  All of 
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which is very often true.  But just as it is important not to jettison the concept of voice in the rush 
to embrace the hard-edged certainties of accountability, it is also necessary not to abandon the 
instruments with which a more evidence-based approach to reason-giving and explanation-
demanding can be constructed.  
 
But even as this chapter has stressed the necessity of information and transparency, it has warned 
that access to information is not a sufficient condition for producing accountability.  Efforts by 
people and NGOs in Angola to keep tabs on the use of resources derived from petroleum 
revenues is a good example of this.  One report states that ‘Angolans cannot hold the government 
to account for the oil funds because there are no reliable figures and no way of finding out how 
much money is there in the first place’.
114  But this reveals only part of the truth.  The lack of 
information is just one among many impediments to achieving accountability, though a critical 
one.  But, again, the shifting standards of what are considered sufficient levels of transparency 
are changing the outlook.  BP Amoco in Angola began publishing information that was once 
considered far too confidential to share with the outside world, including the total net production 
of each BP oil block, the level of payments made to Sonongal (the petroleum parastatal) as part 
of revenue-sharing agreements, and the amounts paid in taxes and other bonus payments.  Just 
having this information will not be enough to force either Amoco or the government to begin 
doing business in ways the benefit poor people.  But without it, any hope of more socially 
desirable outcomes is almost impossible to imagine. 
 
 
4.3.3   The Return to Trusteeship 
 
In the field of public service delivery, a few contemporary efforts to elicit a responsible use of 
discretion by ‘front-line’ service providers are producing new standards of service provision and 
a new type of government worker, closer in training, character and commitment to the NGO 
workers with whom they have so often been unfavorably compared.  A classic obstacle to more 
responsive service delivery is the difficulty of finding a balance, for front-line service providers, 
between responsiveness to the dictates of hierarchical superiors in administrative accountability 
systems, and enough discretion to enable them to react creatively to local needs.  The fact that 
unchecked discretion has resulted in opportunistic entrepreneurship by local officials
115 produced 
a ‘New Public Management’ bias towards enhanced hierarchical accountability systems and the 
introduction of competition with private sector providers in the 1980s and 1990s.
116   
 
But there is a competing view that holds that a bureaucratic culture that provides some significant 
degree of discretion serves the interests of democratic accountability better than one which 
stresses strict central control.
117  This is because while checks and constraints on discretion may 
                                                 
114 Lara Pawson, ‘Fields of Dreams’, BBC Focus on Africa (June 2001), p. 34. 
115  Robert Klitgaard, ‘Incentive Myopia’, World Development, vol. 17, no. 4 (1989), pp. 447-59. 
116  A. Gelb, J.B.Knight, and R.H, Sabot, ‘Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking, and Economic Growth’,  The 
Economic Journal,  vol. 101 (September 1991), pp. 1186-99. 
117  Judith Tendler, Good Governance in the Tropics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995);  
Colin Campbell, ‘Turning Full-Circle? Public Choice, Problems with Implementation and the Return to Trusteeship 
in Public Service’, paper prepared for delivery at the 18
th World Congress of the International Political Science 
Association, Quebec City, August 1-6, 2000           Page 81 of 88 
   
minimize corruption, their punitive nature fails to educate pubic officials into using their moral 
agency in ambiguous situations, or to build their personal and institutional resources to behave 
with probity when faced with ethical challenges.  This is precisely what some recent 







US Whistle Blower Protection Act of 1989. 
 
This act protects those who make ‘disclosures regarding illegality, abuse of authority, gross 
waste, gross mismanagement or substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.  
Though not especially new, the idea behind the act reflects at least four of the concerns driving 
more recent concerns with accountability.   
 
First, it conveys a sense in which public servants are expected to conform to higher standards of 
probity, including intolerance for malpractices in their midst.  
 
Second, it opens to public scrutiny accountability relationships within the state, particularly the 
bureaucratic chains of command that can, in the name of administrative accountability, actually 
smother genuine accountability to ordinary citizens.   
 
Third, though a piece of government legislation, it is one around which focused civil society 
activism has sprung up: The Government Accountability Project (GAP) is a U.S.-based 
‘nonprofit, nonpartisan public interest group’ that defends the rights of employees who "blow the 
whistle" on illegal or potentially harmful activities of government agencies.  Its main focus now is 
on implementing the law in the US, which includes defending those punished for whistle-
blowing, and disseminating the idea internationally.   
 
And, fourth, whistle-blowing is embedded in the idea of international human rights.  The GAP is 
in fact ‘looking for test cases to develop a precedence of whistleblower protection as a human 
right in tribunals such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
 
There are a wide variety of ways in which the legislation has been used.  Whistleblowers at a 
nuclear facility in Ohio alerted regulatory authorities to environmental and safety standards 
violations, and the resulting investigation helped to prevent the completion of a similar plant.  
After a police chief fired a whistleblower who had reported him for cruel and racist behaviors at a 
Veterans Administration hospital, the police chief was dismissed, prosecuted on several 
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A more radical example comes from the state of Ceara in Northeast Brazil, where the standards 
of service delivery in a range of sectors improved dramatically in the 1990s through, among other 
things, an investment in the quality of discretion and responsiveness of the lowest-level pubic 
sector workers.  Between 1987 and 1994, two successive reformist governors turned around 
mediocre public agencies in the health, agriculture, informal-business-support, and public works 
sectors to produce responsive and effective pubic services.  These generated palpable human 
development gains in what had been one of Brazil’s poorest states.  Most impressive of all were 
the reforms to a rural preventive health service which, in the space of five years, increased 
preventive health coverage from 30 to 65% of the state’s population, contributed to a 36% drop in 
infant mortality, and tripled coverage of some vaccines (See Box 24).   
 
In this and other public services, the key to reforms was not, as in so many public-sector 
accountability-related reforms, a standardization of tasks and a multiplication of reporting 
requirements upwards in the chain of command.  Far more important were measures to build 
probity, commitment to clients, and new poverty-sensitive standards of care. This was achieved 
by rupturing the control of local politicians over program budgets and personnel, and creating 
conditions for field workers to use their discretion in developing a locally appropriate service.  
Field workers did not use this expanded discretion to limit their workload and constrain client 
demands, as is so often the pattern where service providers are over-worked and under-
motivated.
118  Instead, a sense of commitment to clients produced ‘self-enlarging’ interpretations 
of worker responsibilities, resulting in new and high standards of care.  The maintenance of 
massive publicity for reform experiments meant intense and constant public scrutiny of these 








The Health Agent Programme in Ceara, Brazil: Worker Discretion Builds New Standards of Care 
 
This program required the recruitment of 7,300 new basic community health workers (mainly 
women) and 235 nurse-supervisors to carry out infant vaccinations and child preventive health 
campaigns. Recruitment of these non-tenured, low-skill field workers from the same 
communities in which they were to work was conducted centrally by the office of the state 
governor.  This bypassed the patronage systems of the local mayor, and even the control of the 
health department.  The state lavished an unusual amount of publicity on the large local 
recruitment process, thereby ensuring that considerable public prestige was given to attainment 
of the job on merit.  This socialisation of both successful and unsuccessful job applicants, and 
indeed the local communities, to the programme’s social ‘mission’ during the hiring process was 
the first step in building the state-citizen sense of joint purpose which has sustained the 
programme.  Unsuccessful applicants and community members were encouraged from the start 
to act as unofficial monitors of the programme and to report both poor performance and success 
stories.   
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Non-material incentives helped to develop job commitment and responsible use of discretion.  
The three months’ training was more than tenured public sector workers normally received.  
Health agents were immediately noticed and welcomed by local communities, thanks to their 
‘uniform’ of a white T-shirt emblazoned with the programme’s name, blue backpacks filled with 
supplies, and their substantial presence – between 30 and 150 – in the locality.  The enormous 
publicity given to the ‘noble’ mission of improving local health also endeared workers to the local 
community, something that contributed to their job satisfaction.  Together, these elements 
produced an unusual sense of ‘calling’ in the health agents, which became an informal 
accountability mechanism, producing self-monitored responsiveness in service delivery. 
 
New standards of care evolved as a result of close interactions between individual health 
workers and their clients, mothers receiving health agents in the privacy of their homes.  The 
need to establish trust with clients prompted an expansion of the job into simple curative 
interventions such as removing stitches, treating wounds, taking sick children to hospital, as well 
as a range of socially supportive tasks such as cutting children’s hair, helping with childcare, or 
assisting with cooking or cleaning.   
 
Accountability systems relied in part upon building tremendous publicity and public interest in the 
program, resulting in exposure of any poor performance, but also in rewards (public prizes and 
celebrations) for successes.  The ‘self-expanding’ nature of the work, the way the job evolved 
into a mothers’ support system, created new public expectations from public sector workers.  In 
other words, health agents came to be held to account for new standards of care, including the 
demonstration of empathy, responsiveness and integrity. 
 
Source:  Judith Tendler and Sarah Freedheim,  ‘Trust in a Rent-Seeking World: Health and 
Government Transformed in Northeast Brazil’, World Development, vol. 22, no. 12 (1994), pp.  




The notion that self- and peer-imposed constraints and a sense of ‘organizational mystique’ 
should act as an informal accountability institution and produce raised standards is not new.
119  It 
is the basic rationale for the cultivation of elite work cultures around the civil service and other 
professions (such as law or medicine), where extremely difficult entry-level qualification tests, 
extended apprenticeships, and peer review of performance, are intended to perpetuate high 
performance standards.  What is new about cases such as health agents in Ceara is the inclusion 
of lower-level bureaucrats or front-line workers to the public service meritocracy, rather than the 
use of more conventional top-down accountability tools usually deployed to control this category 
of staff.   
 
These experiments come with organizational reforms typical of successful private-sector 
endeavors: the emphasis is on flexibility and client-centredness, a problem-solving approach 
rather than the delivery of centrally-determined products, and great publicity for innovations and 
successes.  The publicity is important for demonstrating just what standards of performance and 
outcomes should be expected of government employees.  It is creating new notions of trusteeship 
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in public workers that rely less upon self-assigned, elitist, and inevitably patronizing mandates 
and more upon explicit and publicly negotiated notions of the obligations of public service 
providers. 
 
Although there is a groundswell of public intolerance for corruption around the world, it is not 
always the case that more exacting standards and expectations of good governance are in 
evidence, particularly in relation to the behavior of politicians.  France’s Cour de Cassation ruled 
in October 2001 that, while still in office, President Jacques Chirac was not only immune from 
prosecution on charges of corruption, stemming from the period when he was mayor of Paris, but 
that he could even be questioned by investigators probing several cases of misappropriated public 
funds.  Older standards of accountability (which protect acting heads of state from prosecution) 
were applied on the question of answerability as well as enforceability.  And by dismissing the 
jurisdiction of the relevant horizontal channels of accountability – legal proceedings, 
administrative inquiries – the court had effectively placed all of the burden for checking abuse by 
power-holders on vertical channels of accountability.  They required French voters to throw Mr. 
Chirac out of office before there would be even a chance of him being held accountable.  The 
lawyer pursuing the case against Chirac argued that the judges had ‘in effect turned the French 
electorate into a jury’, and had ‘sent a clear message to the nation: you must decide whether the 
president should be pursued or whether to wait for another five years, which amounts to an 
amnesty’.  Unfortunately, as we have seen, electoral institutions are often very ineffective in 
achieving this type of accountability.  According to an analyst from the French BVA polling 
agency, which has measured Chirac’s continued appeal despite the negative publicity he has 




This last example demonstrates that a precondition for accountability institutions to function 
properly is shared social expectations about propriety in the behavior of politicians and 
administrators.  Unsurprisingly, cultivating a culture of raised expectations about public-sector 
probity, and raising awareness about citizens’ rights to demand this, is often the first step in 
donor or civil society efforts to support accountability reforms. 
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Part V – CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Much of the contemporary concern with accountability failures, particularly in developing 
countries, is driven by the way they drain resources for growth and development.  This Human 
Development Report moves beyond this to investigate the implications of accountability failures 
for social justice, equality and poverty reduction.   
 
This chapter has delineated the relationships between accountability failures and the deprivations 
suffered by the poor and other socially excluded groups in order to demonstrate how the 
improved functioning of institutions of public and private sector oversight might promote human 
development.   
 
But it has also argued that even were conventional accountability institutions to work with much 
greater efficiency, a number of biases in the conduct of public servants and the terms of access to 
public resources would persist unchecked, and continue to reproduce social exclusions.  This 
reflects, among other things, the problem of the weak voice of the poor and other socially 
marginalised groups, who have difficulty in making accountability institutions – from legislatures 
to court rooms to the office of the auditor-general – respond directly to them, or indirectly to 
provide redress for the injustices they experience.   
 
Another problem highlighted in this chapter is that spatial reorganisations of power – 
globalisation and localisation – are endowing old actors as different as multinational corporations 
and traditional authorities with new powers to affect the life-chances of the poor, yet leaving 
conventional state-based institutions of regulation and oversight underprepared to control their 
actions. 
 
The persistence of these problems has triggered a wide variety of experiments to increase 
accountability.  Some of these are simply the diffusion of well-known mechanisms, such as anti-
corruption commissions and auditors-general, while others represent a redesign of conventional 
institutions, such as reform to electoral systems to bind political leaders more closely to the 
wishes of their constituents.   
 
It must be borne in mind that these kinds of reforms must be part of any agenda for enhancing the 
ability of ordinary people to hold the powerful to account.  But the focus of this chapter is on the 
emergence of a new accountability agenda, the defining characteristics of which are summed up 
the thematic headings under which the empirical case material has been presented: 
 
New Roles for New Actors in Accountability Relationships 
 
  Efforts by citizens to engage directly in horizontal accountability functions which have been 
found wanting; for instance in financial auditing (through participatory budget analysis and 
review), or legal review of public decisions (through Public Interest Litigation). 
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  Civil society creativity in promoting the foundation of new official accountability institutions, 
particularly at the international level. 
 
  Sensitivity to a need for internal accountability from the private actors (NGOs, political 
parties, religious bodies) which have spearheaded efforts to hold states and firms to account, 
and from the international public actors, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN, that 
are promoting accountability improvements in developing countries. 
 
New Methods across New Jurisdictions 
 
  A simultaneous globalisation and localisation of accountability jurisdictions.  Globalized 
jurisdictions compensate for the failure of national accountability institutions to control the 
human rights or environmental abuses of public officials or multinational corporations.  
Localised jurisdictions facilitate much more detailed and intimate oversight functions and 
more locally appropriate enforcement mechanisms 
 
  Novel methods of investigating abuses of power and demanding answers of power-holders, 
methods inspired by the new spatial arenas (local, global, and the de-territorialized world of 
cyberspace) within which accountability struggles are being fought. 
 
New Standards of Accountability 
 
  More exacting standards of accountability that revise expectations of the process integrity and 
performance outcomes for which power-holders should be held to account.  There is an 
incipient sense that democratic accountability must be judged according to substantive, not 
just procedural criteria – in other words, that power-holders must be held to account for 
enabling human development by promoting social justice and equality. 
 
It is, however, important to recognise that this is not a coordinated, or even internally consistent, 
agenda.  It is emerging from a wide variety of spontaneous initiatives the world over.  It has 
dramatic implications both for the way we think about accountability, and for contemporary 
approaches to promoting good governance.   
 
The initiatives described in this chapter, many of which are elaborated further in this Report, 
considerably challenge the classic distinctions through which accountability is defined and with 
which this chapter began.  Citizen engagement in horizontal institutions of accountability, for 
instance, is blurring the conventional distinction between vertical and horizontal accountability 
mechanisms.  Efforts to augment citizen voice in planning, auditing, or determining service 
delivery standards are expanding space for ex ante accountability rather than confining them to ex 
post accountability.  And new, more exacting standards of accountability, combined with a 
decreasing pubic tolerance for weak enforceability, are raising awareness (if not yet closing the 
gap) between de jure and de facto accountability. 
 
Almost all of the initiatives surveyed above put a great premium on voice as the animator of both 
demand- and supply-side accountability efforts.  But it would be a mistake to draw a policy 
conclusion that accountability for human development can exist only when the poor are directly 
involved in mechanisms for checking abuses of power.  Such a conclusion would not only be           Page 87 of 88 
   
unrealistic, it would also be unfair: it, in effect, asks the poor themselves to shoulder an 
intolerable burden, and insists that those who have the most to lose from challenging power, and 
who have the fewest defences, should take the greatest risks.  Improving accountability is a slow 
and frustrating process, and until it begins to pay off, the poor will inevitably have to find ways 
of coping with the existing reality.  And an important feature of the survival strategies of people 
operating sometimes on the margins of society is to keep a low profile in order to avoid having 
what are often semi-legal means of maintaining their livelihoods taken away from them in 
reprisals against their attempts to play a more active role in governance.  This highlights not just 
the need for the poor to develop alliances amongst other social sectors, but also the continued 
relevance of investing in the sense of trusteeship and commitment to impartial and responsible 




The Risks of A la Carte Accountability Systems 
 
Finally, it is essential to grasp the implications of an essential characteristic of the new 
accountability agenda: its ad hoc and fragmented nature.  While informal approaches can be as 
effective – if not more so – than officially planned strategies, and the combined effect of such a 
diverse range of niche forms of accountability can prove more flexible than the monolithic 
structures associated conventional state-dominated systems, it is also true that they can leave 
important gaps unfilled.   
 
The move from conventional state-dominated accountability systems to an uncoordinated set of 
overlapping initiatives in fact parallels some of the changes that have characterised the 
manufacturing industry in recent years.  The analogy is not as far-fetched as it sounds.  Where 
manufacturers once themselves fabricated almost all of the parts of which their products were 
made, delivering to clients a complete system, they now increasingly assemble products from 
readily available components, supplied by a wide range of firms, each with its own specialised 
niche.  Accountability, similarly, used to be something delivered, fully assembled, by the state – 
through its regulatory agencies, courts, bureaucratic reporting systems, and so on.  The functions 
of answerability and enforcement came from the same supplier, so to speak, even if through 
different subsidiaries.  But these days the components of accountability systems are contracted 
out to different firms altogether: one getting the contract for enforcement, another for 
answerability.  The old anti-trust regulations separating suppliers in the horizontal and vertical 
sectors of the accountability industry have been effectively abolished.  And the cross-border 
restrictions to the promotion of accountability are being lifted progressively, just as they are in 
international trade. 
 
While it would be foolish not to recognise the extent to which all this functional differentiation 
and flexible specialisation can increase the productivity of accountability institutions, neither can 
we downplay the risks.  Just as when a computer-buyer purchases her laptop, printer, scanner 
modem and mouse from different suppliers, and finds that they are not fully compatible – and 
even worse, the support contract does not extend to the essential task of making the components 
work together – so do people in the new world of dispersed accountability-provision find 
themselves caught in situations where it is difficult to know where to point the finger of blame, or           Page 88 of 88 
   
where to go for redress.  As one critique of the operational implications of multi-level governance 
in the European Union put it:  
 
A further challenge to some applications of subsidiarity stems from the requirement of 
accountability.  Subsidiarity can prevent the public from placing responsibility for actions 
on particular officials, who may appeal to vague and complex notions of comparative 
effectiveness and limited room for independent action. Such responses hinder accountable 
government.
121   
 
Moreover, the fragmented nature of today’s accountability systems are even more prone to 
market failure than private-sector activity.  Where business suppliers will normally step in to fill 
an under-served market, responding to the price signals that accompany increased demand, in the 
process of producing accountability there is little to prevent an oversupply of voice-related 
initiatives, and an undersupply of enforcement.  Demand goes unfulfilled.  
 
Above all, just as the global market provides hundreds of brands of breakfast cereal for those 
with the money to buy them, and not nearly enough drinking water for those without, it will take 
conscious interventions – by the state as well as other actors – to correct for the failure of new 
modes of accountability provision to work for the poor.  It is not enough to expect the promising 
but incomplete profusion of initiatives surveyed in this chapter to reach a pro-poor equilibrium.  
The emerging agenda must be actively shaped if it is to have a positive impact on human 
development.   
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